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CHAPTER I
THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND ITS PRINCIPLES

Periodically, when evil conditions reach a climax, a rumble of discontent is heard from the heart of the masses.

Sometimes this rumble

becomes an avalanche and sweeps all before it as during the French Revolution; again, the rumble moves along evenly and forces the evil conditions
to right themselves.

Whichever is the case, the periodic stirrings of

the people inevitably result in change, and ttlis change, rightly or
wrongly, is referred to as progress and the people who advocate it as
progressives.
The term "progressive" means different things at different times.
According to tne dictionary, it is something or someone "aiming at or
encouraging advancement toward maturity or completion, or toward a better
state." 1

That general definition is well suited for our purposes.

Any-

thing more specific is dated for thdse things for w'nich tne "Progressives"
stood in 1912 would now be considered conservative.

As this chapter

develops, the aims and purposes of the Progressive party will be set
down.

It is with these in mind that we use the term "progressive" as

relating to 1912.
The progressive movement did not begin in 1912 nor did it end with
the defeat of the Progressive party in that year.

Within the last few

years, Henry A. Wallace, speaking of the liberal wing of the Democratic
1

The Funk and Wagnalls College Standard Dictionary, Funk and Wagnalls
Company, New York, 1930, 469
1

2

party whose acknowledged leader he was and of his defeat for renomination
as vice-president of the U:dted States, said
been defeated and will not be.
reborn.

rtthe liberal cause has not

It is merely in the process of being

T'ne cause cannot die no matter what may happen temporarily to

certain individuals·" 2 Irrespective of party affiliations, that is an
excellent expression of the significance of progressivism.
is the embodiment of the fundamental measures

an~

The movement

principles of reform

that have been advocated for many years by all political parties.
For many years, America operated, as did the rest of the world,
on the principle of

11

laissez-faire 11 •

Everyone, including the mass of the

people, felt thet the less interference that there was by the government
the better off the country would be.

For America, this attitude was a

reflection·of tne fact that this country still possessed a frontier.

There

governments were simple because conditions were simple and people were
unable to comprehend the need for a more complex government anywhere.
The Civil War marked a change in that attitude. 3
The Civil War diminished agrarian influence in Congress by the
defeat of the South.

At the same time, the country• s frontier rapidly

disappeared and railroads and industrial corporations grew to tremendous
size.

These factors gave impetus to the progressive movement.

There

was no longer an escape valve in the west when conditions became too bad
2 Article in The Chicago Daily News, July 29, 1944, 3.
3 Benjamin p.-n9 Witt, The-FTOgressive Movement, The Macmillan Company,
New York, 1915, and Kenneth w. Heckler, Insurgency, Personalities and
Politics of the Taft Era, Columbia University Press, New York, 194V.

The account or-t~ackground is taken largely from De Witt, Chapter I
and Hechler, Chapter II.

3
in the east.

And the growing business interests saw in the Republican

party an opportunity to use the government for their benefit.
control of the politicians and bent them to their will.

They gained

They received

huge land grants and franchises from the government in great number.

And

they-made substantial inroads on the natural resources of the nation that
should have been the heritage of all.

At the same time, they kept the

government from interfering in their activities.
And while the corporations were becoming rich, the masses of the
people were facing new social and economic problems.
ing in size and number.
with the factories.

The individual worker could no longer compete

Men became economic chattels forced to live in con-

gested cities and to work in unhealthy factories.
was low.

Cities were increas-

Hours were long and pay

At first, the people did not tum to their government for relief.

They still believed that government interference was bad and that the
government was not to be concerned with their problems.
unions to fight capital.

But the fight was too unequal.

They formed
The government

fought on the side of capital.
The idea that relief from oppression by the business interests could
be obtained through government intervention gained ground slowly.

One of.

the groups which promoted the idea was the "Muckrakersn with their social
literature.

And when the people were converted to this idea, they found

that they could no longer force their government to their will.

They came

to the government which they had made, intending to use it to curb the
abuses of capital, and they found that it was already in use by that self-

4
same capital.

Then the people tried to correct the abuses within the

government itself.
duced.

In response to popular clamor, civil service was intro-

In an attempt to keep corrupt influences from government, laws

for direct primaries were enacted, lobbies were regulated, corrupt prac-.
tices acts were passed, and the initiative, referend~ and recall were
introduced.

Then, the government, being more responsive to the demands

of the people, passed laws regulating the railroads and the corporations,
and providing for social legislation.
This is an over-all picture of the progressive movement.
gressive party was but a part of this.

The Pro-

It was only one of the many waves

of insurgency that swept across the country after the Civil War.

Two of

the previous outbreaks had found expression in the Greenback and the
Populist parties. 4 These were eventually incorporated into the progressiv
element of the Democratic party.

5

It is natural that the Democrats

should have·attracted the reformers first because, as the

par~out

of

power, they found much to criticise and change in the administrations.
The Greenback party appeared on the scene in 1876 with a platform
that advocated the unlimited use of paper money "based on the faith and
resources of the nation", and the withdrawal of all bank currency.

They

held a national convention that year and placed Peter Cooper in the field
as presidential candidate.

The

par~lost

its separate identity after the

election but the dissatisfied elements that combined to make it later

4

Ray Stannard Baker,

LXXII, no. 1, 60
5 De Witt, 28.

The Meaning of Insurgency", The American M"agazine,
(May, 1911).
11

5
found their way into the other movements coming into being at that time. 6
It was the Populist party that caug!lt up most of the loose ends of
progressive sentiment in 1891.

The party was the result of the union of

several organizations which had come into existence as a result of unrest
among the people.

It included the Grange, the Fanners' Alliance, the

Knignts of Labor and various other fann and labor organizations.
the party nominated James B. Weaver i'or the presidency.

In 1892,

The platform that

they adopted was very forward-looking anci included the direct election of
Senators, government control of public utilities, and postal savings
banks.

The party also advocated certain financial reforms peculiar to it,

including the free coinage of silver, increased issue of paper money,
and the direct distribution of this money to the people without the intervention of the national banks.
election.

The party made a strong showing in the

In 1896, the Democratic nominee for president, William Jennings

Bryan, received t~e support of the Populists. 7
In 1896, the progressive wing of the Democratic party gained control
and nominated Bryan for the presidency.
many discordant elements.

He gathered under his bannar

Al thougn his platform is remembered chiefly

for its free silver plank, there were other measures advocated that were
of greater importance in the long run.

These included the control of cor-

porations, income tax, and direct legislation.

It is the first instance of

such liberalism in a platfon:n of one of the major parties.
6

But Bryan's

The World Book Encyclopedia, 6th ed., VII, "The Greenback Party",
Chicago, 191J; 2956=2957.
7 Ibid., XIII, 11 The Populist party11 , 5740.

6
defeat was a serious blow to progressivism in the Democratic party, for,
with the rejection of bimetallism, the rest of the platform was discredited
also. 8 Bryan continued his control for a time, but by 1904 the Democrats
had lost their peculiarly progressive nature. 9
Despite the fact that the Democrats

attr~cted

the reformers in

greatest number, the Republicans were not without their farseeing men.
The Civil War was still a vivid memory when the Liberal Republicans disrupted the party in 1872.

Still later, the "Mugwumps" revolted against

James G. Blaine. 10

The former movement was the more significant since

it actually resulted

~

the formation of a third party.

'rnis was formed

essentially in protest of the administration's severe policy toward the
South but it did number among its members such a staunch supporter of
honest government as Carl Schurz.
Thus it can be seen that the progressives of both parties struggled
against corruption within their parties and fought to promote progressive
legislation.

The Progressive party was one aspect of t11e movement.

It

enlisted all types of people--social reformers, champions of the rights
of labor, and scions of the business world advocating a greater sense of
responsibility to the public--and spread throughout the country.

Its

battleground was largely the city hall and the state Capitol in the beginning but it eventually reached also into the halls of congress. 11

8 De Witt, 33-34.

•

Is the Republican Party Breaking up? The Story
of the Insurgent west", The American Magazine, LXIX, no. 4, 438
(February, 1910).
10 Hechler, 11.
11 Ibid. , 24.

9 Ray Stannard Baker,

11

7
As early as 1897, Mayor Samuel M. Jones of Toledo, Ohio was advocating
equal opportunit! for all and attempting to provide just that by abolishing
the private-contract system of doing city work and by supporting the public
\.

ownership of public utilities.
governo~

At about the same time, Hazen S. Pingree,

of Mlchigan, was attempting to introduce the direct

more effective railroad taxation in his state.

and

prim~

In.l904, WilliamS. u•Ren

finally obtained a primary law in Oregon that included the famed "Oregon
Plan. 11
The progressive members of Congress were called "Insurgentsn.

Tnis

word was little used before the election of 1908 and did not come into
common parlance until after Taft was inaugurated in March of 1909 according
to the Insurgents themselves.

The word was carried over from international

law where it is used to describe the. state of armed rebellion preceding
recognized belligerency. 13

And it 1rell expressed the position of the

progressives, particularly in the Republican party, from 1909 to 1912.
The fight in the Senate became pronounced--though not successful--in the
fight over the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Bill in 1909.
Representatives, the ouster of

11

14

In the House of

Uncle Joe 11 Cannon as Speaker in March of

1910 was the work of tne Republican Insurgents in league with the Demo'_\

crats. 1.5

From that time, the fight went on in Congress between the

Insurgents and the •Stand-pattersn or Conservatives.
12 Fred E. Haynes, Tnird Party Movements Since the Civil war with Special
Reference to Iowa, The State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa-city,
Iowa, 1916;-4IQ:417.
13 Hechler, 12, citing The Three Friends, 166 u. s. 1.
14 William Francis Raney, Wisconsin, a Story of Progress, prentice-Hall
Inc., New York, 1940, 304.
-1.5 Hechler, 420-421.

8
By the end of 1910, the principles of progressivism had become a
cause.

The term progressive began to be spelled with a capital

11

P11 •

These men then began to think of banding together in some sort of formal
organization to promote progressive legislation in the various states as
well as in the nation.

When Taft became "persona non grata" with the

progressive Republicans, the need for such an organization became more
pronounced.

Finally, after nearly a year of discussion, Robert La Follette,

Senator from Wisconsin, drafted a Declaration of Principles during the
holiday recess of 1910.

After some changes, suggested by Senators Bourne

and Bristow, the declaration was mailed to those members of the two houses
of Congress who were progressives and also to the leading progressives
in the various states.

When the next session of Congress met, the organi-

zation that had been so long discussed was founded. 16
On January 21, 1911, the progressive Republicans gathered at Robert
La Follette• s Washington home and established the orga.'1ization known as
the National Progressive Republican League. 17

Its purpose was to work

for simplification of the agencies of government and

11

the purification of

its working so it will reflect and be responsible to the popular will." 18
The first officers were Bourne, president; Frederic

c.

Howe, secretary;

and Charles R. Crane, treasurer. 19
The Progressives felt that the evils of government were due to the

16 Robert M. La Follette, La Follette's Autobiography, The Robert M. La
Follette Company, Madison, Wiscons~n, 1913, 495.
17. Ibid., 495-496.
18 ~rs of Edward P. Costigan relating to the Progressive Movement in
Colorado,

1902-19!7, Colin B. Goodykoorrtz, Ed.,

un~vers~ty

of Colorado,
Sub-

1941, Letter of J. Bourne to E. p. Costigan, Feb. 14, 1911, 154.
se uently ref rred to as
a
11 tt

Cost~

Papers.

9
complexity of political agencies, wnich caused government to fall under
the control of special interests.
Declaration of Principles.

As remedies, they presented their

This included direct primaries, direct elec-

tion of United states Senators,

amend~ents

to state constitutions pro-

viding for the initiative, referendum, and recall, a thorough-going
-

corrupt practices act, and direct election of delegates to national conventions with an opportunity for the voter to express a choice as to
candidates. 20 With these reforms achieved, it was the hope of the Progres
sives that

11

the people themselves will be able to purge our politics of

the ascendancy of special privilege and bring about such other economic
and social reforms as they desire. n 21
It was tne plan of the Progressives to run cm1didates against the
conservatives where ever possible.
Republican party, however.

They were not going to leave the

As can be seen, the platform they advocated

stressed political rather than social reform.
the Socialists.

In this tney differed from

They did, however, sponsor some economic measures.

They

favored a lowered tariff, tax reform including an income tax, reform of
the currency, a postal savings bank, parcel post, conservation, regulation
of public utilities, and pure food and drug and public health laws. 22
After the foundation of the Progressive League, pressure was brought
to bear by progressives throughout the nation on the members to put
for«ard a candidate for the presidency.
20
21
22

On the thirtieth of April, 1911,

Ibid., 495.
Letter of Bourne to Cost~, Costigan Papers, 154.
Ray Stannard Baker, 11 The Meani.'lg of Insurgency", The American :Magazine,
LXXII, no. 1, 62 (May, 1911)

10
the progressives met in Senator Bourne's committee room to decide upon
a sui table man. 23
was decided upon.

The topic was discussed and Robert M. La Follette
When he was assured that no other candidate would be

put forth and that he would have sufficient financial support, he accepted
the nomination. 24
In July, La Follette's campaign got actively under way.

Progressive

headquarters were opened in Washington, clubs were organized in a number
of the states, thousands of circular letters were sent out, and the
services of a corps of speakers obtained.

Men like Gifford Pinchot, Louis

Brandeis, Willia.11 Allen White, and Francis J. Heney supported the cause. 25
In October, a meeting was held in Chicago attended by approximately
three hundred Progressives and arranged by Walter L. Houser, La Follette's
campaign manager.

This meeting endorsed La Follette. 26 Many newspapers,

especially in the Middle West, and the majority of the magazines of the
nation came to the support of the progressive cause and its candidate. 27
Enthusiasm for the movement became marked.
Before continuing the historf of the development of the Progressive
party, it might be well to look at its official position up to this time.
On September 9, 1911, the progressive Republican Conference was held at
Montrose, Colorado.

There it was stated that the Progressives in Colorado

were "undertaking to restore genuine representative government.''

The

23 La Follette, 516.
24 Ibid., 519.
25 Outiook, "The Insurgent League 11 , vol. 97, 245 (editorial on February
4, 1911).
26 La Follette, 532, also Costigan Papers, 175.
27 .Ray Stannard Baker, "Is the Republican Party Brealdng Up? The Story
of the Insurgent West", The American Magazine, LXIX, no.
Februa
1910 •
---- ----

4, 435

~

---------------------------------------------------------------------.
11
methods to be used should be the establishment of honest elections through
a thorough corrupt practices act, a sane and effective civil service law,
the recall of unworthy public officials, the Australian ballot and a
primary election law.

In regard to economic reform, the Colorado Pro-

gressives insisted on regulation and control of all public service corporations and their elimination from political activity through the proper
application of a public utilities law with strong anti-pass and antipreference provisions.

The movement sought more equal distribution of

wealth through the enlargement of the bonds of human rights and opportunities.

It favored compensatory damage for victims of industrial acci-

dents, an eight-hour day for women, and control and curb of monopoly, an
equalized tariff, and the fair division of the burdens and expenses of
government.

A summary of the Progressive stand was given in the words:

"It (the party) particularly contends that the conservation of men, women,
and children--their lives, their liberties, and their opportunities--is
the predominant conse~ation policy in the world." 28
When the Progressives met in Chicago, they presented their stand to
the nation in the Chicago Platform wnich they adopted on October 16, 1911.
In this, they restated their foremost idea.

T'ne platform said:

"The

progressive movement is a struggle to wrest the control of government in
the nation and states from the representatives of special privilege and
restore it to the control of the people." 29
28
29

The platform also supported

Costigan Papers, doc. 25, (Montrose Address of E. P. Costigan) 165-166.
Ibid., 11 The Chicago Platform of Progressives", doc. 30, 175, citing
The ~hicago Record Herald, October 17, 1911.
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the regulation of trusts but was very careful to bring out the fact that
the party favored "constructive legislation, not destructive litigation." 30
Finally, it favored the use of the initiative and referendum and the
direct election of representatives to national and state conventions.31
Returning now to the history of the Progressive party, we find that
in the late autumn and winter of 1911 La Follette made an extended speak-

ing tour of Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois and was greeted with great enthusiasm. 32

But already there was a turning from him to the man who had

long been considered the focal point of progressivism in the Republican
party, Theodore Roosevelt.

By the middle of January, 1911, men like the

Pinchots, Medill McCormick, and William Flinn, who had given substantial
monetary aid to La Follette, were giving their endorsements and their cash
to the Roosevelt

11

boom". 33

The opportunity for publicly disavowing

La Follette came after he gave a long a partially incoherent speech at a
banquet in Philadelphia on February 2.
was suffering from over-work.

It was obvious that the Senator

Shortly after this, Pincnot and the other

previously mentioned leading contributors to the Progressive treasury
announced that La Follettess physical condition made it
to continue as a candidate.

impossibl~

for him

The way was now open for Roosevelt. 34

It is not our purpose to go into the justice of the treatment of
La Follette by the mean who had at first supported him nor of the position
30 Ibid., 176, citation as above.
31 GeOrge Henry Payne, The Birth of the New Party or Progressive Democracy,
J. L. Nichols and Company, Napervffie-;Illinois7""1~11, 101.
32 De Witt, 76.
33 Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, a Biography, Harcourt, Brace and
Company, New York, 1931, 554, citing Clapp Committee, vol. II, 541;
1184-1185.
De itt
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of Roosevelt in this matter.

It is sufficieltt to know that the change in

allegiance came by January of 1912 before La Follette• s collapse. 35
Toward the middle of the month, Roosevelt turned his attention to a means
of getting into the fray in such a way that his entrance would seem to
be in answer to public demand. 36 He decided on the eighteenth of January
and the method was to bea letter from some of the governors of the more
progressive states in the nation. 37 Meanwhile, headquarters to support
the Roosevelt campaign for the Republican nomination had been set up in
Chicago by Alexander H. Revell on January 31.

Revell visited Oyster Bay,

Roosevelt•s home, and then called a meeting of the governors saying that
he was sure that Roosevelt would respond to an invitation to carry the
Progressive banner in the Republican National Convention. 38

This invi-

tation was to be the public demand needed by Roosevelt.
Seven governors attended the Revell meeting--Stubbs of Kansas,
Osborne of Michigan, Aldrich of Nebraska, Hadley of Missouri, Bass of New
Hampshire, Glasscock of West Virginia, and carey of Wyoming.

On February

10, they sent a message to Roosevelt asking him to lead the Progressive

:

movement. 39 On February 13, Roosevelt announced that he was considering
the call of the governors and on the twenty-fourth, he accepted their invitation to lead the movement.

40

s. Temple) to Gifford Pinchot, January 3, 1912 and Reply,
12, 1912, Costigan Papers, 181-182.

35 Letter of (J.
Janu~

36 Pringle, 555.

37 Harold Howland, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (volume 47 of The
Chronicles of America Series, Al1en~n~), Yale Univers1ty Press,
New ffaven, conn. 1921, 209.
38 Victo.r Rosewater, B<lkstage in 1912, The Inside Story of the Split
Republican Convent1on, Dorrance and Company, Inc., PhiTaaaiph1a, 1932,
41, citing Philadelphia North American, February 1, 1912.
Payne, 52.
osewat r

~~------------------------------------------~
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...
It was Roosevelt's original intention to battle only for the Republican
nomination for the presidency against Taft in the National Convention.
There seems· to have been no thought of a third party early in 1912. 41
From Februar,r until the convention met in June, Roosevelt and Taft hurled
hard words at each other and the campaign was every bit as bitter as any
that took place between the candidates of different political parties.
rt became obvious, however, that Roosevelt was fighting a losing battle
because many states were choosing two rival sets of delegates and Taft•s
followers controlled the seating of these disputed delegations. 42

Thus,

by the end of May, Roosevelt's utterances were threatening the creation of
a third party if his candidacy were rejected. 43
The Republican National Convention met in Chicago from June 18 to
June 22, 1912.

Most of its attention was given to the question of seating

delegates. 44 Roosevelt, himself, was in Chicago to lead the fight for
his candidacy but to no avail.

On the night of June 19, it became obvious

that the Roosevelt delegates were not to be seated.

At two o'clock the

following morning, before a crowd of shouting, sweating men in the Florentine Room of the Congress Hotel, Roosevelt made the announcement that was
to split the Republican party and result in the election of Woodrow Wilson.
He announced that, if the convention would not accept his delegates, he
would not allow his name to be put in nomination and, thus, a new party

41 Pringle, 556-557.
42 Ibid. , 563.
43 I'6Id.' 562.

44 Wfiiiam Jennings Bryan, A Tale of Two Conventions, Funk and Wagnalls
and Company, New York, 1'9'1.2,""!-'89".-

15
was born. 45

As soon a.s Taft was nominated, with most of the Roosevelt

delegates refusing to vote, his followers left the convention. 46 On
that same night, Jillle 22, a meeting was held in Orchestra Hall at which the
delegates pledged their support to Roosevelt. 47

He, in an address to the

group, urged them to return to their homes and encourage progressive sentiment and then come together in August for a convention of their own.48
The Progressive party conventionmet in Chicago on Monday, August
1912.

Albert J. Beveridge, former Senator from Indiana, was made temporary

chairman and gave the keynote speech.
men.

5,

He was later made permanent chair-

On August 6, Roosevelt gave a speech known as his "Confession of

Faith".

The following day, the permanent organization was effected,

committeest reports were adopted, and the platform accepted without opposition.

Theodore Roosevelt was nominated for the presidency and Hiram

Johnson of california for the vice-presidency.
convention was adjourned that evening.

Both men accepted and the

The whole affair had been conducted

amid the wildest enthusiasm with the singing of

h~mms

and patriotic songs

and great demonstrations. 49
Rooseveltt s "Confession of Faith

11

he rom1dly condemned the old parties as

was a lengthy document in which
11

husks, with no real souls within

either, divided on artificial lines, boss-ridden and privilege controlled,
45
46
47
48
49

Payne, 19-26, Also Pringle, 565,
B~, 82.
Pringle, 565.
De Witt, 83.
Bryan, 248-249.

citing~

York Times, June 20, 1912.
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each a jumble of incongrous elements, and neither daring to speak out
wisely and fearlessly what should be said on the vital issues of the day."
He proposed to change all "t;his and "boldly to face the real and
questions of the day",

11

5

gre~t

to raise aloft a standard to which all honest men

can repair, and under which all can fight, no matter what their past
political differences", and

11

to put fort11 a platform which ••• shall be

a contract with the people ••• and ••• we shall hold ourselves under honorable
obligation to fulfil every promise it contains as loyally as if it were
actually enforceable under the penalties of the law." 51
The nconfession" continued to express the views that went into the
making of the Progressive party platform.

Roosevelt stated that the

political bosses and the privileged interests were with Taft and Wilson and
wanted to defeat the Progressives.

He insisted that neither the Democrats

nor the Republicans were to be trusted in the promises they made.

And the

speech contained a suggestion of paternalism in the passage that it was his
aim nto use the government as an efficient agency for the practical better-

ment of social and economic conditions throughout the land." 52
As far as actual promises were concerned, Roosevelt wanted a national
law for Presidential primaries, a corrupt practices act, the initiative,
referendum, and the recall.

He desired the people to have the right to

interpret the constitution and this idea was incorporated in the party platform in the form of a plank advocating an easier and more expeditious method

50 Ibid., 250.
51 IEid., 250.
52

This summary of Roosevelt's speech is taken from Bryan's
report in his story of the convention, 250-278, and, henceforth, only
direct quotations will be foot-noted.
Ibid., 252-253.
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of amending the Federal constitution.

53 Also on the political question,

Roosevelt and the Progressives advocated woman suffrage.
For the working man there were many reforms suggested.

Industry was

to publish wage scales and such other data as would be of public interest,
such as diseases, deaths, and injuries due to occupation, for inspection by
the public and

co~~ttees

of the workers concerned.

Furthermore, minimum

wages were to be established, sta.."'ldards of safety and sanitation were to be
enforced, and compensation for industrial accidents and deaths were to be
paid.

Child and woman labor was to be prohibited or regulated and was

never to be night work.

Finally, hours were to be regulated to the extent

that women were not to work more than forty-eight hours a week and all
workers were to be entitled to one

d~

a week of rest.

There were the usual kind words for the farmer and suggestions were
made for improVing his lot.

None of these were very positive, however,

consisting as they did mainly of

suggestions~that

the farmer's life and

that of his wife be made more attractive and more profitable.

It was also

suggested that the Country Life Commission, recently abandoned, be revived.
Roosevelt devoted more time in his speech to a discussion of the trusts
and their control.
plary.
it. n

He pointed to his own record in this respect as exem-

He maintained that "our aim is to control business, not to strangle

54.

He felt that "the only effective way in which to regulate the

trusts is through the exercise of the collective power of our people as a

53
54

Ibid., 281.
262.

rora.,

jP
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whole through the governmental agencies established by the Constitution
for this very purpose."

55

He suggested strengthening the Anti-Trust Law

and also setting up a commission to regulate and control all the great
industrial concerns engaged in interstate transactions.
The Progressives and their standard-bearer favored a protective
tariff but one "approached from the standpoint of the interests of the whole
people, and not as a bundle of preferences to be given to favored individuals."

56

A com:nission of non-partisan experts was to be selected to

examine the question of the tariff.

This commission would then make

suggestions to Congress which would then make the necessary reVisions
schedule by schedule rather than treating the whole tariff as a single bill.
An improvement in the national currency system was advocated.

The

issuance of money by private agencies was deplored as harmful and unscientific.

It was felt that the government alone should issue money and that

the currency should be sufficiently elastic to meet the changing needs of
the country.
Roosevelt also advocated the maintainance of the army and navy at a
high pitch of efficiency.

He wanted the Panama Canal fortified and felt

that we should not have to pay tolls on our own coastwise traffic that passed
through it.

As far as other foreign affairs, were concerned, he favored

friendly relations with all nations.
Finally, both Roosevelt and the platform devoted a great deal of time
and space to conservation.

55
56

Ibid., 265.
Ibid., 268.

It was urged that all natural resources that

19
were not already in the hands of private interests be retained for the
use of posterity.

Waste land should be reclaimed and the use of natural

resources, such as water power, should be rigorously supervised by the
states or the nation.
The Progressive platform was a reflection of Roosevelt's speech.
It did, however, contain some additional planks. 57
for public recall of judicial decisions.

One of these provided

It also held for a limited use

of injunctions in labor disputes and the establishment of a Department of
Labor with a seat in tne Cabi:t:et.

The platform advo:.eated a graduated

inheritance tax and supported the Constitutional admend;'!lent then pending
establishing an income tax.

Finally, there was the usual support for a

soldiers' bonus and the usual criticism of the administration's use of
the civil service law.
After the enthusiasm of the conventions and the bitterness of the
Taft-Roosevelt pre-convention quarrei, the actual campaign was anti-climax
and roused little interest.

The most exciting thing that happened was

a shot fired at Roosevelt in Milwaukee on October 14, 1912.

Roosevelt

acted very nobly in the situation, sa7ing the culprit from a lynching and
going on with his scheduled address. 58
But all the fine promises of the platform and all the heroics of
Milwaukee were unavailing.

After the uninspiring campaign, the voters

went to the polls and the results were as had been expected.

Woodrow

Wilson was elected with 435 electoral college votes to 88 for Roosevelt

57 Ibid., 279-295.
58 Pr1ngle, 568-570.
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and only 8 for Taft.

The popular vote was not as one-sided, however.

Wilson received 6,286,124 votes; Roosevelt 4,126:t020; and Taft 3,483,922. 59
As can be seen, the two Republican candidates polled more votes than did
Wilson, but the split in the party defeated them.

Moreover, there were

many progressives who preferred to vote for Wilson rather than Roosevelt
for the Democratic candidate was also considered a progressive.

Because

of this, also, Roosevelt did not gain any strength from the progressive
Democrats as he had hoped to. 60
After the election, Roosevelt withdrew his support from the Progressive
party and, in its 1912 version, it all but went out of existence.

Its

death knell, on a national scale, was sounded by Roosevelt's refusal to
run in 1916, although it did continue to have some life in the various
states. 61 But there its existence was more of a substantiation of the
claim that the progressive spirit is never dead than any formal carry-over
of the Progressive party of 1912.

59 Ibid., 570.
&J "De'Witt, 86-87.
61

Pringle, 570.
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CHAPTER II
LOOKING AT CAREERS
Having viewed the progressive movement, we can now turn our attention
to the two men who were its leaders in 1912.

Before looking at their

snecific records on some of the major problems of the day, it might be wise
to take a bird's eye view of their careers up to the point where we find
them engaged in the heated campaign of 1912.

Here, as in all subsequent

chapters, we will begin with a consideration of Theodore Roosevelt.
Theodore Roosevelt was born on October 27, 1858, the second child
and older son of Theodore Roosevelt, Sr., of New York and :Martha Bulloch
Roosevelt of Georgia.

The boy was born in his father's home on then-

fashionable East Twentieth .Street and h.sd the advantages of wealth, travel,
and fine education in his youth.

All, however, was not easy for him for

he had to overcome the handicap of a frail body and weak eyes.

His fight

ac:::ainst his nhysical c1isabilities is too well-known to recount.

Having

cvercome his disabilities, Roosevelt matriculated at Harvard and was graduated from there in June, 1880.

It is from that date that we follow his

political career. l
Throughout his life, Roosevelt was a great believer in doing things
rather than just talking and this characteristic was one of the things
which turned him to politics as a career.
l

He wanted to take nart in

This paragraph is a s~~ary of Pringle, Chapters I to IV, l-53.
21
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everything that was going on and that incluceci civic affairs in his communit •
He wa11ted to be one of the governing class and if that necessitated going
into nolitics he would go into politics despite his friends' objections to
the tyoe of men with whom he would have to associ~te.

Roosevelt was very

definite about this himself for he later said that he did not enter politics
nto benefit other peonle, but (as a means) of getting for myself a privilege
to which I was entitled in common with other people." 2 Any other course
would have been inconsistent with the character of the man who said:

"The

nrime thing that every man who takes an interest in nolitics should remember is that he must act, and not merely criticize the 3~Ctions of others • 11 3
Once Roosevelt's interest was aroused, he promntly took steps to make
himself a nart of the political organization of his ward.
his own advice that

11

He followed

if he (a man) goes into politics he must go into

practical politics, in order to make his influence felt."

4

He began his

career by joining the Twenty-first District Republican Association in New
York in 1880, the very year that he graduated from Harvara.
controlled by a very practical politician na~ed Jake Hess.

The Club was

5

The first

six months or so of Roosevelt's membership in the Club were without the
explosive qualities that marked his subsequent political career.

He was

involved in studying law at Columbia Law School during the winter and went
Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography, Macmillan and
Company, Limited, London, 1913, 68. Subsequently referred to as
Roosevelt, Autobiography.
3 Theodore Hoosevelt, American Ideals, New Knickerbocker Edition, G. ?.
F-utne.m's Sons, New York, 1920, 26. Subsequently referred to as Roosevelt
American Ideals.
L Ibid., 28.
5 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 64.
2
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to Europe with his wife in the spring.

i•hen he returnee from that trip,

he found himself, for the first time, a candidate for public office. 6
The Twenty-first District Republican Association was having a bit of
internal difficulty in the fall of 1881.

Joe Murray, an ex-Tammany Democrat,

was working for Hess but had ideas of his own.
Theodore Roosevelt.

One of them concerned

tlurray decided to press for the nomination of Roosevelt

for the position of Assemblyman from the District against the candidate
nut forward by Hess.
with the plan.
worked.

Aftersome hesitation, Roosevelt agreed to go along

Murray was himself an astute politician and his plan

Roosevelt was nominated in the party caucus. 7 Once the nomination

was made, Hess, despite Roosevelt's assertion that he was elected in spite
of the "machine", 8 suuported the young aristocrat.

His course might, in

part at least, have been dictated by the fact that the rich Republicans of
the district had lost confidence in the local Reuublican leadership, and,
since their contributions were necessary, Hess hoped to restore their goodwill with an Assemblyman whom they all knew personally. 9
As a candidate, Roosevelt attracted some attention outside of his own
district.

The New York Times praised him as "a public-spirited citizen,

not an office seeker." 10

He was endorsed by the Council of Reform, and

6 Pringle, 46, 59.
7 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 67.
8 Ibid., 67.
9 Howard L. Hurwitz, Theodore Roosevelt and Labor in New York State.
1880-1900, Columbia University Fress, New York, I94J,70,Citing
Chauncey M. Deuew, My Memories of Eighty Years, (N. Y., 1922), 159.
10 Pringle, 61, citingNew York Ti::nes, Nov. b,l8"81.
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other civic organizations.

But he was wise enough to realize that the

supl:'ort that really counted was that of the Republican machine and, sensibly,
allowed its leaders to conduct the major portion of his camoaign.

There

actually was not too much work to be done for the Twenty-first was a solidly
Republican district.

Roosevelt was easily elected and prepared to take his

seat in the legislature at Albany. 11

Although he did not go -vvith the

unqualified blessing of his organization's boss, Hess fat more kincly toward
him because of his campaign attitude that proved that he did not intend to
ignore the machine comnletely. 12
l'luch of Roosevelt's work in the Assembly will be treated under the
oroper chapters so a brief summary will suffice here.

He served until

April, 1884 and attracted considerable attention to hL11self during that time.
The legislature, at that time, was in part composed of a group of men called
t!1e "black horse cavalryn
s'Jec:l.al interests.

w~10

supported, usually by selling votes, the

Roosevelt developed as the natural leader of the o:;pos-

ition to this group. 13

Roosevelt, himself, mentions these men when he

estimated that about a third of the me!Ilbers of the New York legislature were
ooen to corrupt influences in some form or other. 14
The new Assemblym&'J first attracted attention to himself when he
attempted to force the imoeachment of Judge Westbrook.

The Judge was in

Ibid.' 61.
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 60-61.
Harold Howland, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (volume h7 of The
Chronicles of ATJJerica Series, Allen Johnson, ed.), Yale University
Press, New Haven, Conn., 1921, 11-12.
14 Roosevelt, A11erican Ideals, 50.
11

12
13

the grip of the business interests and Roosevelt and his friends came
in the possession of some correspondence to prove this.

The Assembly

refused to take up the charges against the Judge but Roosevelt was determined.

Against the advice of his friends and associates, he forced the

issue and kept talking in the legisla.ture until public oressure and interest
in the case necessitated the aopointment of a committee to investigate the
charges.

Westbrook was "whitewashed 11 but everyone knew that it was just

that and Roosevelt hac achieved a moral victory. 15
himself firmly in the DUblic eye.
affair was the

11

He had also placed

Thayer goes so far as to say that this

deciding act in Roosevelt's career." 16

Thereafter, his legislative career was less spectacular although
Roosevelt was made the minority leader of the assembly after the Democratic
victory in the state in 1882.

This was a great honor for one so young

and virtually without precedent for one with only a single year of experienc
behind him. 1 7 While Cleveland was governor of the State, Roosevelt
worked with him and supported many of the reform measures that he attempted
to enforce, including civil service reform. 18

In general, Roosevelt

supoorted those measures that would encourage clean government, worked
against the special interests, and, unhap,)ily in view of his future record,
was unfriendly toward labor, esoecially organized labor.

But more of that

later.

15 Howland, 14-15.
16

17
18

William Roscoe Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, a..11d Intimate Biography,
Houghton Miffin Comoany, N. Y., 1912, 35.
?ringle, 74.
Ibid., 75.
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In the summer of 1884, Roosevelt was a delegate-at-large to the
Renublican National Convention.

He supported the candidacy of the Senator

from Vermont, George F. Edmunds, and worked hard for him in order to
defeat the Reoublican bosses' choice,

Ja~es

G. Blaine.

~ben

Blaine was

nominated, however, Roosevelt stood by his party's choice despite his
convictions. l9
After the Convention and ca'Upaign, Roosevelt retired to his ranch
in the West.

He remained in

New York City in 1886.

11

retirement 11 until the mayoralty election in

That year Henry George ran for mayor as the repres-

entati ve of the laboring class.

s.

The Democrats opt=Josed him with Abraham

Hewitt, an indeoendent of great wealth.

The Republicans, had they been

interested in saving the city from the radical ideas of George, should have
supported 1-Ievvitt.

But he was too honest to aliow the usual division of

spoils between the machine Republicans and Tammany if he should win •
.Moreover, the Republicans hoped that, since George had labor's support and
the Democrats pretended to be the oarty of labor, George would take more
votes from the Democrats and that their candidate might slip into office.
Roosevelt was approached and accepted the nomination.

But the great fear

of George on the part of business, forced many Republicans to vote for
Hewitt and Roosevelt was defeated, running third. 20

Thereupon he went

to Europe and faded from the spotlight for a time.
When Harrison was nominated by the Renublicans in 1888 to oppose
19
20

Howland, 21-23.
Pringle, 113-115.
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Cleveland, Roosevelt took the st"t.unn for him.

After Harrison was elected,

he repaid Roosevelt for his efforts by arypointing him a Civil Service
commissioner.

This was in ~;£ay 1889, and Roosevelt served until May 1895. 21

vVhile on the comnission, Roosevelt steered its policies and enforced its
regulations with the utmost vigor.

His enthusiastic support gave great

impetus to the cause of Civil Service reform. 22
Roosevelt moved directly from his job on the Civil Service

Com~ission

in 7{ashington to one of the New York City Board of Police Commissioners.
He was aopointed by the anti-Tammany but Democratic M:ayor Strong. 23
Roosevelt was handicaoned in his position as presicent of the board by the
arrangement that made unanimous consent necessary for any real action but
he did work hard and enthusiastically.

He attempted to take politics out

of the force and gave great nublicity to all that the commission did in
order to keen alive public interest and supnort. 24 He, himself, gives
a good summary of the work he did:
Our method for restoring order a.nd discinline were simple,
and indeed so were our methods for securing efficiency. We
made frequent personal inspections, especially at night ••••
vre then proceeded to pumh those guilty of shortcomings, and
to reward those who did well. ••• The days of political "pull"
were over while we had the power. 25
As police commissioner, Roosevelt stopped the wanton brutality of
policemen but he backed up strong action where it was necessary.
Roosevelt, A~erican Ideals, 100.
Howland, 39, also Thayer, 89.
Roosevelt, American Ideals, 119, also Howland, 40.
24 Howland, 43.
25 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 127.
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He stopped
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blackmail by enforcement of the law.

That he was successful is attested

to by the fact that in February, 1897, the Judge who addressed the grand
jury of the month congratulated them on the fact that there was less crime
in New York C:ity relative to the ponulation than ever before. 26

Finally,

however, New York hac1 enough of reform anc the corru?t influences in the
city were able to force Roosevelt's resignation. 27

That was in 1897 and

the ex-cOI'h'llissioner was on the threshhold of greater thir:.gs.
In return for his support of McKinley in the election of 1896, Roosevelt was once more in line for a -position in Washington.
Henry Cabot Lodge, supported his ambitions. 28

His old friend,

Finally, on April 6, 1897,

EcKinley sent his name to the Senate for confirmation as Assistant Secretary
of the Navy.

The nomination was confirmed on ADril 8 and Roosevelt assumed

his duties on April 19. 29
elderly

gen~man

The Secretary of the Navy Long was a conservativ ,

who was overshadowed by his forceful, bellicose, and out-

spoken assistant. 30

Roosevelt was a firm believer in a big navy and worked

diligently toward that end.

Moreover, he looked forward with a degree of

enthusiasm to the war that was brewing with Spain.

He did everything he

could to put the navy on a war footing- and the excellent condition of that
branch of the service in the Spanish-A'11erican War was due in no small part
to his efforts. 31
Once war had broken out, Roosevelt desired to get into active service.
26

Ibid.' 134.

27 Hurvntz, 149.
28
29
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31

Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, Shown in His Own
Letters, Charles Scribner's Sons, N.Y~l920, vol. I, 70.-- --- --Ibid., I, 72.
Pringle, 170.
Bishop, vol. I, Chap. IX, 70-91.
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He succeeded and the episode of the "Rough Riders" is so well-known as to
need no retelling.

Moreover, since it has no relation to the question of

this paper--although very important to the furtherance of Roosevelt's
career--we can content ourself with no more than a mention of this period.
Roosevelt enjoyed himself greatly while in Cuba and then returned home to
find his political future very bright indeed.
,vbile Roosevelt was in Cuba, Thomas C. Platt, Senator from and boss
of f!ew York State, did some serious

thin~ing

candxate for governor of his state in 1898.

relative to a Republican
The narty was concerned

tecause of a threatened exnosure of undue extravagance in repairing the
Erie Canal. 32

Platt needed a strong candidate to maintain his hold on the

state anc the name ·of the leader of the "Rough Riders" was constantly being
nut before him.

Platt did not at first want Roosevelt but his lieutenants

convinced him that the Colonel--the name Roosevelt acquired in the SpanishAmerican War and which clung to him from that time on--would attract the
needed independent voters because of his reforn record and woulc, moreover,
be free from any connection with the canal scandal. 33

Roosevelt was

approached and was not, at first, over-enthusiastic about the prospects of
being governor of New York.

He preferred national politics. 34

Nothing

was forth-coming in that line, however, so the governorship became more,
32

33

34

Pringle, 201.
Harold F. Gosnell, Boss Platt and His New York Machine, a Study of the
Political Leadership of ThOffias-c: Plat~1heodore Roosevel~and others,
The University of Chicago Press~ Chicago,-r92~8-99.
Pringle, 202.
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attractive.

Roosevelt called on Platt to discuss the nomination.

It

was his in return for a promise that he would not make war on the Regular
Republican organization and that he would consult Platt, especially in
mald.ng appointments. 35

Roosevelt, after his election did live up to this

promise and consulted Platt in reference to almost all appointments although he sometimes disregarded his advice, especially where candidates
for judicial positions were concerned. 36
Once he received the nomination, Roosevelt made the campaign one
of the "hoopla" and 11 hurrah 11 type with great emphasis placed on his war
record.

But it took a statement from Richard Croker, the Tammany leader,

to the effect that Justice Daly had not been renominated to the Supreme
court of the state because he refused to make certain appointments in his
court that were recommended by the organization to elect Roosevelt.

The

Republicans cried for "an untrammeled judiciary" and the people were roused
to action. 31

Even then, Roosevelt was elected by the small majority of

17' 794. 38
A great deal more will be said about the legislative advancements
made during Roosevelt's administration later.

He did support civil service

reform, franchise taxation, economy in government, and increased honesty
among public servants. 39 He, himself, felt that he had been an outstanding

35 Gosnell, 96.

36 Ibid., 207 ff.
37 Ibid., 142-143.
38 Pringle, 207.
39 Public Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Governor, 1899, Brandow Printing
Company, AlbanY, N.Y., !899:, 25. Subsequently referred to as Roosevelt,
Public Papers.
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success as governor but he was a trifle over-enthusiastic.

He did succeed

in obtaining an improved civil service law, a corporation franchise tax,
and a few other miscellaneous reforms of lesser consequence.

One thing

that restricted his efficiency as a reformer was his connection with
platt.

He could not, or would not, openly defy him, preferring to com-

promise.

Roosevelt, himself, best summed up his ideas on the subject of

compromise while he was governor in a speech before a State Bar Association
banquet on January 8, 1899:
It is not possible for any man ever to do or to get all that
he would like to do, or all that he would like to get in the
way of good government and in the way of striVing to see his
ideals realized •••• perhaps we must always advance a little
by zig-zag; only we must always adv~,ce; and the zig-zags
should go toward the right goal. 40
As Roosevelt's term as governor drew to a close in 1900, his name
was mentioned for the vice-presidential spot on the national ticket led
by McKinley.
happiness.

Roosevelt did not receive the suggestion with any great
He felt that it was the road to oblivion.

Neither Mark Hanna

nor McKinley liked Roosevelt on the slate, either. 41 But when the convention met, it nominated Roosevelt.
influence.

T11is was largely due to Platt•s

Platt wanted him out of New York where his reforms were alienat-

ing the wealthy contributors to the Republican party. 42
presidency at stake the wishes of the boss of the state
electoral vote could not be overlooked.

And with the

wit~

the largest

Thus it was that Roosevelt became

40 Ibid., 250-251.
41 James Ford Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations,
1909, The Macmillan-cQmpany, N.Y:;-1923, 134.
42 GOSnell, 123.

1897~
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vice-president at the time when the Republican Victory indicated na clear
mandate to govern the country in the interest of business expansion."

43

Roosevelt was wrong in his estimate of the vice-president's job.

rt

led not to oblivion but directly to the White House itself for President
McKinley was assassinated in September of 1901 and Roosevelt succeeded
to the presidency.

To even summarize his career there would be a lengthy

undertaking so we will leave those things which concern us to be treated
under the proper chapters.

We can say, though, that Roosevelt's accession

did cause consternation among business men.

44 Roosevelt, however,

indicated his willingness to work with his party leaders and even submitted
his first annual message to Hanna for his suggestions.

He snowed a

willingness to consult with the regular Republicans although he did not
always follow their advice.

45 His first term was not particularly

productive of reform legislature--his chief achievements consisted of
obtaining an amendment to the Elkins Act and setting up a bureau of
corporations to investigate corporate practices.

This may have been the

result of an alleged agreement with Senator Aldrich, the arch-conservative,
giving Roosevelt a free hand in foreign affairs in return for the president's
non-interference in legislative affairs.

46

Despite the apparent surface peace, there was a feeling of opposition

43 Rhodes, 144, citing Croly, Life of Hanna, 341.
44 Pringle, 238.

45

Rhodes, 221.

46 George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement,
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, ~6,

17.

33

between Hanna and Roosevelt that became public in May of 1903.

Already

Republican eyes were turned toward the election of 1904 and Hanna was
being considered as a candidate.

In May of 1903, Foraker, the senior

senator from Ohio and a foe of Hanna, came out for Theodore Roosevelt and
demanded that the Ohio Republican Convention, meeting in June, do likewise.
H&Lna opposed such a resolution and thus made evident his disapproval of
Roosevelt.

47

Hanna, however, did not actively seek the nomination,

probably because of his advanced age and precarious health. 48

Despite

his disapproval, and that of business, he kept his opposition quiet and
Roosevelt was nominated for a second term and elected.
It was of this second election that Roosevelt wrote:

"It is a

peculiar gratification to me to have owed my election ••• above all to
Abrru1am Lincoln's

1

plain people'·" 49

And it was to these same people

that Roosevelt directed many of his public utterances.

He had the happy

faculty--for a politician--of making himself loved by the masses.
Roosevelt was not one to sacrifice all for an ideal.
in the

~V'nite

House, he was a good party man.

Yet

Throughout his terms

He wanted to and did "work

with my party and make it strong by making it worthy of popular support."

50

In 1906, Roosevelt finally displaced Platt as boss of New York
politics.

Frank

w.

47

Rhodes, 281-282.
48 Ibid., 287.
49 Bishop, I, 345.

50

~., I,

150.

Higgins represented him in the state and, in that year,

34
they succeeded in having Wadsworth elected United States Senator. 51

Thus

when his term in the White House ended, Roosevelt had someplace to turn.

He had established himself as a political leader of New York Republicans-especially the more liberal minded among them.
In 1910, after returning from his African hunting trip, Roosevelt
was urged by the progressive Republicans of his state, under Lloyd

c.

Griscom and Herbert Parsons, to accept the position of temporar,y chairman
of the Republican State Convention.

The progressive group were opposed

to the machine led by William Barnes, Jr.

After some hesitation, Roosevelt

accepted but he refused to run for governor or any other office.

52

At

this convention, w'.aose chairman Roosevelt became, a direct primary plank
was adopted, "this being the main fight as far as progressive planks went."53
After the convention, Roosevelt became an observer of political developments until his entrance into the campaign of 1912.

Of this we shall say

more later.
In summation, Roosevelt was a man of many advantages.

His father,

whom he greatly admired, was a philanthropist who worked for social welfare
and his example quickened Roosevelt• s sense of obligation to the community.~
But he was preeminently a practical idealist.
should be preached by every reformer:

"The first is the gospel of morality;

the second is the gospel of efficiency."
51 Gosnell, 352.
52 Payne, 30-Jl.
53 Ibid., 35.
54 ROOSevelt, Autobiography, 12-13.
55 Roosevelt, Pmerican Ideals, 27.

He felt that two gospels

55

Furthermore he believed 11 in
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the duty of the man who preaches to preach realizable ideals."

56

His
Howland

nhiloso:ohy is best sum.rned up by Howlanc , a loyal supporter of his.

said of him that he believed in getting things done anrl would compromise on
the method but not on the principle.

If he couldn't obtain all that he

wanted, he would take what he could get.

Roosevelt chose "the companionable

roac' of oractical idealism rather than the isolated peak of idealistic
ineffectiveness."

57

It would be unfair to say that Robert La Follette was ineffective and
he was sufficiently practical to gain the control of an entire state, yet he
differed from Roosevelt in that he was one who never compromised.
La Follette's way or not at all.
nrinciple was involved,

11

58

It was

He believed passionately that, where a

no bread is often better than half a loaf."

Once a

comnromise was written into the law, he felt, you had lost your chance to
fight for a true reform bill.

59

This made him much harder to work with

and much less poPular than rtoosevelt.

But to understand La Follette, it is

best to go back to the beginning of the story.
Robert Earion La Follette had the right beginning for a politician
of his time.

He was born in a log cabin on June lL.,

Dane County, Wisconsin. 60

Eis ancestors had come to

S6 Theodore Roosevelt, ADplied .I!;thics, being

1855,

in Primrose,

~·:isconsin

from

~ of the '!:illiam Belden
i'Joble Lectures for 1910, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1911, 7.
Subsequently referred to as Roosevelt, Applied Ethics.
S7 Howland, 21.
S8 l1Jils P. Haugen, Pioneer and Political Reminescences {1.'\'isconsin r::agazine
of History, volumes XI, XII, XIII), The P..ntes Press, lDvansville ;::isc.,
D."d., 151.
S9 La Follette, 268.
60 Dictionary of American Biography, "Robert M:. La Follette!!, Frederic A.
Paxson, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1938, X, .541. All factual
information regarding rEr. La Follette 1 s life is from this source unless
otherwise foo~noted.

L
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Kentuc~

with a short stopover in Indiana.

While in the former state,

the La Follettes had been neighbors of the Lincolns.

In fact, young Bob

La Follette's background is remarkably like that of Abraham Lincoln.
La Follette was left without a father while still an infant and, as soon
as he was able, he took over the management of the family's affairs.

When

he was nineteen, he sold the farm in Primrose and moved his family into
Madison.

But, even before that time, the influences that made La Follette

a progressive were already at work.

He says himself:

"As a boy on the

farm in Primrose Township I heard and felt this movement of the Grangers
swirling about me; and I felt the indignation m1ich it expressed in such
a way that I suppose I have never fully lost the effect of that early
impression." 61
La Follette entered the University of Wisconsin, then a struggling
prairie
sity.

scho~

with the class of 1879.

Things were not easy at the Univer-

La Follette was still responsible for the welfare of his family and,

as a consequence, it was necessary for him to have some means of income.
To solve his problem, he purchased the University Press, then the only
college paper and not very prosperous, and turned it into a paying
proposition.

He also helped to pay expenses by teaching school.

~Vhile

at the University, President Bascom had a tremendous influence on the youth.
He was constantly reminding his students of the debt they owed to the sta.te
and instilling in them a "proper attitude toward public affairs." 62

61 La Follette, 19.
62

Ibid., 28.
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La Follette, although he did not lead his class scholastically, evidently
learned this lesson well.
After his graduation in 1879, La Follette spent some five months
studying law, dividing his time between the University's law school and
a law office in Madison, and was admitted to the bar in February, 1880.
He was then without funds and in rather desperate need of money because
of his obligations.
attractive.

The district attorneyship of Dane County looked very

As a result, La Follette began to canvass the territory with

a view to getting himself elected to the job.
llbosstt of that time, Colonel E.

w.

Before long, the Republican

Keyes of Madison, informed him that he

(La Follette) was not going to be the next district attorney of the county-"Boss" Keyes had already chosen the man, and it was not La Follette. 63
But La Follette was only spurred to greater effort by the incident.
By his own hard work and with the help of his former classmates at the
University, he succeeded in winning the election without the support of
the machine.

One thing that eonvinced the thrifty farmers that he should

be elected was the fact that he promised to try all the cases brought
before the court without employing additional help, a system which had
long been in vogue.

La Follette kept his promise and the farmers showed

their satisfaction by reelecting him for a second term--the

on~

Republican

to win on the county ticket. 64
In 1884, after completing his second term as district attorney,

63 Ibid., ll.
Frederic c. Howe, Wisconsin, An Experiment in Democracy, Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 19!2, 6.

64
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La Follette was encouraged to run for Congress by his friend and associate,

sam

Harper.

The suggestion found favor with him almost at once.

He had

acquired a relish for public work and a love for the political arena that
never left him.

He and Harper immediately began to canvass the district.

once again the political bosses told hin1 that he was wasting his time and
money.

But La Follette had gone to the people with his campaign in 1880

and he was prepared to follow that plan again.

65

The farmers of his

district knew about the work he had done and they liked the way he took
them into his confidence and made them a part of his endeavors.

They

nominated him in the convention and they then elected him with a majority
of 491. 66

Then just twenty-nine years of age, he was the youngest member

in the House. 67
After securing for himself the position of Representative, La Follette
began to realize how little he knew of·national problems.

As a result,

he went to Washington in January, 1885, although the Congress to which he
was elected did not meet until the following December.

He hoped in that

way to acquaint himself with some of the questions then under discussion.
This is typical of the thoroughness that marked his course.
has said of him:

As one writer

"La Follette is one of our deepest, most painstaking,

and most cautious students, a man who speaks only after months, even years
of investigation, and not then unless he has arrived at a constructive

65

La Follette,

43-45.

66 Howe, 6-7.
67 La Follette, 48.
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conclusion." 68
When La Follette returned to Washington to begin his term of office,
he immediately felt the influence of the senior Senator from Wisconsin,
philetus Saw,yer, a multi-millionaire lumber man and one of the bosses of
the state.

Sawyer was very nice to him but when the young Congressman

expressed a desire to serve on the Committee on Public Lands, Sawyer
looked askance at the idea. 69

He was finally appointed to the Committee

on Indian Affairs where his "radical views" would be less of a hinderance
to the schemes of the politicians.
make himself heard.

7° But La Follette still managed to

He spoke against the "pork-barrel" bill for river

and harbor appropriations in 1886. 71
Indian lands from the railroads.

He also worked to protect the

His action made the machine back in

Wisconsin determined to defeat him for reelection in 1886.

But La Follette

had a way to beat them.
His early experience had taught him that in order to beat boss rule
it was necessary to have an informed electorate.

As soon as he was elected

he got a list of the voters in his district and then proceeded, while he
was in the House, to send these people copies of all speeches made on
pending legislation in their particular field of endeavor.

He followed

this system with only the necessary modifications throughout his public

68 William Bayard Hale, "La Follette, Pioneer Progressive", The World's
Work, XXII, no. 3, 14598 (July, 1911).
69 La Follette, 53-57.

70 Frank Harris, Contemporary Portraits, "Senator La Follette", Brentano' s,

New York, 1923, 158.

71

La Follette,

75.
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life.

He says himself that this is probably the reason that he never

got rich in politics since most of the printing bills he had to pay himself.

But he also says that this was the only way for him. 72

Despite

the expense, it was worth while in furthering his career for "one great
secret of La Follette's political strength was his constant touch with the
masses of the people.

He had respect for their understanding and, once

he had determined upon a policy, he laid it before the voters at length
with all the arguments in support of it.n 73

He followed this method

now and was reelected, not only in 1886, but in 1888 as well.
During the 1889-1891 sessions, La Follette came to the fore as a
member of the Ways and Means Committee.

This was a coveted position and

he obtained it as a result of a speech which he had given the previous
session on the Mills Bill.

While on the Committee, he served with the

future president McKinley and became a great admirer of his.

He also did

noteworthy service on the preparation of the McKinley Tariff Bill.
same bill helped to defeat La Follette, however, in 1890.

This

The high

tariff which it authorized brought difficult times to the farmers and,
in addition, the Bennett law had passed the state legislature and this,
with its regulation of the schools of the state, had turned the catholic
and Lutheran vote against the Republicans.
with the rest of his party.

La Follette went down to defeat

Despite the fights which he led against the

party bosses in Wisconsin, his ntendency to insurgency" did not appear to
72 Ibid., 63-67.
73 Raney, 304.
74 Ibid., 284.
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any extreme extent.

While he could not, by any stretch of the imagination,

be called a "stand-patter", he had usually voted with the party.

74 He

did not during his time in the House separate himself irreconcilably from
his party and this is important, for it means that, had he so desired,
he could still have allied il:imself to the regular Republicans and taken
advantage of the opportunities that they had to offer.
Wnen he returned to Madison following his defeat, La Follette turned
his attention to his law business.

11

public service was vague and remote."

Any thought ••• of returning to the

75

Yet the lure of political life

was upon him and it was inevitable that he should return to the battle
field.

An event occurred in September of 1891 that served to both return

him to the fray at once and to crystallize his antipathy toward machine
politics.
For years it had been tne habit of the state treasurers to deposit
the revenues of the state in certain favorite banks and then appropriate
the interest on the money for themselves.

No one objected to the system

until the Democrats got into power after the 1890 landslide.

The attorney-

general then promptly brought suit against the defeated Republican treasurers to recover hundreds of thousands of dollars of back interest.
Senator Sawyer was the principal bondsman for the treasurers and stood to
lose $3,000,000 if the case were decided in favor of the state.

The case

was to be heard by Judge Robert J. Siebecker, La Follette's brother-in-law
and his former law partner.

75

La Follette, 136.

Shortly before the trial was to begin, Sawyer

asked La Follette to meet him at the Plankington House Hotel in Milwaukee,
and the latter agreed.
that is disputed.
bribe him.

What happened when the two men met is a subject

According to La Follette's story Sawyer attempted to

Sawyer claims that he was merely trying to employ La Follette

as an attorney in the case.
Whatever is the truth in the case, the results were far-reaching.
La Follette, after consulting some of his closest friends, went to Siebecker
and told him what had occurred.

The judge promptly withdrew from the case

and that gave rise to a great deal of speculation as to the reason.
announcement was forthcoming and La Follette made no statement.

No

Sawyer,

however, in an interView in the Milwaukee Sentinel said that he had tried
to hire La Follette as an attorney in the case and that the latter had
misconstrued his purpose.

In the face of such a statement, La Follette

presented his side of the affair.

This cost him a great deal for he knew

that his action would split the Republican party in the state and that the
machine would now resolve to completely destroy him and would use every
means at their command to discredit him with the people.
says of this time that

1 ~'his

Indeed, one author

(La,Follette 1 s) greatest battle was with his
~

conscience on the Sawyer-Siebecker deal." 76 But good came of the abuse
and calumny which the machine-controlled newspapers and the machine
politicians heaped upon La Follette.

Out of the experience came the deter-

ruination to destroy the power that was corrupting and undermining the

76 Richard Lloyd Jones, "Among La Follette• s People,"
no.,

24,

18 (Sept. 3, 1910.)

Colliers, XLV,
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government of the State. 77
In 1892, despite the objections of the regular organization, La Follett
took the stump for the Republican candidate for the presidency, Harrison.
He did not discuss state issues, but he did keep his place in the Republican
party and in the eyes of the public.

And his courage in facing the wrath

of Sawyer's men set at rest any question as to the integrity of his
motives. 7S
In 1894, La Follette decided to put forward a candidate for governor
in opposition to the machine's candidate despite the fact that there was
no real chance for success.

Nils Haugen, one of his associates in Congress,

was chosen for the hopeless trial and gave up his seat in Congress for the
endeavor. 79

La Follette and his helpers--most of them former associates

of his at the university--worked feverishly.

They did not succeed in

nominating Haugen but they did put their men in the rest of the places on
the ticket.

This victory encouraged them tremendously. 80

The La Follette group began to increase in size despite the fact that
they did not, at that time, have a broadly constructive policy.

La Follette

attracted the younger and more progressive element to him and the group
became knmm as nHalf-breeds" by the regular Republicans. 8l

He was

appealing for followers primarily of the program of overthrowing corrupt

77 La Follette, 142-164.
78
79
80
81

The story of the Sawyer-Siebecker affair is a
summary of it as it appears in the Autobiography.
Howe, 11.
Haugen, 113.
Ibid., 12.
T:"S. Adams, "The Drama of Wisconsin Politicsu, T'ne Independent,
LIX, no. 2800, 1824 (July 31, 1902).

rr
'
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machine control. 82
When the calJlPai.gn of 1896 came around, La Follette announced that he
was a candidate for the Republican nomination for governor.

For a time it

looked as though he might secure the honor but the political bosses
rrreachedn many of the delegated pledges to him.
nomination.

As a result, he lost the

Then La Follette decided to go to the people once again.

In 1897, La Follette made a tour of the various county fairs, telling
the people about the reforms which he advocated.

To further help his

cause, some of his friends purchased a small weekly newspaper in Madison
and renamed it The State. 83

Even these steps did not secure the nomina-

tion for governor for La Follette when he sought it again in 1898, but the
pressure on

~he

machine was so strong that the bosses were forced to incor-

porate many of the reform measures in their platform of that year.
elected, however, they completely forgot their promises.

Once

The people

remembered this when the 1900 election arrived.
In 1900, after six years of trJQng, La Follette was finally nominated
and elected governor.

From the people of Wisconsin, he received the

unprecedented plurality of 103,745. 84 As governor, La Follette's troubles
continued for, although the Assembly was progressive, the Senate of the
state was still controlled by the bosses.
problems later on.
La Follette, 186.
83 Ibid., 204-207.
84 HoWe', 14.
82

More will be said of these
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In addition to these difficulties with the legislature, La Follette
had to face a

11

smear 11 campaign on the part of the bosses.

At this time

one of them bought the Sentinel, one of the few large papers in the state
that had previously supported him.

The papers were filled with stories

of the unconstitutional way in which he tried to force the legislature
to pass the bills which he wanted.

The~y-

said that his program of regulating

business would drive capital from the state.

85

Finally, to add fuel

to their fires, La Follette became ill during the legislative session of

1901 and the bosses tried to convince the people that he was physically
incapable of handling his office.

This last was strangely prophetic of

1912.
When the campaign of 1902 approached, the bosses organized the
Wisconsin Republican League--usually referred to as the "Eleventh Story"
League because it had its headquarters in the eleventh story of a MilwaUkee
office building. 86

The League spent money lavishly and used every method

known to discredit the

11

Half-breedsn and their cause.

But La Follette

believed that platforms were pledges to the people and that they should
be lived up to, and showed where the "Stalwarts" had not done this.
people believed him.

He was reelected by a majority of

The

47,599, and this

time he could count on a sympathetic legislature. 87

85

Ibid., 15-16.
86 Henry w. Wilbur, 11 A Coming Mann, Gunton' s Magazine, XXIII, New York,
250 (September, 1902).
87 Howe, 16.

45
The legislative session of 1903 passed most of the reform measures
which La Follette advocated.

There was one, however, which the governor

could not get through the legislature.

This was a bill that would fix

the rates for railroad transportation, these rates to be based on a
physical evaluation of the railroad's property.

This was just the issue

which La Follette needed to take to the people.

He felt that another term

of office was needed to "securely ground and bulwark self-government in
Wisconsin." 88

As a consequence, he took the relentless logic of statistics

to the county fairs and showed the people how they were being plundered
by discriminating

frei&~t

rates and charges.

The Republican convention was held in Madison in 1904.

The "Stalwarts"

bolted the convention after La Follette was renominated and nominated a
ticket of their own.

La Follette was named by the convention of his

supporters to head the Wisconsin delegation to the National Republican
Convention to be held in Chicago that same year.

This is important because

the "Stalwarts" also chose a delegation and when the two delegations
arrived in Chicago those from the

11

Stalwart 11 convention were seated despite

the fact that the courts of Wisconsin had declared the La Follette men
the true representatives of the people of the state.

Paxson suggests the

fact that Theodore Roosevelt, the Republican candidate for the presidency,
did not object to the seating of the unlawful delegation aroused 11 in

88 La Follette, 320.
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La Follette a conviction that his progressivism was neither genuine nor
dependable. 11 89
La Follette was reelected in Wisconsin, this time with a majority
of 40,000. 9°

He continued his reform program making common use of commis-

sions to study various problems.

This gave great impetus to the University

of Wisconsin and did much to bring that school to national prominence.

By

the end of 1905, the progressive movement in Wisconsin and the "Wisconsin
Idea"--the name given to the reform ideas of La Follette--were fully
launched. 91

In the five years that he had been in office through tireless

effort "La Follette had transformed a state ruled for and by the corporations into an object lesson in social and economic democracy." 92
La Follette was ready to move to higher levels and in 1905, the
legislature of the state appointed La Follette to the United States Senate.
The governor did not resign his office, however, until he had his program
for the state completed.

In 1906, he felt this was done and want to

Washington to take his place in the Senate.
There is no need to follow La Follette's career as a Senator in detail
here.

He took a uniformly progressive stand on measures before the Senate.

One thing that served to mitigate his usefulness was the fact that he early
began to think of the presidency.

One source puts the time as early as

89 Dictionary of American Biography, X, 544.
90 Howe, 17. -91 Dictionary of American Biography, X,
92 Mowry, 49. -

544.
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1907.

This ambition made him anxious to steal the spotlight on all

occasions and made teamwork difficult. 93
one measure against which La Follette took a very strong stand was
the payne-Aldrich Tariff.

La Follette mars11alled his forces to fight

it as soon as its nature was evident and when the bill WE¥3 put to a vote,
there were ten Republicans who voted with the Democrats against it.

This

is generally regarded as the beginning of the national insurgent movement.94
The bill eventually passed but the opposition to it had solidified the
progressive sentiment in the Senate.

Moreover, opposition to it resulted

in the election of the Democrats in 1910.

The day of the nstalwarttt

Republicans was drawing to a close.
The battle over the payne-Aldrich Tariff gave some excellent indications of the ]jgJ.'lt in which La Follette was held by the "Stalwarts."

When

Taft was trying to swing the Progressives• votes to the bill, he invited
mean like Beveridge, Clapp, Borah, and Dolliver to 1vine and dine with
him in the hopes of "converting11 them.

But he made no move toward

La Follette or Curmnins of Iowa because he knew that they were unchangeable.95
La Follette's stand on this tariff so enraged Taft and the eastern business
men that they made plans to defeat him in the Wisconsin primaries in 1910
when he was running for the Senate. 96

93 Haugen, 151.

94 Raney, 297.

9 ..,~ Mowry, 63 •
96 Ibid., 111.

Their plans, however, failed.
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The story of La Follette after his return to the Senate and his
part in the formation of the National Progressive

Republica.~

League and

the campaign of 1912 have already been discussed in Chapter I.

In summary,

we can say that La Follette did his greatest work as governor of Wisconsin
where his efforts to educate the electorate were ablem be effective.

On

the national scene, too often his efforts were confined to opposing undesirable legislation because so many of his suggested bills never appeared
after they once went to the committees.

~is

influence on state governments

and their management was unequalled. 97 His leadership was preeminently
that of a crusader and a reformer.

Yet "his cargo of reforms was too

heavy for good political navigation". 98

Nioreover, his previously mentioned

inability to work witn others and to allow tnem to sometimes put forth the
ideas and get the credit, reduced his usefulness.

Yet he didI' great good.

His ideas of an educated electorate is sound democracy and the example
he set served to awaken public thought and conscience and to stimulate to
action.

97 William Allen White, "The Progressive Hen and the Insurgent Ducklings,"
98

The American Magazine, LXXI, no. 3, New York, 397
'Raney, 304.

(Janua~

1911).

CHAPTER III
POLITICAL REFORM
'\'roodrow Wilson characterized progressivism as "all those policies
whose object is to wrest government from the control of special groups of
men, and restore it to the country.

All the policies that re-establish the

connection between representatives &"ld the people." 1

The political

reforms that the government advocated were directed to this specific end.
They were designed to do away with the political "bosses" who controlled
the party machinery and with the economic
political ones.

11

bosses" who often controlled the

We want to turn our attention now to a consideration of

the stand of the subjects of this paper on the all-important question of
political reform.
EVery reformer has his strong point and it would not seem that
political

r~form

was Theodore Roosevelt's.

That is not to say that he

was completely uninterested but there were other problems with which he
was more concerned.

This, in part at any rate, may be due to the fact that

Roosevelt was, until 1912, always on good terms with his party and received
its support when running for public office.

He was a strong believer in

party unity. 2 It might be said that he was always one of the party althoug
not always one with it.
1 Alberto. Barton, La Follette's Winning of Wisconsin, 1894-1904, 2nd
edition, no publ., Madison, Wisconsin, 1924, 25.
2 Pringle, 90.
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Long before the Progressive platform defined that party's stand on
questionf of political reform, Roosevelt had an opportunity to voice his
objection to the system of boss rule as evidenced in Congress.

As he was

leaving office, the Insurgents in the House of Representatives asked his
support in their attempt to oust Cannon as Speaker of the House.

Roosevelt

maintained that he could do nothing, although ne did approve of their
course, because he did not know how Taft would stand on the matter.

He

did, however, promise to write a letter, that was not for publication,
which the Progressives could show to their friends and which would
express his stand. 3 On the day before he left office, Roosevelt said that
he could not write the letter after all but offered to introduce two of
the Insurgents, Nelson and Gardner, to Taft and to intercede.

He took them

to Taft, who was in another part of the room, but Taft has stated that he
only introduced them and madeno plea for their cause.

4

After Taft was elected, he suggested to Roosevelt that Cannon be
removed as Speaker.

Roosevelt was most unenthusiastic about this, pointing

out that, though he believed the step was desirable, it would not be
exPedient.

5

On this evidence it would not seem that Roosevelt was overly

eager to destroy Ghe power of the political bosses as represented by
Cannon in 1909.
The Progressive platform devoted some of its most concrete planks to

3
4

Hechler, 50, citing John
Ibid., 51.
5 Mowry, 42.

)1.

Nelson, interview, Feb., 1939.
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the discussion of political reforms.

These included the publication of

campaign contributions and expenditures, the registration of lobbyists,
public committee hearings in Congress, except on foreign affairs, and the
recording of votes in coMrrittee, and a ruling that federal appointees could
not take part in political conventions for nomination of elective state
or national officials nor could they hold office in state or national
political organizations. 6 The plank on the most important questions of
political reform was equally definite and is worth quoting in full:
The party declares for direct primaries for the nomination
of State and National officers, for nation-wide preferential
primaries for candidates for the presidency; for the direct
election.of United States Senators by the people, and we urge
on the States the policy of the short ballot, with responsibility to the people secured by the initiative, referendum,
and recall. 7
The platform also urged the extension of the vote to women. 8 There
remains now the examination of the records of Roosevelt and La Follette
in the light of the Progressive party platform.
As was common with the masculine leaders of the

d~,

neither Roosevelt

nor La Follette was active in the fight for woman suffrage.

Roosevelt,

however, evidently did give some thought to the matter for, as governor
of New York, he recommended to the legislature in his annual message of
1899 the "desirability of gradually extending the sphere in which the
suffrage can be exercised by women." 9

I could find no evidence, however,

6 Payne, 306, from the Progressive Party Platform.
7 Ibid., 305.

8 Pringle, 567, citing Letter of Roosevelt to Taft, Oct. 12 and Nov.
10, 1908, Roosevelt MSS.
9 Roosevelt, Public Papers,

25.
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that he followed up this recommendation and in 1912 it seemed that the
idea was new to him and he gave it only half-hearted support. 10
The major questions of the hour revolved around the initiative,
referendum, recall, and direct primaries.

An

examination of the stands

of Roosevelt and La Follette on these will be a good indication of their
interest in and positions regarding political reform.
Roosevelt's position on these matters of major importance does not
seem to have been consistent.

When the Insurgents in Congress were just

beginning to unite on a program, both La Follette and Bourne wrote to
Roosevelt who was then on his safari in Africa.

They asked his opinion

of the policies of the group--those policies that were later included
in the Declaration of Principles of the National Progressive Republican
League.

Roosevelt replied that he was not at all decided about the recall,

the initiative and the referendum, but agreed witn the rest of the program.ll
rt would seem that, in early 1910, Roosevelt was not convinced of the
wisdom of these reforms.
When Roosevelt returned from Africa in June of the same year, he
found that the direct primary was an issue in the New York campaign of that
year and that the liberal Republicans, wnose leader he had been, were
supporting the bill under Governor Hughes.

Roosevelt joined the fight.

On June 29, 1910, just eleven days after his return from Africa, he sent a
10 Pringle, 567.
11 Mowry, 176-177, citing Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to La Follette,
Jan. 3, 1910 and to Jonothan Bourne, Jan. 2, 1910, Roosevelt MSS.
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telegram to the chairman of the New York Republican State Committee giving
his approval to the direct

prim~

that it would be made a law.

bill and expressing his earnest hope

This placed him in the forefront of the

fight for the bill in his state. 12
As was mentioned in Chapter Two, Roosevelt became chairman of the
New York State Republican Convention when it met in 1910.
the convention and carried all his points. 13

He dominated

out of this convention came

a genuine direct nomination plank for the Republican platform. 14 This
would seem as though Roosevelt was a supporter of the direct primary.

But

at this very time, Roosevelt was writing to Henry Cabot Lodge:
''
Hughes made a fight on an issue upon which the people were
not really aroused ••• He had created a situation, and had put
me in a situation, where the least of two evils was to stand
by him. The fight is v~ry disagreeable •••• There is no way out
of it that I can see. 1~
This would hardly seem that Roosevelt was enthu3astic in his support of the
primary bill.

The

peop~~

of New York were no more enthusiastic.

The

legislature had defeated t11e bill in July and the people defeated the
Republican candidate for governor, Henry 1. Stimson in November. 16
In the summer of 1910, before the New York Republican Convention met,
Roosevelt went on a speaking tour of the West.

At osawatomie, Kansas,

on August 27, he gave the famous speech that formed the basis of his New

12 Bishop, II, 299-300.
13 Ibid., II, 304.
14 Payne, 35.
15 Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, September 21, 1910,
Bishop, II, 303-304.
16 Pringle, 537-538.
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Nationalism.

Yet, despite his progressive ideas on other subjects, he

made no mention of the initiative and referendum, no did he mention the
recall of judicial decisions that became a part of the Progressive party
platform. 1 7
When the National Progressive

Rep~blic~~

League was fanned early in

1911, its leaders naturally asked Roosevelt for an endorsement.

He

hedg~d.

He told Bourne that tnough he was in sympathy with its purposes, in a
general way, he felt that certain limitations and safeguards should be
added.

He said that he was uncertain about the recall on a national scale.lB

Whatever his feelings were on the other specific measures which the organization advocated, Roosevelt•s name was not among tnose sponsoring the
League.
Roosevelt•s failure to support the League and his criticism of some
of its measures are most amazing in view of his activities early in 1911,
right after he nad refused tolend the prestige of his name to the League.
He went on another of his speru{ing tours, this time through the South and
the West.

At Phoenix, Arizona and several places in california, he

specifically advocated the recall of judicial decisions, saying that he
favored it only when, by actual experience, the people were driven to it
in order to do away with some serious evil. 19

The members of the League

must have been not a little confused by this since the recall was Roosevelt•s

17 Ibid., 543.
18 Ibid., 548-549, citing Letter of Roosevelt to Bourne, Jan. 2, 1911,
19

ra-Follette Papers.
Bishop, II, )10.
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greatest objection to the League's Declaration.

It must also have been

confusing to the readers of Outlook for in his article on the League in
that magazine, Roosevelt had given it only luke-warm support and had made
no mention of the initiative, referendum, and recall. 20
Roosevelt finally completely allied himself with the principles which
the Progressives had been fighting for wnen he made known his candidacy
for the nomination for the Presidency in 1912.

On February 21, speaking

at Columbus, Ohio, he gave his "A Charter of Democracy" speech.
he termed himself a Progressive and declared his support for

11

In this,

all govern-

mental devices which will make the representatives of the people more
easily and more certainly responsible to the people's will." 21

Among

these devices, he included the recall of judicial decisions, the initiative
and referendum on legislation, the short ballot, popular election of
United States Senators, direct primaries, presidential preference primaries,
and popular election of delegates to national nominating conventions.
closed his address

11

He

with an earnest plea for social justice, for the

moralization not only of political conditions, but of industrial conditions.n 22

Thus did Roosevelt unequivocally place himself on the side

of the Progressives and begin his fight for the presidential nomination in
1912.
There remain only a few more points to make regarding Roosevelt's stand
on political refonn.

Even after his campaign as an independent Progressive

20 Pringle, 349, citing Outlook, January 14, 1911.
21 Haynes, 427.
22 ~., 427.
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candidate in 1912, he evidently entertained some doubts as to the wisdom
of all the measures which his platform had contained.

After the direct

primary for president was written into the Democratic platform in 1912-their convention met before the Progressive convention--Roosevelt championed
it but he then changed his mind although his own platform contained a
presidential preference plank. 23

Shortly after the election was over,

Roosevelt expressed his doubts as to the wisdom of another of his platform's
planks.

In a letter to a friend in Boston, he showed a definite weakening

in his support of the recall as applied

to judges. 24

In conclusion we must mention the platfrom plank for a corrupt practices
act.

Roosevelt advocated this in his speech before

~~e

Progressive conven-

tion in 1912, 25 but seems to have done little more about it.

His own state

of New York did not pass such a bill until 1909, 25 and I found no record
that he had worked for such a measure earlier.
In summarizing Roosevelt 1 s stand on tne questions of political reform,
we cannot help but be struck by his inconsistency on the subject.

That he

was a firm believer in honesty in government cannot be denied, 26

but he

was evidently in doubt as to the wisdom of the specific measures advocated

23 Oscar King Davis, Released for Publication, some Inside Political
History of Theodore Roosevelt and His Times, l:'898-1918, Houghton

Mifflin Company, New York, 192;;--312, 433.
Letter of Roosevelt to George D. Crocker, November 19, 1912, Bishop,
II, 348.
25 S. Gale Lowrie, Corrupt Practices at Elections (Comparative Legislative
Reference Department), Madison, Feb., 1911, 51, citing New York Consolidated Laws of 1909, Ch. XVII, sees. 175, 36~, 543-561; Ch. LXXXVIII,
sees, 751-7B2.26 durwitz, 77.

24
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by the progressive element in both parties.

He probably did not give great

thought to the matter until forced to do so when he began his fight for the
Republican nomination in 1912.

He had directed his reforming efforts

previously toward different abuses.

As has been said, this may well have

been due to the fact that Roosevelt laid great stress upon party loyalty, 27
and never, before 1912, had an actual falling out witn ti1e regular members
of his party.

Under sucn circumsta..>'lces, ne could hardly be overly critical

of the methods employed by that party to keep itself in power.
La Follette's record on political reform was very different from
Roosevelt's.

It was really a major part of the program which he sponsored

for Wisconsin and which gave him his reputation as a reformer.
was especially interested in the direct
work in its behalf.

prim~J

La Follette

and did some of nis greatest

Indeed, even an apologist for the

11

Stalwartsn in

Wisconsin said of him:
It must be acknowledged that to Robert M. La Follette should
be given whatever credit is due for the ultimate adoption of
the prima~ election system in Wisconsin. While others may have
originated the plan and drea"D.ed over its success at some future
time, he took the matter in both hands and went gut to cultivate
the crop, even if he did not sow all tne seed. 2
But La Follette's interest was tne result of an unhappy experience with the
Republican party in Wisconsin and before this time his record was not
unsullied.
27
28

Rhodes, 218.
Emanuel L. Philipp, assisted by Edgar T. Wheelock, Political Reforms
in Wisconsin, a Historical Review of the Subjects of Pri~a~ Election,
Taxation and Railway Regulation, E-.-L:-?hilipp, Mulwaukee, Wisconsin,
n. d., 21-.--Subsequently referred to as Philipp.
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La Follette made use of all the tricks of the political trade and took
under his banner all recruits without scanning their motives in joining
him nor their actions in the field while he was engaged in his fight with
the political

11

bosses 11 of Wisconsin. 29

In 1894, when he was promoting the

nomination of Nils Haugen for governor, he did not oppose t11e use of the
caucus and convention

~stem

and he used some pretty shaFp, though legal,

practices in attempting to control both of these bodies. 30

In 1896, he

suggested to Haugen and Judge Emil Baensch tnat they, along w:i.th himself,
become candidates for the Republican nomination for governor with the
understanding that all would throw their votes to the leader in the convention.

Haugen refused but La Follette and Baensch went into the convention

witll this idea.

They were botn defeated, however. 3l

Also, La Follette

did not object to collecting campaign funds from state employees in early
1900.

Haugen recalled that his last contribution to the La Follette cam-

paign fund was in the spring election of delegates to the National Convention
in 1912. 32
Yet it would not be fair to judge La Follette on the basis of these
efforts of his to

n fight

fire with fire."

In fact, he w as from his earliest

days in politics the opponent of the political overlords of his state.

His

first position was obtained in the face of the opposition of the Republican
29 Barton, 29.
30 Allen Fraser Lovejoy, La Follette and the Establishment of the Direct
Primary in Wisconsin, 189o-19oh, (voi.-r; Patterson Prize-Essays),
Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1941, 30.
31 Haugen, 118.
32 Ibid., 141.
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uboss 11 of his territory.
to the •toossesn, either. 33

He did not owe his election to Congress in 1884
La Follette definitely split with his party over

the Sawyer-.Seibecker affair in 1891 34 although he did not immediately settle
upon the principles of political reform that later became a part of his
program.
La Follette resolved upon the direct primary as an &'1swer to "boss"
rule in 1896.

In that year, he was a candidate for the governorship.

Many

districts of his state sent uninstructed delegates to the convention although
the caucuses in those same districts had expressed a preference for La
Follette.
fault

Ti1is prevented his obtaining the nomination.

lay with a

11

Knowing that the

system that permitted corrupt agents to betray their

principles", La Follette resolved never to compromise with the system and
never to give up the fight until he
of the people." 35

11

had made government truly representative

From tnat time one, one matter was supreme with him

and that was the primary election law.

On that he set his heart despite the

fact that some of his followers had tneir doubts and expressed them to him.36
La Follette began a study· of the direct primary question and, in
February of 1897, he was ready to give public utterance to his ideas.
that month, he gave a speech at the University of Chicago in which he
publicly advocated for the first time
33
34

La Follette, 43-45.
Ibid., 142-164.
35
195.
36 Haugen, 138.

rna.,

prima~

elections for the direct

In

nomination of all political candidates.
La Follette outlined a model law.

In concluding this speech,

It provided for nominations petitions to

be signed by a certain per cent of the voters of a district at the last
general election, and set down strict

regarding pre-primary caucuses,

~~les

electioneering, bribery, and the canvassing of the vote.

It also stipulated

that a committee to formulate platforms should be elected along with the
party's candidates. 37
After this speech, La Follette containued his
primary throughout the year 1897.

On July

5,

c~npaign

for the direct

he spoke at Mineral Point,

Wisconsin and promoted his direct primary plan.

He also attacked tne state

administration's attitude on the corporation and taxation questions. 38
on August 20, he reiterated his belief in the direct

primaF~

in a speech at

Fern Dell and on March 12, he gave his f~ous Ann Arbor speech. 39

There,

before the students of the University of Michiga"l, La Follette took an
unequivocal stand in favor of the abolition of all caucases and conventions
and the nomination of all candidates for state, congressional, legislative,
judicial, and local offices by a direct vote of tile electors, using the
Australian ballot. 40

This speech on

11

Primary :Slectionsn was important

because it received nation-wide publicity and made La Follette a national
figure.

41

La Follette's work began to bear fruit.

37 Lovejoy, 35.
38 Barton, 80.
39 Ibid., 80.
40 Plirripp, 2L
41 Lovejoy, 43.

Although he was again defeated
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for the Republican nomination for governor in 1898, the regular state
Republicans adopted a plank in tneir platform, in response to public sentiment, that suggested that they would establish the primary law in 1898.
The plank was most indefinite, however, merely admitting that there were
defects in the caucus and convention system and promising legislation that
nwould secure to every citizen the freest expression of his cnoice in the
selection of candidates."

42

Yet it was a step forw·ard and La Follette's

county fair campaign was largely responsible. 43
In 1900, it was obvious that La Follette would again be a candidate
for the Republican nomination for governor.

Yet, in the

year, he made no mention of the direct primary.

ear~

part of tne

This was evidently in

the interest of party harmony and an effort to obtain adcli tional support
from the less conservative members of the

11

Stalwart 11 faction.

This silence

led many to believe that La Follette had given up his pet tneory and when
they found otherwise they felt that tney had been duped. 44
Once La Follette was assured of the nomination in 1900 by the defection
of the otl1er candidates, ne came out so strongly for a primary bill that it
was obvious that he would not run on a platform which did not have it as a
plank.

45

When the convention met, he insisted on, and got, a platform

pledge providing that:
caucuses and conventions for the nomination of candidates
should be abolished by legislative enactment, and that all

42

Philipp, 21.

45

Lovejoy,

43 Lovejoy, 38-39.
44 Philipp, 25-27.

52.
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all candidates for state, legislative, congressional and county
offices be nominated by a primary election upon the same day
by direct vote under the Australian ballot. 46
Even this unequivocal statement did not alienate the regulars for in
1900 all Republicans worked for La Follette's election, including such
"Stalwarts" as Spooner and Quarles.
made few references to reform.
harmony.

47

During the campaign, the candidate

La Follette was also working for party

48 once the campaign was over and he was elected, it was a differ-

ent matter, however.

We can now trace the history of primary legislation

in the Wisconsin legislature.
The first attempt to regulate primaries by law in Wisconsin antedated
La Follette's interest in the subject by many years.

In 1891, tne Keogh

law was passed but this applied to Yi.lwaukee county only.

49 The Keogh

law was amended at each session of the legislature through 1897.

Up to

this time, the mean who subsequently became tne leaders in the fight for
primary election reform had taken no nand in the framing of sucn laws as
passed the legislature to better conditions.
evolutionary one.

The movement had been an

The last of the evolutionary measures was the Lange bill,

passed in 1899, wnich extended the operation of the primary law to the
whole state in a modified form.

It was essentially an experiment.

50

But before 1899, the revolutionary movement to affect a real change

46 Philipp, 27.

47
48
49

So

Lovejoy, 47.
Barton, 163.
Philipp, 10.
Ibid., 17.

........

____________________
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and improvement in the situation had begun.
the people was evidenced by many things.
the

11

The sentiment growing among

Philipp, an avowed opponent of

Half-breeds 11 says of this time:

Already the revolutionary movement had been foreshadowed by
the introduction of a sweeping direct primary election bill
in 1897 by Assemblyman William T. Lewis of Racine, in public
addresses by Robert ~. La Follette, a tentative bill prepared
for publication and publicly circulated by non. L. J. Nash of
1;~anitowoc, and a bill introduced in the assembly by Gen. George
E. Bryan in 1899 as a suggestion of wnat Mr. La Follette then
advocated. 51
The Lewis primary bill was the first of the truly progressive measures
introduced into tne

~Usconsin

legisl&ture.

When he was elected, Lewis had

two projects which he hoped to have the legislature consider.

One concerned

convict labor, wnich he hoped to keep from competing with free labor; the
other was the direct nomination of all candidates at primary elections. 52
On arriving in Madison, he asked La Follette to draw up the primary bill to
introduce to the legislature.

La Follette was then working on his speech

for the University of Cnicago so he turned the job over to his law partners,
Sam ;:.rarper and A. G. Zimmermann.
provisions of the bill. 53

He clid, however, carefully supervise the

The bill was indefinitely postponed on recommen-

dation of the committee which reported it to the assembly. 54
The second bill to require nominations by direct vote was introduced
in the legislature by Bryant in 1899.

This is the bill referred to above.

This measure was almost identical in its provisions with the Lewis bill and

51 Ibid., 18.

52 I"'bfd:.,

20.

53 LOVejoy, 35, also Barton, 78-79.

54 Philipp, 20.

64
it met the same fate at the hands of the legislature.

55

Vlhen the legislature next met La Follette was governor of the state and
the Republican platform had expressed its approval of the
bill.

prima~

election

It seemed reasonable to expect some positive action on the measure.

yet, before the measure came up for consideration, there were rumors that
tne

11

Stalwarts 11 would attempt to defeat it.

On January 9, 1901, one of the

Madison papers printed an article to that effect. 56 Whether this is true
or not is a matter of dispute.

Philipp mainta:ins that it is not and says

that the Senate committee on privileges and election was not packed with
anti-La Follette men thus proving that there was no conspiracy afoot.

He

holds that there were three administration men on the committee, one
"progressi ven who was neutral, and one "Stalwart".
different story.

57 Lovejoy tells a

He divides the committee into two administration men, two

"Stalwarts 11 --he moves Senator Hatton from La Follette's camp--and one neutral.
The latter, in both cases, was Senator vVhitehead, who, although not yet
allied with the "Stalwarts", was felt to be opposed to La Follette's primary
measure. 58

As events developed, he later did oppose the bill. 59

In view

of Philipp's patently anti-La Follette attitude and on the face of the records
of the men involved, Lovejoy's explanation seems the more reasonable.
The primary bill of 1901 had an extremely stormy trip through the
~5 Ibid., 20.

~6

Lovejoy, 56, citing Madison state Journal, Jan. 9, 1901.
~7 Philipp, 30.
~~ Lovejoy, 59.
~9 Ibid., 64.
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Wisconsin legislature before finally being vetoed by the governor.

The

administration's measure was introduced simultaneously in the Assembly
by E. Ray Stevens and in the Senate by George p. Miller on January 28.
were promptly referred to committee.
Assembly.

Both

On lv1arcn 18, the bill came before the

It was placed on the agenda for tae following day.

The March

nineteenth session began at 7:30 p. M. with both the administration forces
and the

11

Stalwarts 11 ready for battle.

to a vote, E. A. Williams, one of
na call of the house."

t~e

Before the measure could be brought
members who opposed passage, moved

The following morning, after a hectic all-night

session, the governor's followers finally got the bill "ordered to engrossment and a third reading11 •
consideration. 60

It was then placed on the calendar for final

On March 22, tne Stevens bill passed the Assembly and

was sent to the Senate. 61
In the Senate, tne bill encountered great dii'ficul ty.

When it was

first realized that there would be trouble over it, the "Stalwarts" suggested
compromise.

They offered to refer the measure to the people at the elections

in April, 1902.

The administration supporters refused because the machine

always was organized for election but many people wno were
voters voted only in November.

indep~ndent

The "Half-breeds" thus reasoned that the

"Stalwarts" could defeat the measure. 62
The primary bill came up for consideration by the Senate on April 11.
But before

6o

t~is,

Philipp, 36,

61 Lovejoy, 59.
62 ~., 63.

on April 9, two opposition Senators, Hagemeister and

41-44.

66
Kreutzer, introduced bills as substitutes for the administration measure.
The Hagemeister bill was crudely drawn and provided for the nomination of
county officers only at primary elections.

Kreutzer's bill provided for the

election of delegates to all conventions as well as the election of the
county officers at primaries. 63

It was a much more carefully prepared bill

but fell far short of the demands of the administration.
The original primary bill sponsored by La Follette was defeated by
the Senate, 20-13.

Another attempt at compromise was made by the "Stalwarts"

but was rebuffed by the administration.

After s orne maneuvering by both

sides, Kreutzer withdrew his bill and left the way clear for the Hagemeister
measure.

He then offered an amendment to the bill in the form of a referen-

dum clause submitting it to a vote of the people.

This was carried.

The

Hagemeister bill was then passed by the identical vote which had defeated
the measure supported by La Follette. 64
vVhen the

~agemeister

bill reached the governor, La Follette showed

his determination to work for a real reform measure.
and sent the Senate a scathing reprimand.

He vetoed the bill

Even his critic, Philipp, admitted

that "Governor La Follette was justified in vetoing the Hagemeister bill."
La Follette realized that if he signed it, he would have no further opportunity to strive for an acceptable bill.

This was consistent with his

theory of not taking half a loaf when there was a chance of getting the
63

64
65

Philipp, 47.
Ibid., 47.
Ibid., 47-48.
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67
w'nole loaf with a little added effort. 66
to the people of the state

~1u

La Follette explaintedlis position

he could feel fairly sure of their sympathy

because of the nature of the bill presented to him.

one of the current

magazines cormnented on it in an editorial, saying that "a more farcical
bit of legislation has rarely commanded the approval of even the anti-reform
elements." 67

The people of Wisconsin, who had elected La Follette over-

whelrningly on a platform calling for a strong direct primar;:• bill, could
not help but be aligned on the governor's side.
In 1902, La Follette was again the Republican nordnee for goverLor.

He

made the question of direct primaries one of the major issues of his campaign
In his opening speech, he stated that the primary election bill was "part
of tne Progressive movement.'' 68

He went on to answer the objections of his

critics to the effect that the primaries woula result in minority candidates
being nominated with the irrefutable argument:
Better an honest plurality representing tne honest judgment
of a large constituency tnan a macnine-made convention majority
which eXP.resses the will of only a small coterie of political
bosses. '69
He concluded his speech with a summary of the situation as he saw it.
The problem of government today is protection from public service
corporations and political machine domination. Direct nomination
of all candidates by the people offers a simple, practicable
solution. It is for us witn simple courage and patriotism to
discharge our plain duty to the state. 70

66 La Follette, 268.
67 outlook, "Governor La Follette's Ringing Message, vol. 68, no. 4, !Jew

York, 201 (editorial in tne issue of May 25, 1901).
68 Lovejoy, 71, citing the !.[ilwaukee Free Press, Oct. 1, 1902.
69 Ibid., 72, citation as above.
--70 Ibid., 73, citation as in note 68.
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Despite La Follette's stand on the direct primary and his criticism
of the "Stalwarts", Spooner and the other

11

Stalwart" leaders told their

followers to vote for him in 1902 for the sake of party unity. 71

Thus,

La Follette, as well as Roosevelt, was helped by the machinery of the
Republican party.

In La Follette•s case, however, after his one peace

effort in 1900, no further efforts were made by him to promote party harmony
within the state.
La Follette was elected in 1902 and it was obvious that the primary
bill would be brought to the attention of the legislature once again.

The

primary election law was accordingly introduced into the Assembly on
February 2 and was rapidly passed on February 6, 1903 by a vote of 70 to
19.

It was just as rapidly referred to the Senate, reaching that body on

February 9. 72
Once it reached the Senate, the bill had a more difficult time.
was referred to the Committee on privileges and elections.

rt

On March 26,

the bill was reported out of the committee with minor amendments.

In the

discussion that followed, Senator Gavney added a referendum amendment.
bill was then passed on the same day by a vote of 18 to

15.

The

The Assembly

accepted the Senate measure on March 31 but struck out the section on the
referendum.

on April 1, the Senate voted to adhere to the amendment on

referendum and the bill then went to conference between the houses.
After much debate, an agreement was finally reached.

It was finally

71 Raney, 289.
72 Philipp, 65-71. The history of the progress of the primary election
bill of 1903 is taken from these pages.

69
agreed to submit the entire matter to a vote of the people at the November
election in 1904, instead of submitting the question of applying the law
to the nomination of state and legislative candidates only.

The bill, with

t.ilis provision for referendum, was passeci by both Assembly and Senate and
was ready to go to La Follette on May 20.

He signed it and the matter was

then up to the people.
In 1904, the people of Wisconsin elected La Follette governor for the
tnird time and also expressed their approval of the direct primary election
bill.

Although only about half as many people voted for the bill as voted

for governor, the measure was overwhelmingly approved.

out of a total of

210,891 votes cast, 61.9 per cent or 130,699 votes were in favor of the
direct primary, while 31.1 or 80,192 votes were against it.

This gave the

bill a majority of 50,507. 73
Wisconsin was the first state to adopt the state-1ride direct primary

74

and the credit for this reform--one of those advocated by the Progressive
party--must go to La Follette.

And La Follette did not end his devotion

to the cause after it was achieved in Wisconsin.

Wnen he wrote the Declara-

tion of Principles for the National Progressive Republican League, he
included it as one of the policies for m1ich the League would fight. 75
And t:1is was before the Progressive party platform was written.
An

investigation of La Follette's stand on some of the other policies

73 Lovejoy, 91, also Philipp, 82.

74

Charles c. Platt, What La Follette's State Is Doing; Some Battles
Waged for More FreedOm, Batavia Times Press~Batavia, New York, 1924,

75

La Follette,

215.

--

495-496.
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supported by the Progressive party platform is now in order.
the difficalty which his own state had
opponent of this group.

·wit~

Because of

the lobbyists, he was c>..n early

When his followers founded their newspaper, The

-

state, in 1897, they gave a s~~ary of La Follette's program.

In addition

to its advocacy of the direct primary, the platfonn included a recornmendation to enact and enforce

11

laws to pnnish bribery in every form by the

lobby in the legislature and wherever it assails the integrity of the
public service. n 76

In announcing his candidacy for the governorship in

1898, La Follette continued this idea by speaking strongly against tne
lobbies. 77

Then wnen he was elected governor, in his first message to

tile legislature, in 1901, La Follette urged that lobbies be curbed by
legislation. 78

His recommendations were ignored until the progressive

legislation of 1903.

That year, Wisconsin got its law governing lobbies.

It required all lobbyists to register with the secretary of state, giVing
the names and business of their employers; and further provided that no
lobbyist should hold secret communication with legislators or legislative
committees. 79

La Follette continued his interest in the reform and it was

likewise included among the Principles of the National Progressive Republican
Leagae.
The program of La Follette as given in The State also included a demand
that laws be enacted and enforced to prohibit corrapt practices in election.8°

. 76
'77
78
79

Ibid., 209-210.
Barton, 110-111.
Ibid., 167.
ra-Follette, 320.
80 Ibid., 209-210.
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The following year, 1898, the first corrupt practices law was passed in
Wisconsin forbidding corrupt practices at elections. 81 In 1905, while
La Follette was governor, the law was strengthened.

It then provided that

"illegal registration or voting is punished by fine or imprisonment" and
that all candidates had to file statements of expenditures within thirty
days of the election or be fined. 82

In 1907, the law was extended to

apply to primary elections as well as general ones. 83

And this reform

was another one of tnose wnich La Follette included in the program of the
League.
Although La Follette was far from a suffragist, he evidently did feel
tnat women should take a more active part in the government.

In his message

to. the legislature in 1901, he showed that he was at least abreast 1ri th the
times on this question by recommending that women be appointed on various
educational and charitable boards within the state. 84
Finally, in concluding this section on La Follette &!d political reform,
it might be well to review again the National Progressive Republican League's
Declaration of Principles.

These were written largely by La Follette and

snow his feelings almost two full years before the Progressive party was
formed.

In addition to the previously mentioned provisions relative to

the direct primary, to control of lobbyists, and the corrupt practices act,
the Declaration asked for the direct election of United States Senators,

81 Lowrie, 71, citing Wisconsin Revised Statutes, 1898, sees. 13, 4478-4546.
82 Ibid., 71, citing Wisconsin Laws of 1905, ch. 313, 502.
83 Ibid., 71, citing Wisconsin LaWS 01 I9IT1, ch. 666, sees, 11-24.
84 Barton, 167.
--- --
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direct election of delegates to national conventions with an opportunity
for tne voter to express a choice as to presidential candidates, and
@nendments to the constitutions of the various states providing for the
initiative, referendum, and recall.

85

This would seem conclusive proof

that La Follette gave thougnt to the problem of political reform and favored
it.

On the basis of the evidence presented, it seems obVious that La
Follette's record on political reform had more to commend it than did
Roosevelt's.

He was interested in the problem from tne very oeginning of

nis career while Roosevelt was still expressing doubt when the League
was formed in 1911. 86

Another tning that counts heavily in La Follette's

favor is the fact tnat he achieved his reforms without the aid of Roosevelt,
then president and considered a leading progressive.

It was generally

understood that the national administration was hostile to the Wisconsin
movement during Roosevelt's incumbency.

He gave Federal appointments to

the "Stalwarts" in the state upon the recommendation of the V![isconsin
Senators who were themselves "Stalwarts".

In visiting Madison in April of

1903, in the midst of the fight for La Follette's reforms, Roosevelt did
nothing to aid the governor in his endeavors.

Vmen La Follette's delegation

to the National Convention of 1904 asked for his help in getting their places
in the convention, :1e put them off.

He did not support them until after the

85 La Follette, 209-210.
86 Mowry, 176-177, citing Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to LaFollette,
Jan. 3, 1910 and to Jonathan Bourne, Jan. 2, 1910, Roosevelt MSS.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court declared tnem tne legal delegates and even tnen he
allowed the "Stalwartsn delegation to be seated in the convention. 87
Roosevelt's first endorsement of La Follette came in September, 1910,
after the latter had achieved a sweeping landslide at the polls in the race
for the Senatorship of the state.

Roosevelt then said that it was the duty

of the Wisconsin legislature to return La Follette to the Senate. 88

This

wasunenthusiastic praise indeed.
In conclusion, La Follette did some of his greatest work in the field
of political reform.

His Declaration of Principles was taken, almost intact,

by the makers of the platform of the Progressive party as the basis of their
policy.

And as early as 1897, he had evolved a well-thought out program

of reform.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, was comparatively disinterested

in political reform as a formal policy.

Since this point was so basic to

the progressive movement, his failure to wholeheartedly support it thoughout
his career is a serious defect.

His sudden allegiance to the principles

of this reform and his coolness to them after that campaign do not speak
well of his sincerity ru1d carFy the tinge of political expediency.

Certainly

on this point at least, La Follette was by far the more progressive of the
two men.

g7 Barton, 380-384.
88 Ibid., 384.

CnAP'rilt IV
THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYEES

In view of the current interest in the rights of the working man, it
seems strange that neither Roosevelt nor La Follette took more interest in
legislation to relieve the condition of the laborers of their day.

It is

probable, however, that their attitude was a result of the "laissez-faire 11
principle which was prevalent in their youth.

Both of them expressed their

interest in the working man largely through forms of relief other than direct
legialation to improve his condition.
The Progressive party platform devoted one of its lengthiest sections
to its numerous labor planks.

Relative to the use of the court in labor

disputes it said that the party was against tne issuance of injunctions in
cases arising out of labor difficulties when such injunctions would not
apply wnen no labor disputes existed.

The platform further advocated

legislation for the prevention O'f industrial accidents, occupational diseases
overwork, and involuntary unemployment.

'E'1e list of reforms also included

tae fixing of minimum safety and health standards, the proi1ibi tion of child
labor and minimum wages for women with all night work forbidden.

The plat-

form showed its concern for the more defenseless victims of industrialization
further by sponsoring an eight-hour day for women and children.

The party

felt that one day's rest in seven was essential for all and wanted to see
convict contract labor abolished.

It approved of compensation for death

by industrial accident and for injury and trade diseases and of social
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insurance.

Finally, it favored the organization of worker to protect their
Depar~~ent

interests and the establishment of a separate

of Labor in the

cabinet. 1
For Roosevelt's attitude on the question of refonn of laboring condi tions, we can best begin with his record in his home state of New York.
There he first attracted real attention

wn~l

he was appointed a member of

a comrni ttee of Assemblymen to investigate the ma..J.ufacture of cigars in the
tenement houses.

The Cigar-Makers 1 Union wanted to prohibit this practice.

Roosevelt went into the tenements and saw for hintself tne abominable condi tions that existed.

As a result he reported the bill favorably anci. ius

was tne determining vote of the three man committee.

The bill was poorly

drmvn but passed the legislature and was signed by Cleveland, then governor

of l•;ew York, at Roosevelt 1 s suggestion. 2
Later tne courts of Hew YorK declared the bill unconstitutional
maintaining that it interferred with the sacredness of t11e home.
wa.s exasperated by the attitude of t-he court and said of it that

Hoosevelt
11

i t was

this case which first waked me to a oim and partial understanding of the fact
that the courts were not necessarily the best judges of what should be done
to better sociaJ. and industrial conditions."

3

Despite Roosevelt's cna'Ttpionship of the bill to forbid c.fgar-making
in tenement houses, labor in New York was cool to him.

1
2

3

Payne, 307-309, from the Progressive Party Platform.
Roosevelt, Autobiography, 88.
Ibid., 89.

The friendliness and
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praise given him when he first supported the bill, changed when he, in
urging Cleveland to sign it, told the governor that he was opposed to most
trade union measures.

4

In addition to the activity mentioned above, Roosevelt's position on
the various labor bills before tne Assembly during the time he served in
that body give an indication of his feelings at that period in nis public
life.

The unions in 1883 were demanding the abolition of prison labor which

could produce more cheaply and whose products were sold on contract to
companies in competition with free labor.
free working men down.

This obviously kept the wages of

A bill to abolish prison contract labor was intra-

duced into the !Jew York legislature.

Roosevelt opposed it and delayed action

on the measure in the Assembly even though the voters of the state had, at
the polls, indicated their approval of the bill.

5

In a speech before the

Assembly explaining his &and, he said that he did "not pretenci to have the
interests of the working men 2_t heart." 6 He did not want to abolish the
system of prison labor but he did indicate tnat he was open to suggestions
relative to its reform. 7 The position that Roosevelt took on this matter
did not meet with the approval of labor even as much as did his position
on the Cigar-Makers 1 Bill.

A brief summ~ 8 of the way Roosevelt voted on other labor bills is

4 Hurwitz, 88, citing Cigar gakers Official Journal, March 6, 1883.

5 Ibid., 93, citing New York State Bureau of Labor Statistics First Annual
'RePOrt. 1883, I, 20,40'5'";""882, 966.
- --6 Ibid., 93-94, citing speech before Assembly on Convict Labor Bill,
ROOSevelt MSS.
7 Ibid., 94,-clting New York Evening Journal, April 18, 1883.
8 Ibid., 95-104.
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equally enlightening.

In the Agembly, he regularly opposed bills regulating

the wages and hours of male workers.

In 1882, he voted against an increase

in salary for city laborers in New York Oity, Brooklyn, and Buffalo.

That

same year, Roosevelt voted 11 no 11 to an increase for tne policemen and firemen in the same towns.

T'.ais bill was passed but vetoed.

1Yhen it was revived

the following year, it was passed again and signed by the governor and the
following year an additional wage increase was provided.

Roosevelt was

against all of these bills.
On the question of .aours which men could or had to work Roosevelt
helped to defeat an attempt to put teeth in the eight-hour day law for
state employees.

He also opposed the reduction of the street railway

workers 1 hours to twelve.
day ten hours

~~th

The bill was then amended to make the working

overtime for t.ae other two hours but Roosevelt still

voted with the opposition.

This bill was passed by the Assembly and then

vetoed by the governor.
But all of Roosevelt's record was not so dark.
respite for men workers as

contr~

Althoug.a he opposed

to the principles of free enterprise, he

did support measures safeguarding women and children and the health of all
workers.

He voted for measures to limit the hours of women and to provide

factory inspectors to enforce safety provisions.

In 1882, we fino him

voting for a bill that provided safety measures in workshops and factories.
The next year, he approved a measure to increase the safety measures necessary
and to limit the hours of mechanics to w.aat was considered a healthful
number.

In 1884, he applied the limited hours bill to building workers.

also agreed to the establishment of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

He
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A~ter

leaving the Assembly, Roosevelt felt called upon to defend

his seemingly unsympathetic stand on the labor question.

In a magazine

article, he explained that he felt that people should depend on themselves,
not the state.

In his opinion the state had already done much to help

tne working man and labor unjustly accused the "system" of being wrong. 9
T~1is

same idea was repeated in his message to the legislature of the state

when he was its governor in 1899. 10

This stand is consistent with his

great belief in the necessity for man to help himself and in the principle
of rtlaissez fairen, still popular at that time.

P..oosevelt, as a Uew York

Assemblyman, was a far way removed from the Progressive platform of 1912.
As governor of New York Roosevelt's labor record is more consistent
with the principles of tne progressives.

In his inaugural message, he

reiterated his new solicitude for organized labor which had been spoken of
in the campaign. 11

During the campaign, Roosevelt admitted t:n.at ne nad been

rather uncharitable to labor in his past and announced tnat ae D.ad seen the
light. 12

Although he was far from a radical reformer as governor, his

position was advanced over that of his days in the Assembly.
One of Roosevelt's earliest suggestions to the legislature regarded
the law requiring an eight-hour day and a prevailing rate of wages for
state employees.

This law had been enacted in 1897 and had been poorly

9 Ibid., 105, citing T. Roosevelt, "Phases of State Legislation,"
Centu~J, XXIX, 826 (April, 1885).
0 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 10.
1 Ibid., 2.
2 Pringle, 206.
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enforced.

Roosevelt suggested to tne legislature tnat "if this law is to

remain on the statute books, it should be enforced, and, therefore, the
Legislature should make it the particular tiusiness of somebody to enforce

it·" 13

The legislature followed ttle governor• s recormnendation and amended

the law of 1897.

Although Roosevelt•s suggestion to tne legislature coula

hardly be said to constitute strong approval of the principle of the eighthour day for labor, he showed, in signing tne bill,
pathetic with this idea.

Here he said:

11

t~at

i1e was not unsym-

It is highly desirable that the

principle whic11 this law seeks to establish should be really established and
taat tne nominal purpose of the eight-hour aay snould be in fact fulfilled.nJ4
Later on in his first year as governor,

l~osevelt

suggested that the

legislature establisn a Board of Factory Inspectors t0 enforce labor
regulations.

15 This was followed

b;y the law that buildings to be used for

manufacturing should be granted a permit after inspection by the -Board.
This was designed to wipe out tne
facturing. 16

11

sweat snop 11 system of tenement manu-

The passage of tnese laws was among the most notable accom-

plishments of Roosevelt•s first year as governor. 17
In his annual Message of December, 1899, Roosevelt gave another indication of how far he had traveled from his labor stand as an Assemblyman.
In the Assembly, he had voted against limiting the working hours of the

13

Roosevelt, public Papers,

14 Ibid., 94-98.
1s rora., 11-12.
16 Ibid., 13.

17 BIShop, I, 124.

4.
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employees of the street railways. 18 In 1899, he said:

"The law regulating

the hours of labor on surface railroads is also an excellent provision against the tendency to work the men to an almost unlimited number of hours. 11 J9
Thus was the Rooseveltian attitude on labor being revised.
In this same message, Roosevelt had included a suggestion that the
legislature provide for employer liability.

However, Benjamin B. Odell, Jr.,

the Republican State Chairman, intimated tnat this was not desirable and
Roosevelt removed it. 20

Tnis was an indication of the general tenor of

events during the second year of Roosevelt's governorship.

He was handi-

capped in whatever labor legialation that he might nave desired to have
enacted by tae spector of the presidential election of 1900.

As governor

of Eew York, he was expected to carry his state for his party and the party
leaders, who could also withnold the nomination for governor from him,
urged him to a policy of caution so as not to alien:te essential sources of
support. 21
As President, Roosevelt's labor policy became more clearly defined.
ae summed up this attitude himself in a speech in April of 1902 and his
statement is worth quoting for it pertains not only to labor but to capital
as well.
This is the era of the great combinations both of labor and
capital •••• But they must work under the same law, and the laws
concerning them must be just and wise ••• conceived in the spirit
18 Hurwitz, 95-104.
19 Roosevelt, Public Pape~ 11.
20 Pringle, 211-212.
21 Ibid., 211.
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I

of those who ••• recognize the need ••• of gJ.vJ.nc: the vl'idest scope
nossible for the free exercise of incividual initiative, and yet
who recognize also that after cOl'lbinations have reached a certain
stage it is indis:oensable to the general welfare that the Nation
should exercise over them, cautiously and firmly, the power of
supervision and regulation. 22
This exnlains much of his attitude for, at all times, he was a firm
believer in orcerliness and confirmation to the law.
In studying Roosevelt's recorc as nresident, his attitude on the variou
problems as nresenteo in the ?regressive narty platform will be, in so
far.as nossible, considered separately.

In regard to some of these, such

as restricted hours for women and safety measures, he hac already indicated
his approval as 'Sovernor of New York.

For some of the others, we can

look to his Jears in the White Eouse.
Roosevelt's ideas on at least one of the reforms advocated in the
;Jlatform of 1912 underwent considerable change during his political lifetime.

Long before the formation of the Progressive oarty, in 1896 to be

.

exact, the Der.1ocratic olatform contained a plank condemning the use of
injunctions in la.bor cisnutes.
"contains

a.'1

Conunenting on this, Roosevelt said that it

attack uryon the main deryendence of our liberties 11 and that it

was fitting that "with the cemand for free silver should go the demand for
free riot." 23

But this cannot be said to be Roosevelt's attitude even

before he became the Progressive party candidate in 1912.
22. Theodore ·Roosevelt, Presidential Messages and State Papers of Theodore
Roosevelt, F. F. Colher anc Son, New York-;-n.c., I, 26. ·

23

Pringle, 163.
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In

190.5, the U."lions started a move the deprive the courts of the right

to is·sue injunctions in labor disnutes.
Roosevelt opposed this bill, but he

In his annual ;-::essage of that year,

su~gested

that the procedure in injunc-

tion cases mi:;ht be regulated by requirin'?: the judge to r_sive due notice to
the arverse oarties before granting the wril.
congress in that year, but it was defeated.
Throughout the year

Such a bill was presented to

24

190.5, Roosevelt had worked for the protection of

labor against the excessive use of the injunction des:·Jite the fact that he
did not a--yorove of the exact legislation desired by the unions. 2 .5
he continuer' his efforts.

In

1906,

In !!Tay of that year, he said that he opposed

having any "operation of the law turn into an engine of oppression against
the wage-worker."

In his I'lessage to Congress, the-presiden.t pointed to

abuses 11 which were possible

~)ecause

"gra~e

of the use made of the injunction in the

hands of caoi tal. 26

He had his bill of the year before introduced into

Congress once again.

The unions continued their opposition, but Roosevelt

would make no further concessions.

The law was not passed, however, even

in the limited form thd Roosevelt asked. 2 7
vVhen Congress convened in :Cecember of
for a limitation in the use of injunctions.

1907, Roosevelt was still working
On January

31, 1908, he sent a

24

Bishon, II, 1.5.
2.5 frin~le, 429.
26 Theodore 3oosevelt, State Papers as Governor and President, 1899-1909

27

(volume XV of :.-~-orks,ecr:-by HermanHagedorn) National ~clition, Charles
Scribner's Sons, Kew York, 1926. Subsequently referred to as Roosevelt,
Works, XV.
Bishon, II, 16.
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special message to Congress that was the most radical of all his messages.
In it he scourged the courts for their promptness in using the injunction
against labor unions. 28

He disclaimed any intention to abolish the injunc~

tion nrocess, which, in the hands of a wise judge, was an essential part
of the judicial machinery.

On the other hand, he said,

11

it has sometimes

been used heedlessly and unjustly, and ••• some of the injunctions ••• inflict
grave and occasiona2-ly irre'Jarable wrong upon. those enjoined." 29
sent another message to Conzress asking the limitation of

t~e

He later

injunction

but this was among the suggestions of the nresident which Congress chose to
ignore. 30

Yet Hoosevelt certainly tried during his administration t:> obtain

a law that would ,rotect the workers and the unio!l leaders in event of a

strike.
Yet it must not be sup:Josed from the above that Roosevelt was a person
to condone disregard for the law and for order.

Hepeatedly in his public

utterances, we find the idea that violence was to be deplored.

In a Labor

Day sneech in Syracuse, !\lew York in 1903, he pointed out that "there is no
worse enemy of the

~age-worker

than the man who condones mob violence in any

shane or who preaches class hatred."

He coc1tinued by pointing out that when

business was bad all people suffered and there was, therefore, great need
for all to work together. 31

28
29
30

31

Mowry, 28.
Pringle, 47 8.
Ibici. , 482-483.
Bishop, I, 257.
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Roosevelt exoressed much the same disa•)proval of violence in connection
with labor organizations in the Annual ivies sage to Congress in December of

1904.

This section of the message is worth repeating.
Wage-workers have an entire rightto organize and by all peaceful means to endeavor to persuade their fellows to join their
organizations. They have under no circumstances the right to
commit violence upon those, w-hether canitalists or wage-earners,
who refuse to sup'Oort their organization, or who side vfith those
with whom they are at odds, for mob rule is intolerable at any
time. 32

•

Roosevelt was strongly in favor of the creation of a Cabinet post to
look after the interest of the laborir.g class and to protect and foster his
anti-trust prog;ram.

For this purnose, in his first message to Congress after

;:cKinley' s death, he suggested the creation of a Department of 8orrunerce and
Labor with power to investigate corporate earnings and to guard the rights
of the workingman. 33

Congress followed his sug~estion and created the

Jepartment in February of 1903.

The Department included a Bureau of Corpora-

tions which was to devote itself especially to the trust question. 34
Roosevelt was pleased with the action of Congress and felt that this was
one of the outstandir.g achievements of his first term in office.

35

Another important part of the Progressive party platform concerned

32
33

34
35

Ibid., II, 426.
Pringle, 245-246.
Ibid., 341, also Rhodes, 296-297.
Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, October 26, 1904,
Letters to Kermit from Theodore Roosevelt, 1902-1908, Will Irwin, ed.,
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1946, 78-79. Subsequently referred to
as Roosevelt, Letters to Kermi!•
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itself with the demand for workmen's compensation or employers' liability
legislation.

Roosevelt took up this problem early.

We have seen that he

was interested in it as governor of New York and he did not
interest as president.

forge~

his

In his message of December, 1904, he suggested the

possibility of workmen's compensation to Congress. 36 He continued to keep
the idea in mind and in 1905, Roosevelt promoted the idea of employers'
liability legislation for the District of Columbia. 37 Finally, the president's efforts bore fruit and on June 11, 1906, Congress passed the Employer
Liability act. 38
The difficulties were not over, however.

The Supreme Court declared

the Employers 1 Liability act unconstitutional on January 6, 1908 because
it was not made to apply only to injuries incurred in interstate commerce. 39
When Roosevelt sent his message to Congress in Januar,y of 1908, he called
the attention of Congress to the action of the court and suggested another
law that would meet the Constitutional requirements.
made to apply to carriers in interstate commerce only.

He asked that it be
He also called for

workmen's compensation for all government employees, and expressed the hope
that the "same broad principle" would be applied to all private employers.

40

This was followed by a special message on the subject 41 and finally, on
April 22, 1908, Congress enacted a law drawn up to Roosevelt's specifications

36 Pringle, 360.
37 Ibid., 430.
38 Rhodes, 337.
39 Ibid., 331.
40 Pringle, 478.

41

~.,

482.
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This law was upheld by the Supreme Court on January 15, 1912. 42 As he was
preparing to leave office, Roosevelt summed up his achievements by saying
that, although Congress did not give him everything that he wanted, he
bad obtained a good Employers• Liability act and he was justly proud of
the fact. 43
When discussing workmen's compensation in his message of 1904, Roosevelt
also suggested the need for eliminating child labor abuses.

Any such sug-

gestion was greatly opposed by the manufacturers. 44 Again in 1905, Roosevelt suggested an investigation of conditions relative to child labor. 45
It was not until 1908, however, that any law regulating child labor was
enacted, and then it applied only to the District of Columbia. 46
One of the best known labor incidents during the Roosevelt administration was the coal strike which began on May 15, 1902. 47

The strike

dragged on through the summer with the owners refusing to arbitrate.

With

winter approaching and the nation threatened with a serious coal shortage,
the president decided to take action.

On October 3, Roosevelt invited

Mitchell, president of the union, and the operators, chief of whom was
George F. Baer, to a conference in Washington.
to have an arbitration board appointed.

The operators again refused

Mitchell then turned down Roosevelt'

suggestion that the miners return to work while a commission reviewed the

42 Rhodes, 337.
43 Letter of May 30, 1908, Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit, 247~248.
44 Pringle, 360.
45 Ibid., 360.
46 Letter of May 30, 1908, Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit, 247-248.
47 Rhodes, 236.
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facts in the dispute.

48 The president then threatened to have the mines

taken over and run by the
agreed to arbitrate.
appointed.

~·

This brought the owners into line and

th~

The miners went back to work and a commission was

The event was significant because it was the first time in

American history that the federal government had officially acknowledged
that "at times justice might lay with labor in its disputes with capital." 49
Roosevelt was just as ready to use the army against labor when it
threatened violence as against capital when it refused to cooperate.

The

summer that the coal strike was in progress, there was also a general strike
of labor unions in Chicago.
at that city.
support.

On a tour of the Middle West, Roosevelt stopped

A delegation of the strikers called on him and urged his

His answer is an excellent summary o£ his feelings relative to

organized labor.

He said:

"I am a believer in unions •••• But the union

must obey the law just as the corporation must obey the law."
threatened to use the

~

And he

against the unions if necessary to maintain

order. SO
There is one other incident that should be cited.

It illustrates

Roosevelt's interest in seeing that labor received some degree of justice.
In February, 1908, the Lowville and Nashville Railway company announced
its intention of reducing wages because of "drastic laws inimical to the
interests of the railroads."

48 Ibid., 239-246.

49 Mowry, 18-19.
50 Bishop, I, 440.
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Other companies made similar announcements.
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On

Febru~

18, the president sent an open letter to the Interstate Commerce

commission ordering an investigation to determine the real cause of the
reduction.
mind.

This threat was sufficient to make the railroad change its

5l
Many of the reforms which Roosevelt suggested, in other fields as well

as in the field of labor, were not enacted by Congress.

This is especially

true of the latter part of his administration when the forceful language
he used in making suggestions to Congress alienated that body.

Yet the

very recklessness of his course "advanced the day when the reforms were
adopted.

They made these heresies (the reforms which he promoted) familiar.

They were still heresies, however, when he left the White House." 52
seems to sum up Roosevelt's position on labor.
about those particular measures which he
conscious of the problem.

Even in his

He made a great deal of fuss

wan~ed

dem~ds

This

and thus made the nation

he did not ask as much as

did the Progressive party platform but he did help people to appreciate the
problems of labor.
La Follette came from a predominantly agricultural state and so he
would not be expected to be as aware of labor problems nor as interested
in labor reform as Roosevelt, coming as he did from industrial New York.
It is true that he devoted the greater part of his efforts to reforming
political conditions and to controlling the trusts, especially the railroads.
Yet, in view of his background, La Follette showed a surprising interest
in the problems facing the working man.

51 Ibid., II, 81-82.
52 Pringle, 485.
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One of La Follette's earliest recommendations relative to the relief
of workers came in his message to the legislature of his state on Januar,y
15, 1903.

At that time he suggested for their attention the "question of

more effieient protection to employees of railroad companies" recommending
"compensation for injuries which he (the employee)

~

receive through no

fault of his own, ••• (and) provision for the support and maintenance of wife,
children, or other dependents, if his life be destroyed in the performance
of his duty." 53

Later that same year, at his Labor Day address at Beloit,

La Follette discussed the trust question.

In the course of his speech, he

pointed out that during the previous six years the wages of factor,y workers
in Wisconsin had increased, on.. the whole, only about ten per cent, while
the cost of living had increased about twenty-seven per cent during the same
period.

This was practically the first public mention of the "high-cost-

of-living" note later to be so familiar. 54

It showed that even at this

early date, La Follette was not entirely uninterested in bettering the
conditions of the working man.
The legislature of 1903 did not take La Follette's suggestions but in

1905, with political reform and railroad regulation completed, the legislature took up some of the other reforms which La Follette thought necessar.r
Included in these reforms, introduced by La Follette while governor of
Wisconsin, ware workingmen's compensation and the creation of an industrial

53 Ellen Torrelle, compiler, The Political Philosophy of Robert M. La
Follette as Revealed .!!: HiSSpeeches and Writings, The Robert-M.I:a
Follette Company, Madison, Wisconsin,-r925, 129-130.
54 Barton, 279.
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commission which had the power to Hcontrol and regulate the most difficult
questions of sanitation, safety, health and moral well-being whieh affeet
the workers of the state." 55 These early measures in a state that was
essentially agricultural show a surprising resemblance to the Progressive
party platform of 1912.
After the legislative session of 1905 in Wisconsin, La Follette moved
his area of action to the United States Senate.

There most of his time

was spent opposing measures which he felt Were contrar,y to his principles.
But he was not without his positive suggestions.

It was La Follette who

introduced the Employer Liability act in 1906, a bill which was considered
as a glory to the Roosevelt administration. 56 When this bill was declared
unconstitutional, La Follette introduced a similar bill eliminating the
unconstitutional features in the Senate in 1907. 57

It was this bill which

passed and withstood examination by the Supreme Court and which Roosevelt
supporters made much of in discussing his labor record.
excellent

testim~ny

This bill alone is

to La Follette's concern for labor.

In addition to his efforts on behalf of the Employers' Liability act,

La Follette's record in the Senate had other things to commend it.

He was

instrumental in securing the passage of legislation establishing the doctrine
of comparative negligence in

55 La Follette, 311.
56 Torrelle, 138.

57

~.,

139.

rail~

employment; and he brought about a bill
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that forbade more than sixteen consecutive hours on duty for railwa,y employees.

La Follette, himself, thought that sixteen hours were a long time but

many of the workers felt that any further restriction would limit their
earning power too much. 58 In 1910, he again came to the defense of labor

In a

and gave good indication of his feelings relative to labor unions.

speech before the Senate, La Follette urged that the provisions of the
Sherman Anti-Trust law not be made applicable to the labor unions.

He felt

that the courts were unnecessarily harsh in the application of the law in
relation to the unions and, furthermore, that the law was never intended te
refer to organizations of workingmen.

59

Although La Follette's record as a labor reformer is not as extensive
as Roosevelt's, it is equally as commendable.

In fact, there is no evidence

that he was ever inimical to labor and, although he did not talk as much
about the topic, his ideas on the subject all resulted in substantial gain
for the working man.

We have seen that the very bill

~ich

Roosevelt counted

as an outstanding achievement of his administration was a product of

La Follette's efforts.
In concluding this chapter on employees, it is enlightening to consider
a particular set of employees--those working for the government.

The ex-

tension of civil service was a most important question during the period
we are considering.

The Progressive party platform took note of it.

The

platform expressed its approval of civil service and urged its strengthening.

58 Ibid., 139.
59 !5IO., 130-131.
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The platform said that civil serVice law should be enf'orced in spirit as
well as in letter.

rt wanted postmasters, collectors, marshalls and all

other nonpolitical officers added to the classified lists.
continuous service during good behavior

&~d

It favored

efficiency and an equitable

retirement law. f:IJ
Any discussion of civil service reform revolves around Theodore Roose-

An authority on the subject who was a great admirer of his called

velt.
him,

11

both as Commissioner and afterwards as President, the leading pro-

tagonist in t11e struggle for the overthrow of the spoils system." 61
Another authority claims that, though Roosevelt worked.haro as civil service
commissioner, as governor of New York and later as president he did not
try as strenuously to "wreck the organization" by drying up tne sources
of power as he

mig~1t

have done.

He feels that then Roosevelt v;iewed the

spoils system with an air of amused tolerance." 62 Whatever view one takes,
Roosevelt's promotion of civil service did much to further tne cause of that
reform.
Roosevelt's interest in civil service showed itself early in his
career.

He made a few speeches on the topic to the Twenty-first District

Republican Club wnen he first joined that organization and its members
did not appreciate them. 63

When he was elected to the New York Assembly,

60 Payne, 319-320, from the Progressive Party Platform.
61 William Dudley Foulke, Roosevelt and the Spoilsman, National Civil
Service Reform League, New York, 192~.

62 Gosnell, 219.
63 Pringle, 59.
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he continued to work for civil service.

In 1883, he got a bill before the

Assembly that made civil service mandator,r for the state and permissable
in all cities therein of more than

5o,ooo

population.

This bill was passed.

Tne following year, he supported a bill making civil service imperative
in cities of more than 20,000 population and to service in police, fire,
and other departments.

11

It was largely tt'1.rough his efforts that these

reforms were enacted." 64
As governor of New York, Roosevelt signea the Civil Service Rules on
June 3, 1899. 65

These reestablished civil service in the state after it

had been suspended by the "Black Act" which had repealed tne original law
of 1883. 66

After this law was passed, Roosevelt supplanted the "starchless

rules" by a set more rigid than had yet been established in any state. 67
This was consistent witn his expressed idea on civil service.

Of this

reform, he said:
Civil-service reform is not merely a movement to better public
service. It ac~ieves this end too; but its main purpose is to
raise the tone of public life, and it is in this direction thg~
its effects have been of incalculable good to the community.
outside the state of New York, Roosevelt was no less active in working
for civil service reform.

He was appointed Civil Service Commissioner in

1889 and served for six years. 69

As commissioner, he did some fine work

and made some excellent improvements in the service.
64

Foulke, 8.

65 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 137-182.
F'oulke, 49.
Gosnell, 217.
68 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 100.
69 Ibid., 100.

66
67

He insisted that the
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list of persons eligible for examination be made public and ordered each
such list posted openly in post offices and custom houses.

Je also insisted

that the questions asked in the various exams be of a practical nature. 70
During his term as commissioner, the classified service was greatly extended.
By the inclusion of the railway mail service, the smaller free-delivery
offices, the Indian School service, the Internal Revenue service, and other
less important branches, the extent of the public serrtce, which was tmder
the protection of the law was more than doubled.

More than 50,000 govern-

ment worl{ers were added to the civil service classification. 7l Of this
Roosevelt said:

"Our aim was always to procure tne extension of tile

classified service as rapidly as possible, and to see that the law was
administered thoroughly and fairly.~~ 72
A few examples will serve to illustrate Roosevelt's continued concern
over civil service while he was president.

At tne beginning of his first

tenn, he repealed a'1 order exempting from examination a great number of
employees of various departments and added to the classified list all
superintendents of Indian Schools acting as agents
service. 73

a~d

tne rural delivery

During Roosevelt's second administration, tne local civil

service boards were consolidated into districts with an experienced man in
charge of each.

Before he left office, thirteen such offices had been

established. 74
70 Foulke, 26.
71 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 116.
72 Ibid., 100.
73 Foulke, 54.
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Foulke criticizes Roosevelt's
to civil service reform.
position.

cha~ged

stand on two questions relative

The reformers did not agree with his second

In the matter of promotions, Roosevelt first felt that they

should be by written examination but later changed his mind, probably due
to his experiences as Police Commissioner in New York City.

Regarding

removals, the law as interpreted during McKinley's administration required
reasons for dismissal, notice, and opportunity to answer.
curred.

Roosevelt con-

As president, however, he made summary removal the procedure if

an offense was committed in his presence or that of the head of a Department.
In other cases, there was to be no hearing altnough the cause of removal
had to be stated in writing.

Taft later reestablished McKinley's plan. 75

Despite this cri t.icism, Foulke did feel ti1.at 11 he (Roosevelt) was the only
president Who from the beginning to the end of his career uniformly supporte
Civil Service. 11 76 His record on tnis reform certainly met the requirements
of the Progressive party platform.
La Follette also indicated an early interest in civil service.

one

of the things advocated by nis newspaper, Tne state, in 1897, was a state
civil service law. 77

This was later enacted by the state but there is no

evidence to suppose that La Follette ever had Roosevelt's interest in the
subject.

He seems to have been a follower on this topic rather tha!l a leadE!"

74 Ibid., 100.
75 rora., 1o2-1o5.
76 rbicl., 81.
77 La Follette, 209.
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A summary of tne positions of the two men on labor reform seems to
snow, as previously suggested in this cnapter, that Roosevelt attracted
much more attention but actually did no more ti1an La Follette.

In fact,

the latter had a more consistently favorable attitude toward the working
man.

ne did not have the natural

SJ~pathy

with labor, coming as he did

from an agricultural state, but he did develop a generous attitude.

Roose-

velt was inclined to speak and act in generalities while La Follette's
work was more specific.

He was certainly as much, if not more, in sympathy

with the program laid down by the Progressive party platform in 1912.

CHAPTER V
THE FIGHT ON THE TRUSTS
The terms ntrust-busting 11 and Roosevelt are so closely allied as to
be almost synonymous.

Certainly, as in the case of labor reform, he did

much to make the public conscious of the need of some type of regulation
of the great companies that were dominating American life during the latter
part of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries.
But it is our purpose here to determine to what extent each merited the
sobriquet of "trust-buster."
The Progressive party platform expressed the sentiments of progressives
everywhere when it said:
We demand that the test of true prosperity shall be the benefits
conferred thereby on all the citizens, not confined to individuals
or classes, and that the test of corporate efficiency shall be
the ability better to serve tne public; that those who profit
by control of business affairs shall justify that profit and
that control by sharing with the public the fruits thereof. 1
It suggested enforcement of these ideas by the strong national regulation
of inter-state corporations, the establishment of a Federal administration
commission to supervise industrial corporations engaged in inter-state
commerce, and the strengthening of the Sherman Anti-Trust law.

rt wanted

to give tne Inter-State Commerce Commission the power to value the physical
property of the railroads as a basis for rate-fixing. 2

1 Payne, 310-312, from the Progressive Party Platform.
2 Ibid., 310-312.
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not more inclusive because so much had already been done.

It is our concern

to discover the part played by Roosevelt and La Follette in this doing.
One of the earliest fonns of trust regulation was the attempt to
force the companies to pay tneir just portion of ttle taxes of the various
states.

We find that Roosevelt was working toward this end very early

nis career.

irt

As an Assemblyman, he and a fellow-legislator, :Mike Costello,

led the fight to prevent the return of over one-half of the taxes collected
by the state from the elevated company of New York.
ing to pusn such a bill through tne Assembly.

The company was attempt

Roosevelt did not succeed

in stopping the passing of the bill but he did attract so much publicity to
it that the governor vetoed the measure. 3
In one of his earliest proclamations to the legislature of New York
as its governor, Roosevelt returned to the problen1 of taxation of business.
In his message relating to Tax Laws on March 27, 1899, he said:
It remains true that a corporation which derives its powers
from the state, should pay to the state a just percentage of its
earnings as a return for the privileges it enjoys. This should
be especially true for tne franchises bestowed upon gas companies,
street railroads and the like •••• Qne thing is certain, that the
franchises snould in some form yield a monied return to the
government. 4
Later on, in May of 1899, he further stated that the taxation of franchises
was a right of the state and reconunended a law which would tax ti:1em as
realty and which would provide for the assessment of the tax by the Board
3

4

Roosevelt, Autobiography, 80-81.
Roosevelt, Public Papers, 55-56.
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of state Tax Commissioners.

5

Roosevelt's insistence on franchise taxation forced the Assembly to
consider the matter despite tne opposition of Platt and the regular Republican organization. 6 After the law was passed, Roosevelt indicated his
intention of seeing that it was enforced.

Platt asked the governor to

sign a bill on behalf of tne New York Central Railroad exempting grade
crossings of steam railroads from the provisions of the bill.

Roosevelt

thought that this was contrary to the spirit of the bill and replied to
platt that his message had come too late as he (Roosevelt) nad already
issued a statement saying that the tax corrmdssioners were opposed to the
proposed measure. 7

Roosevelt made it very clear, however, that his actions

as governor were not directed at the destruction of industry.
"we do not wish to discourage enterprise.

H~

said that

vre do not desire to destroy

corporations; we do desire to put them fully at the service of the State
and the people. n 8
When Roosevelt was catapulted into the presidency by McKinley's assassination, the world of Wall street shuddered.

It took repeated assurances

by the leading conservative Republicans tnat there would be no cnange in
policy under Roosevelt to prevent a serious panic in the stock market. 9

5 Ibid., 107, also Theodore Roosevelt, The Roosevelt Policy, Speeches,
Letters and State Papers, Relating to-corporate Wealth and Closely
Allied Topics, The current Literature Publishing Co~pany, New York,
1968, I, 8. Subsequently referred to as Roosevelt, Policy.
6 Gosnell, 198-199.
7 Ibid., 273.
8 Roosevelt, Policy, I, 19.
9 Pringle, 237-238.
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Roosevelt did go slowly when he first came to the Wni te House out of
deference to party narmony, but he was not one to long remain quiet.

He

watched the ever-increasing power and self-assurance of the industrialists
and felt a corresponding reduction in the power of the government.

He

determined to challenge the ntyranny of plutocracyn that he believed was
being established. 10

The point of attack chosen was tne Northern Securities

company, a holding company recently organized by the Morgan interests acting
for Hill, Harriman, and other of the railroad magnates.
on February 19, 1902, Attorney-Generql Knox announced that the government would shortly demand the dissolution of the Northern Securities Company. 11

The news came as a great shock to the industrialists despite the

fact that, on January 7, the attorney-general of Minnesota had filed suit
against the company under a 1ti.nnesota statute that forbade the consolidation
of comp~ting railroads. 12
st. Paul on March 10. 13

The Federal government's suit was filed in
The litigation had much greater significance

than the breaking up of a llolding company.

It was the first time since

its passage that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was to be sincerely and energetically enforced.

It gave new heart to the reform elements. 1 4

\Vhile tne Northern Securities case was still pending, Roosevelt went
on a speaking tour of the northeastern states.

Tnere in the stronghold of

industry, ;1e again stressed the need for the regulation of the trusts.

10 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 423-425.
11 Mowry, 18.
12 Pringle, 257.
13 Ibid. , 257.
14 ~,1owry, 18.

At
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providence, Rhode Island, he reiterated his belief that

11

the nation must

assume this power of control by legislation; if necessar.y by constitutional
amendment.

The immediate necessity in dealing with trusts is to place them

under the real, not nominal control of some sovereign to which, as its
creatures, the trusts shall owe allegiance, and in
eign's orders may be enforced.n 15

w~ose

courts the sover-

In this same address, however, he gave

evidence of the concilatory spirit that so often softened his blows directed
at corporations.

He brought out that a difference existed between the good

and the bad companies, urged that legislation against business not be too
stringent, and suggested that the power of the government should be exercised with "wisdom and restraint." 16
On March 14, 1904, the Supreme Court dissolved the
Company by a vote of

5-4.

l7

~orthern

Securities

Logically, the government should then have

started proceedings against its founders as law-breakers.
Roosevelt, nor anyone else, desired this.

But neither

The suit had served its purpose;

the government now haa, nominally, the power to deal wi tn the corporations
dangerous to the public good.

Moreover, Pringle suggested, the campaign

of 1904 was approaching and Roosevelt had no desire to further antagonize
the financial support of the Republican party. 18
The establis.hrnen t of the Department of commerce and Labor has been
mentioned in a previous cnapter of this paper, but it is necessary to review

15 Roosevelt, Policy, I, 36.
16 Ibid., 37.
17 Rhodes, 224.
18 Pringle, 263.
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this again.

Roosevelt insisted that the Department include a Bureau of

Corporations witil tne power to "investigate the operations and conduct of
interstate corporations." 19

Business opposed this and Congress was dubious.

The president, however, enlisted public support on his side and., as mentione
previously, the Bureau of Corporations was in the Department of Commerce
and Labor when it was founded.

Roosevelt felt that this was "one of the

most important accomplishments of my administration.u 20

But after the

passage of the bill, Roosevelt controlled the investigations of the Bureau,
and any desire he might have nad to further prosecute the fight against the
trusts, until after the election of 1904.
The election had hardly been favorably concluded when the specter of
corporation control stirred again in Washington.

Just a, few days before the

close of 1904, James A. Garfield, Commissioner of Corporations, issued
a report recommending that congress pass legislation to bring all corporation
engaged in inter-state trade under Federal supervision.

Business was prop-

erly saocked by this sudden indication of the administration nto bite the
hand that fed it.n 21

It was even more apprehensive when Roosevelt gave

his speech to the Union League Club of Philadelphia a month later.

Here

he brought out the necessity of increased government supervision of business
to meet the increased development of indus·t;,ry.

He said that a constitutional

amend.'T!ent would have to be passed if the courts refused to uphold Federal
19 Ibid., 340, citing New York Times, January 7, 1903.
20 Bishop, II, 330.
21 Mowry, 23, citing Report of the Commissioner of Corporations (House
Document 165, 58th Congress,~d Session), 4s:-
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regulation of corporations.

He made special mention of tne need to control

the railroads. 22
Nothing of a spectacular nature was accomplished with the outgoing
congress, however, and action had to wait for the new Congress to meet.
Also Roosevelt

beca~e

so engrossed in problems of an international nature

that reform was, for a time, crowded out of the limelight.

When he came

back to the fray it was to concentrate on railroad legislation.
The

£~kins

Act had been passed on February 19, 1903.

It forbade the

granting of rebates to favored snippers and is counted one of the achievements of Roosevelt's first administration by his supporters. 23

Actually,

it was framed with tne help of the operators thensel ves and they supported
it. 24 No serious effort seems to have been made to enforce this bill,
however; the rebates went on despite the
the situation.

~~appiness

of the railroads over

They were tired of the demands made upon them by the large

shippers and saw more profit for tnemselves if rebates were abolished. 25
But enforcement of the Elkins Act was not the answer to the need for regulation of the railroads.

It did not begin to strike at the real problem.

The magnitude of the problem in regard to the railroads becomes obvious
w~en

we examine some of the statements made by the contro]ers of the roads.

So great was their power that in 1906 E. H. Harriman, railroau czar of the

22 Roosevelt., works, XV, 215-226.
23

Rhodes, 29o;---

24 Pringle, 340.
25 Ibid., 417.
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United States, could say:
lature, I can buy it.

"Whenever I want legislation from a state legis-

I can buy Congress.and ••• tne judiciary." 26

Certainly

tnis is sufficient to make tne need for some curtailment of the power of the
railroads obvious.
In his message of December, 1904, Roosevelt urged that the Inter-State
commerce Commission be given the authority to change the rates charged by
railroads on tne complaint of the shipper.

Tilis change was to be made if

the rate charged was found unreasonable after a full hearing of the facts
and it was to be subject to judicial review.

Roosevelt did not go so far

as to suggest that the C:ommission be given the power to fix rates and,
in fact, termed this as "undesirable.,. 27

This was the opening move in the

fight tnat was to eventually bring tne Hepburn bill onto the statute books.
In accordance with the president 1 s suggestion, the Esch-Townsend bill
was introduced into the House of Representatives early in 1905.
embodied the president 1 s de:nands for rate-making. 28
Congress, however,
demands.

a~d

This

This was a ntame-Duck 11

the Senate was not as responsive to the president•s

'Ihere the bill never got out of the Committee on Interstate

Commerce. 29

Roosevelt, never one to give up when there was a prospect of

a fight, talked constantlya:fl regulation throughout the following year. 3°
When Congress met in 1905, the opposing camps were ready for battle.
26 Rhodes, 332, citing Review of Reviews, ed., 857.
27 Ibid., 323.
-28 MSWry, 24, citing Congressional Record, 58tn Congress, 3rd Session,
Vol. 39, 952.

29

30

Bishop, I, 428.
Pringle, 418.
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The message wrlicn Roosevelt sent to Congress when it met in 1905
reaffinned nis demands for a railroad regulation bill.
he went further than he had done in 1904.

This time, however,

Although he did not· ask that the

Interstate Commerce Commission be given the right to establish rates, ne
did suggest that that body be given the pow·er to prevent the nimposition of
unjust or unreasonable rates.n

]e also requested that all of the accounts

of the railroads be open to the public. 31 When the bill was introduced
into the House by Representative Peter Hepburn of Iowa, the man

gave

wi1o

his name to the measure, it was more radical than the president had suggeste
in tne power it gave to the commission. 32

The House passed this bill on

February 8, 1906 by a vote of 346 to 7 with 3 answering merely npresent 11
and 29 not voting. 33
It was not as simple to obtain Senate approval of the Hepburn
Roosevelt, himself, was not entirely confident of its
too, tne source of the opposition.

pass~ge.

bi~l.

He realized,

Concerning this, he wrote to Kermit:

In trying to pass tile rate bill I have come straight against
the most powerful corporate interests in tl1e country, wnich
are represented in the Senate by men like Aldrich, Foraker, and
tnerest. I think I shall get the rate Bill through, but it
is a hard and doubtful fight, and they are making every effort
to have some seemingly innocent amendment put in w'nich shall
destroy something of what I am endeavoring to accomplish. 34
Among the amendments suggested to the bill was one introduced by ex-Attorney
General Knox, at that time Senator .from Pennsylvania, calling for general

31 Roosevelt, Works, XV, 274-280.
32 Rhodes, 323.
33

34

Ibid., 324.
of March 4, 1906, Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit, 130.

~er
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court review of the decisions of the commission in rate cases. 35

So

desperate did the fight become that Roosevelt turned away from the Republican
leaders and enlisted

11

th.e aid of some fifteen or twenty Republicans added

to most of the Democrats.n 36

1he combination finally won out and tne bill

passed the Senate, but wi ti1 the amenduent giving the courts tae right to
review the commissions rates, on May 18, 1906 by a vote of 71 to 3 with 15
not voting. 37
Roosevelt was jubilant over the victory and he was confident that final
passage would be secured.

He expressed these sentiments as well as saying

that rrtnis has been my ci1ief fight of the session" in a letter to his son. 38
Roosevelt was rigi1t in his prediction.

A conference of the House and Senate

met and their recommendations were accepted by both houses. 39

The bill as

finally passed gave the Interstate Cominerce Commission jurisdiction over
pipe lines, express

~~d

Pullman operations, refrigeration, storage, and all

otner aspects covered by the general term, transpo:rt..tion.

The rate-making

powers of the cormnission had been strengthened and the accounts of public
carriers were open for examination. 40

The bill was approved by the presi-

dent on June 29, 1906 and became a law. 41
The Hepburn bill, as finally passed, was really a compromise between
tne progressive and the conservative members of the Republican party.

35 Pringle, 422, citing New York Times, February 19, 1906.
36 Letter of April 1, 1906, Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit, 135.
37 Rhodes, 325.
38 Letter of May 20, 1906, Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit, 143.
39 Rhodes, 325.
40 Pringle, L.25.
41

Rhodes, 325'.
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Roosevelt was mucn pleased by this for he felt that it would help heal
tile widening breach in the party. 42

He had been anxious for the bill to

pass in the first place because he felt that it would help to prevent the
more radical step of government ownership of the roads. 43

At the tL~e

the bill was passed, he had opposed La Follette's suggestion that fair rates
could not be detennined upon unless the property of the carriers had first
been evaluated.

In this, as in most other measures, Roosevelt's progressiv-

ism was tempered by considerations of expediency.

It wasnot until his

message to Congress in December of 1908 that he supported the idea of
physical evaluation of the railroads. 44 But then he was about to leave the
•

White House and he had passed the zenith of his influence.
In addition to the work done on rate-making, the Roosevelt administrat·
was active in other spneres.
a Pure Food law

45

In December, 1905, the president recommended

and followed that on June

4,

1906 with a special message

to Congress urging the passage of a law giving the Federal government the
right to inspect all stock yards and packing houses and taeir products that
entered into interstate commerce. 46

These suggestions were largely the

result of the exposures made by the muck-rakers.
There

i~

one incident concerning Roosevelt's relations with the trusts

that occurred darii46 the panic of 1907 and that bears telling.

At that time

42 Mowry, 26.
43 Bishop, I, 428.
44 Mowry, 28.
45 Pringle, 429.
46 Rhodes, 334.
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the United States Steel Corporation, a Morgan interest,

bou~1t

up the

stock of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, thus strengthening its hold
on the steel industry.

Tais stock i1.ad been used as collateral for loans
The Panic of 1907

wl1ich the company maaE:. from various New York banks.

had driven the stock so low that it no longer covered the loans. and the
banks were going to sell it.
Henry

c.

Frick and Elbert

n.

The representatives of United States Steel,
Gary, told Roosevelt that t11eir compailJI would

buy the stock and thus prevent the furtner panic tnat would be caused by
having it dumped on the market.

But

u. s.

Steel hesitated to take the

step because it feared prosecution as a moqppoly.

Roosevelt told Frick

and Gary that, while he coulun 1 t advise the purchase, he did not feel duty
bound to object.

u.

With this assurance,

very low panic prices.

S. Steel bought the stock at the

47
In 1911,

Roosevelt had obviously been duped by the steel company.
Taft 1 s administration started proceedings against the combine.
took this as a personal affront and was furious.
sympathy

~~th

his successor.

Roosevelt

It did not increase his

He answered the implied oriticism with an

editorial in the Outlook in which he gave voice to a theory of industrial
regulation and control of trusts whfch he had developed.
Ta.ftts efforts to restore competition by

11

He criticized

destruction of the trusts" and

advocated instead a thorough regulation by a government body
Interstate Commerce Commission.

sL~lar

to ttie

He even wanted to go so far as to set

prices on commodities manufactured by monopolies. 48

47 Mowry, 189.
48 Ibid., 191-192,~ citing Roosevelt,

Yet, despite these

The Trusts, the People, and the
Square Deal," <!outlook, 649-656 (November 18, 1911).
11
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seemingly restrictive suggestions, the article was favorably received by
the business men of the time.

Sucn confirmed believers in corporations as

Andrew Carnegie, Gary, Grenville 11:. Dodge, and Frank A. Vanderlip publicly
cormnended the article. 49 It is just possible that they felt that Roosevelt's talk hurt less than Taft's action.
Roosevelt's stand on the entire question of trust regulation was well
summed up by nimself.

He always, in his public statements, stressed the

fact that trusts were necessary to modern civilization, and that there were
good trusts and bad trusts.

The good ones were of great benefit to the

people and their owners were true heroes who should be corrunended for their
efforts and who should reap their just rewards in monetary returns for
their endeavors.

He felt tnat the good trusts should be protected from the

radicals who would destroy them. 50

This idea was constant~y repeated

throughout Roosevelt's career and undoubtedly influenced him greatly.
might well account for the fact that the

11

It

trust-buster 11 actually only

started twenty-five proceedings leading to indictment under the Sherman
Act while the "reactionary" Taft began forty-five.
root~

It was probably at the

the fact that it was not until the Taft administration that the

Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company were ordered to
dissolve. 5l With Roosevelt, as was implied earlier, it was not ~nat he
did that earned him his reputation, but what he said.
49
50
51

Ibid., 192.
Roosevelt, Policy, I, 52-53, 82, 151.
Pringle, 427.
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Another topic closely allied with the trusts was tne tariff.

The

Progressive party platform used the usual ambiguous language in establishing
its stand on this.

It did believe in a protective tariff but one 11 which

shall equalize conditions in competition between the United States and
foreign countries both for the farmer and the manufacturer, and which shall
maintain for labor an adequate standard of living."

It went on to

11

demand

downward tariff revision of those duties shown to be excessive", and the
establishment of a tariff commission.

It condemned the Payne-Aldrich

Tariff and demanded immediate repeal of the Canadian Reciprocity Act. 52
With such an innocuous platform, there is little opportunity to be
out of step.

Yet Roosevelt managed it as well as anyone could.

as September, 1910, he was
Aldrich Tariff.

ver~

As late

sparing in his criticism of the Payne-

He was then engaged in

t~jing

to return the Republicans

to Congress and he wrote that, though the tariff was imperfect, it was
"better than the last and considerable better than the one before the
last. n 53

Moreover, it seems fair to presume that the Progressives were

advocating some reduction in the tariff.

But Roosevelt did notning about

such downward revision while he was first in office.

He did talk about

improving the tariff and made a few moves in that direction but quit wnen
Cannon told him that it was politically inexpedient.
this was sound advice. 54

He later admitted that

Later in his second administration, realizing

52 Payne, 316-317, from the Progressive Party Platform.
53 Pringle, 540, citing Outlook, September 17, 1910.
54 Mowry, 45, citing Letter of Roosevelt to Jacob Riis, April 18, 1906,
and to Joseph Cannon, February 28, 1907, Roosevelt MSS.
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that he was soon to leave office, he decided that the party could not risk
another campaign wi tnout promising downward reVision.
nothing more.

He promised but did

55 So, despite the reciprocal trade agreement which he spon-

sored between the United States and Cuba in 1903,

56 it would not seem

that Roosevelt was in sympathy with tne Progressive party plank on the tarif
La Follette nad no such glamorous title as Roosevelt, but he did much
to limit the power of t11e corporations, especially in his own state of
Wisconsin.

He directed his efforts against the greatest offenders in the

state--the railroads.
La Follette adopted his attitude of fearlessly trying to control the
actiVities of the railroads early in his career.

While in the ilouse of

Representatives, he withstood th'e efforts of the railroad lobbyists to
obtain nis approval of the measures they sponsored even when they threatened
to use their influence to defeat him in the next election. 57

When he

returned to the piitical wars in Wisconsin, he made nis position clear from
the first.

In the program of action printed in

~

State, it was expressly

stated that he desired equal taxation for all the property of each individual and every corporation transacting business in the state, and that he
wanted the state to prohibit the acceptance by public officials of railroad
passes, sleeping car passes, express, telephone and telegraph franks--the
ingenious means used by the corporations to gain a hold over the legislators. 58

55 Ibid., 45.
56 Rhodes, 183.
57 Haugen, 94.

58 La Follette, 209-210.
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La Follette continued his agitation especially against the two evils
which he thought most needed correcting.

In announcing his candidacy in

1898, he spoke strongly against free passes and franks and against tax-free
corporations.

59

The influence of La Follette forced the regular Republicans

to incorporate some of the ideas which ne advocated in their platform.
That instrument included planks against the pass evil and for a more equal
taxation. 60

Later in that same 1898, the Republican Club of Milwaukee

county contacted La Follette and obtained a summary of the principles which
he was sponsoring.

Included in these were two which are pertinant.

One

advocated the prohibition of the acceptance of railroad and sleeping car
passes, and express, telegraph, and telephone franks by public officials.
The other urged the enactment and enforcement of laws prohibiting trusts
and combinations that destroyed competition and restrained trade. 61
When La Follette was elected governor, he was pledged to a reformation
of the method of taxing the railroads.

T'nough this was not

an

original

idea with him--Assemblyman A. R. Hall had been advocating it· for many years
as a membe~ of the legislature 62 --he deserves much credit for the subsequent enactment of laws enforcing this reform.
Before revie·wing La Follette 1 s work with tae Yfisconsin legislature
relative to tax reform, it would be well to see wnat progress had been made
in that direction previous to his administration.

59

Barton, 110-111.

W Ibid. , 135.
61
62

Ibid. '

120.
Haugen, 126.

In 1897, a committee
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was appointed by the legislature to study the problem of taxation.

In the

next session of the legislature, in 1899, the committee returned its report,
announcing that tae assessments of pro_t:Jerty were inadequate and tnat there
was gross undervaluation.

It also suggestea that a permanent commission

be appointed to supervise all tax matters, study the question, ana make
reconnnendations. 63

The legislature then passed the 11 ~"1hitehead Bills 11

providing for the taxation, under the ad valorem assessment system, of
express, sleeping car, freigat line, and equipment companies. 64 Although
these laws preceded tne administration of La Follette, tney were largely
due to his influence on the Republican platfonn the previous year.

It was

his influence, too, that brought about t11e anti-pass legislation that was
passed at tile end of the 1899 session. 65
As was to be expected, La Follette 1 s message to the legislature in
1901 contained reference to the problem of railroad taxation.

In it, he

accused the corporation lobbyists of preventing t:ne equitable taxation of
the railroads and l1e proposed a permanent C·:>mmission to supervise and
enforce the tax laws.

tie also asked more stringent anti-trust laws, declar-

ing that the legislature nad the right to prevent monopoly by annulling
charters or by otherwise severely punishing conspiracies to monopolize. 66
In addition, he suggested that the legislature impress upon the temporary
tax committee the duty that it. nad

11

to enforce the provisions of the

63 Ibid., 128.
64 Philipp, 129.
65 Barton, 138.
66 Lovejoy, 56, cit.ing Journal of Assembly (1901),
'rhursday, January 10, 1901, Ib-48.

11

Governor 1 s Messagen,
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(Vfhi tehead) law, that all property be placed on the assessment roll at the
actual cash value. 11 67
On January 31, 1901, two railroa<i bills were introduced into the
'.lfisconsin legislature; one in the Assefllbly by Hall, the oti1er in the Senate
by Whitehead.

Hall's bill provided for an increase in the railroad license

fee from four to five and one half per cent.

Whitehead's measure required

that the railroad taxes by based on the ad valorem value _of tne roads.
On April 10, the license fee bill was reported out of committee with the
recommendation that the bill be postponed until April 23.
subsequently defeated in the Assembly.
ad valorem bill as well.

This bill was

On May 2, the Assembly killed the

The Senate also defeated both measures. 68 On

May 2, La Follette gave vent to his feelings regarding the action of his
legislature.

In vetoing a dog license law that had been passed, he took

occasion to upbraid the legislature for
unwilling to tax the railroads. 69
results.

furt~'ler

tmdng the people wnile being

But the session was not entirely without

The legislatures did make the tax commission, set up in 1899

as a tempora~ body, a permanent institution. 7°
La Follette wasted no time in taking nis fight to the people.

He

believed that platforms were pledges to tne people anci that t11ey si:lould be
lived up to and he showed wi:lere he had been prevented from doing this. 7l
67 Haugen, 130.
68 Barton, 175-178.
69 Ibid., 178.
70 Lovejoy, 67.
71 Howe, 16.
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In the opening speech of his 1902 campaign, he attacked the menace of the
public service corporation and the trusts. 72
a..'1d it bore results.

He continued his attack

He was re-elected and had another opportunity to

put his theories into practice.
La Follette's message to the legislature in 1903 laid great stress
once again on the problem of railroad taxation.

In the section on taxation,

he asked for an ad valorem tax on the railroads and the public service
corporations. 73

He maintained that

11

equal and just taxation is a funda-

mental principle of republican goverru'Jlent.n 74

The most striking feature

of the message, however, was the demand for a permanent commission to fix
&'1d regulate railroad rates.

He showed by tables waere Wisconsin citizens

paid 28 to 40 per cent more in freight rates for the same service than the
people in Iowa and Illinois wnere there were regulatory commissions.

75

In addition to his regular message, La Follette sent three special messages
to this 1903 legislature on the railroad issues. 76

This pressure finally

brought results.
Although unwillingly, the legislature of 1903 did pass an ad valorem
railroad tax.
in both houses.

On February 13, 1903, an ad valorem tax bill was introduced
The two were similar except that the Assembly measure pro-

vided that the tax go into effect in 1903 and did not exampt railroad bonds

72 Lovejoy, 71.
73 Ibid., 76, citing Journal of Senate (1903), 20-84.
74 Barton, 242.
75 Lovejoy, 76, citing Journal of Senate (1903), 20-84.
76 Barton, 230.
--
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from taxation:

the Senate bill would not go into effect until 1904 and it

did exempt bonds.

On March 6, the Assembly passed their bill unanimously.

It then went to the Senate where it was amended.

A conference resulted.

Meanwhile, also on March 6, the railway commission bill, providing for a
commission to fix the rates charged by tne railroads, was introduced into
the Assembly.

Tnis posed a problem for the railroad lobbyists.

They

feared to defeat both of the railroad bills because of the public temper.
The commission bill was more obnoxious thm1 the tax bill because the roads
figured that they could cover the increased taxes by charging higher freight
rates.

£.1oreover, the commission bill was easier to defeat because it had

been suggested by the governor and the tax bill was a product of the tax
commission.

Therefore, the railroads decided to defeat the commission bill

and the tax measure was, consequently, passed. 77
This measure remedied a long-standing inequity.

La Follette had fought

for it for many years and deserves most of the credit for its eventual
passage.

It forced the railroads to bear their full share of taxation and

added more tha..."'l $600,000 a year to the state revenue. 78

rt made the market

price of railroad stocks and bonds tae basis of new assessments and this
was checked against engineers' estimates of the cost of replacement. 79
The legislature of 1903 had defeated the railway commission and
La Follette took this issue to the people.

77 Ibid., 243-245.
78 De Witt, 56.
79 Lovejoy, 83.

It was one of the major issues
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in his campaign of 1904.

He worked hard to impress upon the people the

need for the regulation of the railroads and tlle trusts. 80 When the
election was over and he was governor of Wisconsin for another term, La
Follette went to the legislature and

reco~~ended

the commission.

of course, designed to prevent the railroads from raising
cover their increased taxes.

~1eir

This was,
rates to

La Follette urged the creation of a commission

having full supervision over the reasonableness of rates. 81 So strong had
the progressive spirit become in the state that the bill was passed unanimously. 82
This same legislature of 1905 enacted into law another of La Follette's
measures.

He had long campaigned against the policy of corporations giving

free passes or franking privileges to officials.

A law forbidding this

procedure had been passed in 1899 83 but was difficult to enforce.

1905, the legislature moved to correct tnis.

A law was enacted requiring

all railroads to file their lists of passes w:i.. th t11e state.
supervision.

In

Trlis simplified

Also, the state declared that passes given newspaper men in

return for "free" advertising must be listed as earnings.

This stopped the

passes and left the newspapers free of railroad pressure. 84
\Vhen La Follette arrived in Washington as United States Senator from
Wisconsin, the debate over the Hepburn bill was in process in the Senate.
Ibid., 89.
81 3augen, 138-139.
82 La Follette, 345.
83 Barton, 138.
84 ~-, 284.
80
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Despite the usual prohibition against newcomers speaking, La Follette,
feeling that because of his fight in Wisconsin he i1ad something to contribute
took the floor.

nis speech, according to the press of the day, was one of

the most thoroughgoing discussions of tne railroad regulation problem that
had so far been heard in the national Capitol.
principles involved in the problem.

It toucned on the basic

Its chief proposition was the physical

valuation of railroads as a basis in rate-making.

He incorporated this in

amendments to the bill-and to other measures that came up--but was voted
down.

This speech of La Follette, tne neophyte, gave the progressive move-

ment in the Republican party the stimulus that was to quicken it into
organized, individual life.

From this moment, Republican insurgency in

Congress began taking tangible form. 85
!Vhile in Congress, La Follette tried to strengthen tne power of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.

It was his fight,

&~d

that of other pro-

gressives, which made the Mann-Elkins act, passed on June 3, 1910, as strong
as it was.

He was in the Senate throu@1out Taft's administration and con-

sistently supported those meaaures designed to limit the power of the
trusts. 86
Although La Follette did not have the opportunities of Roosevelt to
fight the corporate interests, he was consistent innis efforts to regulate
them for the

pub~ic

good and he did not confuse the issue with platitudes

about good and bad trusts.

85 Ibid. , 284.
86 Mowry, 100.

La Follette was one of the leaders in the fight
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agai11st trusts.

He did not want to destroy them but he did believe that

there should be the smne ethical standards for corporations as for individuals.

He never doubted the validity of that theory &>d it fonned the

"warp and woof of a social and economic creed to whicn he was passionately
devoted. n 87
La Follette's stand on the tariff, likewise, bears closer examination
than does Roosevelt's.

Coming as he dia. from an agricultural area, he was

naturally opposed to t.'1e high tariff on manufactured goods tnat was designed
to protect the industrialists.

In his opening speech of tne 1902 campaign,

he showed his comprehension of the problem by demanding that the national
government revise tne tariff schedules so tnat they would be fairer to the
country as a whole. 88

The plank in nis 1904 platform might well have forme

the basis of the one in the Progressive party platform in 1912.

It stated

that:
We firmly adhere to the fundamental Republican doctrine of
protection to American labor, a.'1d believe that the aim of a
truly protective policy should be to stimulate competition in
the home market and not destroy it by favoring trust combinations. We therefore believe in a readjustment of tariff schedules
in all cases where protection is employed for the benefit of
capital and only to tile injur.r of the consumer and working man. 89
Yet it must be confessed that all of La Follette• s early record was not
without blemish.

During his service in the House of Representatives,

he had served on the committee whicn prepared the McKinley bill and he had

87 Frederic A. Ogg, "Robert M. La Follette in Retrospect, 11
History, vol. 33, New York, 687 (February, 1931).
88 Lovejoy, 71.
89 Haugen, 147.
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supported this measure.

9°

La Follette more than redeemed himself for his stand on the McKinley
Tariff bill when ne next returneci to Washington as a Senator.
led tne fight on the Payne-.&irich Tariff.
of

t~1e

Tnen he

He had the Bureau of Statistics

Department of Commerce and Labor prepare a table comparing the

Payne-J.~drich

Tariff with the Dingley Tariff to disprove Aldrich's con ten-

tion that the former was a reduction.

He read this report into the Con-

gressional Record. It showed that the Payne-Aldrich measure levied an ad
valorem tax of

41.77

per cent on incoming goods, wnereas tne equivalent

ad valorem tax of the Dingley bill was only

40.21

per cent.

91

Despite

La Follette 1 s efforts to defeat it, the Payne-.Hdricr1 Tariff became a law
but, when the bill was put to a vote, there were ten Republicens w11o voted
with the Democrats against it.
movement wi tnin Congress. 92

Tnese were tne nucleus of tne progressive
La F'ollet te was certainly in step w:i.. th the

Progressive party platfonn as far as the tariff was concerned.
In concluding this chapter, there is still another part of the Progressive party platform that bears examina.tion.

Altilough not exclusively a

matter of the trusts, it vitally concerned them and was largely directed
against them.

Tnis is the policy of conservation.

There is one phase of Roosevelt• s record about wilicn there is unanimous
agreement.
90
91

He was a firm supporter of the policy of conservation of our

Raney, 297.
Mowr-J, 52, ci t:ing Congressional Record, 61 Congress, 1 Session, vol.

44, 1447.
92

Raney, 297.
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natural resources and even tnose unfriendly to him list this as a great
accomplishment of his a~~inistration. 93

His interest began early and he

had promoted the cause while still governor of :New York.
as president needs no repetition.
In this, Roosevelt

w~s

94

His record

Even La Follette praised his stand.

95

in perfect agreement wi til the Progressive party

platform.
The platfonn devoted much time to the discussion of the problem of
conservation.

Briefly, i t urged that the lands containing natural re-

sources--coal, oil, forests, and water power--should be held by the government but be open to the constructive use of tne public. 96
Despite the fact that La Follette gained no fame for his part in the
conservation movement, he was no less a regular supporter of it than
Roosevelt.

As governor of ·wisconsin, he urged

t~1e

development of natural

resources of the state, but under such conditions as would protect these
resources from exploitation. 97

His first speech in.the Senate put forward

an amendment to tne Hepburn bill forbidding railroads to acquire title to
Indian coal lands, thus saving many square miles of valuable lands from
unnecessary exploitation. 98

As a fledging Congressman, he prevented the

railroads from gaining much la...'1d through the Sioux Indian reservation which

93 John Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform, Being a History of the Rise, Life
and Decay of the ProgressJ.veMind in A;11erica-; Liverignt, Inc. New York,

ID2, 217.- - 94

95

96
97
98

---

Roosevelt, Works, XV, 21-22.
Roosevelt, AUtObiography, 422.
Payne, 313-314, from the Progressive Party Platform.
Torrelle, 325-327, 11 Message to Legislature,n April 12, 1905.
Ibid., 329-330.
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they claimed they needed as a right of wqr. 99

He loyally supported tne

conservation program under both Roosevelt and Taft. 100

It would seem that

both La Follette and Roosevelt were in harmony with the policy of conservation advocated by the Progessive party platform.
In aummary, it is clear that, although not attracting as much attention,
La Follette worked more consistently for the regulation of corporations
and for a fair tariff tnan did. Roosevelt.
in and supported conservation.

Both men were actively interested

It should be mentioneci, nowever, that

Roosevelt was forced to deal with the problem on a national scale and to
take into consideration the temper, not only of his own industrial state
of New York, but of the people tl1.rougaout the country.

La Follette, on the

other hand, was limited in his activities largely to his own state and
~:asconsin

was essentially an agricultural state c.mere

reg·~lation

trusts was more universally desired. and easier to enforce.

of the

Uoreover,

Roosevelt must be given credit for t;le attention wi1icn ae brought to the
matter.

Even though, as in most cases, he said more tnan he did, he did

rouse the people to the need for some curb on the growing power of tne
large corporations.

99 La Follette, 75.
100

Pringle, 431.

CHAPTER VI
SUlillJING UP
The question of Roosevelt's motives in 1912 will always be a matter
for discussion, and the discussion is unlikely to reach any permanent conelusion.

Facts can be given and a deduction made but its accuracy will

always be open to question.

It is possible that even Roosevelt himself

could not have honestly interpreted his actions for, once he became a
candidate, he undoubtedly convinced himself of the righteousness of his
cause.
the

Here we can only look at some of the incidents of the period before

ca~paign

and try to determine if they indicated a genuine interest in

the progressive cause or whether they were indicative of personal ambition.
lv.hile Roosevelt was still in Africa, nis name was mentioned as a
possible Republican presidential nominee. 1 ~nen he did arrive in the
States, he was greeted by a large and enthusiastic crowd.

He evidently

expected this t;ype of reception for he wrote before he arrivea that he hoped
that arrangements woulu be made so that as few of the crowd as possible
would be disappointed. 2 Yet, Roosevelt declared upon nis return that he
had no intention of taking part in the fight then going on between the

progressive and regular Republicans and that he hoped to reunite the party. 3
Mowry, 118, citing
2 Ibid., 121, citing
Roosevelt MSS.
3 Ibid., 132-;-C'iting
~1910 and to E.
1

Cnicago Tribune, February 14, 1910.
Letter of Roosevelt to William Loeb, April 21, 1910,
Letters of Roosevelt to General J. M. Ashton, July
F. Waggoner, July 14, 1910, Roosevelt, 1JSS.
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This, he later found, was impossible and so joined the progressive movement
and, according to his friends, was drafted into tne presidential nomination.
Before the draft took place, however, there does seem to have been
some atteTipt to sound out public opinion.
time that Roosevelt was arriving in New

In mid-June of 1910, about the

Yor~,

the uoosevelt Club of St. Paul,

lnnnesota held a meeting at which Gifford Pinchot and James Garfield were
present.

The president of tne Club, in his after-dinner speech, predicted

the birth of a new party with Roosevelt, .Pinchot, and Garfield as its
leaders.

When Garfield and Pinchot rose to speak, they did not deny the

ambitious statements of the president.

5

Thus, some people, even peo?le

close to Roosevelt, were evidently considering the possibility of his
candidacy and a new party long before botn of these things became actualities
Roosevelt, himself, refused to commit himself definitely, but he did
keep saying that he was not seeking tne nomination.

He gave some indication

in his correspondence for the reason for his attitude.

He felt that the

Republicans would be defeated in 1912 because of the irreconcilable split
in ti1e party.

Only defeat would bring the

sives" together.

11

Conservatives 11 and the

11

Progres-

Because of this, Roosevelt felt that it would be best to

nominate Taft and go down to defeat.

The~!

the party could reorganize for

victory in 1916 under n some progressive leadership". 6 It was this idea

4

De Witt, 79-80.

5 Mowry, 118, citing Milwaukee Sentinel and Des 1Ioines Register and Leader,
June 12, 1910; Ka."'lsas City Star, June lJ, 1910.
6 Ibid., 175-176, citing Letter of Roosevelt to John C. Greenway, November
21, 1910, and to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., January 2, 1911.
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that may have caused him to refuse to sup:Jort the National Progressive
Republican League.

If he wanted to head the reorganization of his party,

he could not alienate the conservatives by supporting the League, and he
could not repudiate all of its principles for fear of angering the
Progressives.
But all of Roosevelt's friends were not as hesitant.

They dropped

many hints which led La Follette to believe later on that Roosevelt was
planning to be a candidate long before he made his official a1nouncement.
When the Progressives met in Cnicago in October of 1911, they endorsed
La Follette's candidacy. 8 But outlook, a magazine extremely sympathetic
to Roosevelt, said that fiThis endorsement is to be regarded as a recommendation rather than a committal of t11e movement to any one man." 9
in

~~at

same year, George Perkins, a Morgan partner, put his checkbook

at the disposal of Roosevelt's campaign,
11

Later

tossed his hat into the ring. 11 10

oped more rapidly.

althou~~

the latter had not yet

Once the new year dawned, things devel-

On January 1, 1912, the Ohio Progressives met in con-

ference and declared that Roosevelt was to be considered a presidential
possibility.

On January 10, William Allen White started a nRoosevelt or

Bust l 11 campaign in his Emporia Gazette.

On January 20, cummins of Iow-a

announced that he was a candidate for the nomination.
break in the Progressive front. 11

This was the first

The way was prepared for Roosevelt•s

7 Ibid., 176.
8 La Follette, 532; also Costigan Papers, 175.
9 Ibid., 533.
10 Mowry, 200.
11 La Follette, Chapter XII.

This account is a summary of the chapter.
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candidacy.
It is my own belief that Roosevelt himself gave ttle best explanation
of these events.

He did not want to run and lose in 1912, feeling that

that would destroy his chances in 1916.

But when he found that the Pro-

gressives had a chm1ce to win in 1912, he decided that he, m1d not La
Follette, should be the winner.

This is'consistent with the urge for power

which seemed a dominant characteristic of Roosevelt's.

It was an urge

tempered by the strong conviction that he could use that power in the interests of t..'le people as he saw these interests. 12

He undoubtedly con-

vinced himself that he would be of greater benefit to the people in the
vVhite House than would La Follette.
Now it is for us to decide whether Roosevelt's conclusion was correct.
Progressivism was born of a fresh consciousness of the necessity of curbing
the dangerous and growing tendencies toward industrial and commercial
despotism on the part of organized wealth, a new reiization of the justice
of the age-old demand for equal opportunities for all, and a determination
to insist on its more general observance. 13

In order to put their ideas

into practice, the Progressives put tneir faith in tne Americml people.
They believed in teaching tne people the facts.

Then the people would

instinctively choose the morally right course, they felt. 14 This tendency
to put facts before the people was most marked in La Follette.

12 Mowry, 15.
Barton, 23.
14 Lovejoy, 97.

13

de aLways
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kept his constituents informed concerning the issues before him. 15 We
find no similar tendency in Roosevelt.
Roosevelt, as has been already mentioned, stayed within the framework
of the Republican party throughout his career until 1912.
conservative branch of the party that gave him support.

And it was the
He was nominated

·by the conservatives in 1904 and ran on a conservative platform. l6 He had,
it is true, showed some sympathy with progressive ideas early in his first
administration, but had beat a strategic retreat as the 1904 election approached.

He withdrew his support of downward revision of the tariff be-

cause he doubted if such revision was wise just before an election. 17
He became more kindly disposed toward Aldrich
in Congress. 18 He was, in other words,
with the demands of expediency.

11

ru1d

his fellow-conservatives

mending his political fences"

In 1908, Roosevelt again compromised with

the conservatives in order to obtain the nomination of Ta£t.

One of the

few progressive planks that found its way into the platform was t>le suggestion of a downward revision of' the tariff--a promise later reneged on. l9
Despite the evidence, Roosevelt was capable of vocally expressing his
progressive sentiments very well.

Classifying himself as a Progressive

at the. meeting of the New York State Committee on the eve of the State
Convention, he said:
15
16
17
18
19

"Our fight is squared against corruption and the un-

La Follette, 63-67.
Mowry, 22.
Pringle, 353, citing Letter of Roosevelt to J. B. Bishop, April 27, 1903.
Ibid., 353, citing Letter of Roosevelt toW. H. Taft, March 3, 1903,
in Stephenson, Aldrich, 218.
Mowry, 31.
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clean bossism that has bred corruption. n 20

That would imply that he

favored political reform that was directed at eliminating tne bosses.
much earlier, he had cautioned against

revolution~

Yet,

change in metaod.

In every governmental process the aim that a people capable
of self-government should steadfastly keep in mind is to proceed by evolution rather than revolution. 21
And this statement was made in 1902, after La

Fo~lette

had

~ready

been

fighting for the revolutionary change that was the direct primary for almost
five years.

Rooseve~t

evidently still

be~ieved

that

graQu~

change was

desirable in 1912, for he objected to the initiative and referendum in the
National Progressive Republican League's Declaration of Principles. 22
Even in his statements proclaiming hiznself a progressive, he was aznbiguous
on the question of letting the people really rule.

He said tnat popular

rule was merely a means to an end, that end being tne development of "the
right kind of private citizens and the right kind of pub~ic servants." 23
Altho,Igh the idea was acceptable, it did relegate reform to a secondary
place and voiced the moral generalities tnat Roosevelt was so fond of
expressing.
Roosevelt's policy on trusts sounded adequate, too.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on October 4, 1906, he said:

Speaking at
"The Government

ougnt not to conduct the businessof the country; but it ought to regulate
it so that it shall be conducted in the interest of the public."
20
21
22
23

24

l

Payne, 34.
Roosevelt, Policy, I, 59.
Pringle, 349, citing outlook, January 14, 1911.
Chicago Trlbune, JanuarJ 31, 1911.
Bishop, II, 32.

24 Yet,
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an examinaticnof the facts would lead one to believe that there was little
regulation while Roosevelt was in the presidency.

There were 149 trusts

when he took office in 1900, representing four billion dollars in approximate capitalization.

When he went out of office, there were 10,020 trusts

with a capitalization of virtually tnirty-(me billion
cent of which has been estimated as pure water.

25

d~llars,

seventy per

That does not consti-

tute an impressive record for a "trust-buster11 •
Roosevelt talked well of labor, also.

In an address to the Brotherhood

of Locomotive Firemen, in Chattanooga, Tennessee, September 8, 1902, he
stated:

"I believe emphatically in organized labor.n 26

Yet he was opposed

to Governor Al tgeld of Illinois "wno alone stood out as an example of the
Progressive type of governor. n 27

Roosevelt said that

11

Al tgeld is as

emphatically the foe of decent government as Tweed, himself, and is capable
of doing far more damage than Tweed.

Tae Governor is tne foe of every true

American and is the foe particularly of every honest workingman." 28

Labor

could not have been comforted by his words relative to labor legislation,
either.
Most certainly we should never invoke the interference of the
State or Nation unless it is absolutely necessary; but it is
equally true that when confident of its necessity we should not
on academic grounds refuse it. 29
Such a statement left much leeway, for there could be much difference of
opinion as to what constituted

25
26
27
28
29

Chamberlain, 271.
Roosevelt, Policy, I, 69.
Chamberlain, 73.
Roosevelt, American Ideals,
Roosevelt, Policy, I, 129.

11

absolutely necessary".

7.

Roosevelt also showed

131
a disposition to remain friends with capital and he expressed the desire to
have it known that there were crooks and scoundrels in the ranks of labor
as well as capital. 30 \~ile this was undoubtedly true, most of the men
:j

concerned with labor problems were more interested in the many thousands of
honest workingmen than in the few dishonest organizers.
Maybe all of tne points which we have been making are indicative of

J

Roosevelt's tendency to keep "to the middle of the road".
to a certain point in

~lis

program to ward off unrest, and then would make

energetic efforts to appease the right wing. 3l
statement tr1at was meant for Hiram Johnson:
this fight but not for publication". 32
that the Progressives needed.

l\il,

That would explain the

"I am wi tr1 the insurgents in

That was hardly t..'le kind of support

But Roosevelt was loath to take a stand that

would make it embarrassing to change his mind.

\l

He would progress

Only on the question of con-

servation, and possibly civil service, was Roosevelt unchanging.
Roosevelt once said, in an address to the Syracuse, New York, Chamber
of Commerce on February 22, 1899:

"I do not believe in hypocrisy." 33

Yet he showed a remarkable facility for contradicting himself, in word and.
deed, if by that contradiction he could further his career. 34 Some of his
reversals, we have already mentioned.

Roosevelt was definitely anti-labor

in the New York Assembly, became at least vocally pro-labor after he came
30 :Mowry, 193, citing Letter of Roosevelt to Hiram Johnson, October 27,
1911, Roosevelt 1ffiS.
31 Pringle, 427.
32 Mowry, 132, citing Letter of Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.,
August 10, 1910, Roosevelt MSS.
33 Roosevelt, Public Papers, 27~
34 Chamberlain, 266.
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to the presidency, and later said that, if he were Wilson, he would not
have signed the Adamson eight-hour day bill.

He also felt that certain

things were just m1en he did them, and unjust when they were done to him.
His conduct in the 1908 and 1912 conventions is a good illustration of this.
He could even compromise on morals when political expediency demanded it.
i:le chose to ignore the Erie Canal frauds as Governor of New York, because
his own Republican party had perpetrated them.

35

Roosevelt was a surface

swimmer, always aware of the best thing for his career.

He would roar

invocations to morality and then suddenly descend to political bargaining. 36
Possibly that fit into his idea of practical politics, but it hardly made
for sincerity as a reformer.
Yet no one can condemn Roosevelt

He did serve a purpose,

entire~.

and served it better than anyone else could have done.

The very moralities

and platitudes that he was so fond of voicing served to glamorize the
movement and obtain for it the needed publicity.

~e

was an intriguing

figure himself, and the interest in him was transferred to tile movmnent.
The grim, never-compromising sincerity of a La Follette would never have
received the publicity that the effervescent of Roosevelt did.
author has said:

11

As one

Roosevelt 1 s greatest contribution to Insurgency did not

lie in his concrete legislative achievements.

Rather it was his moral

crusade against evil, his raising of the ideals of the Populists, Bryan,
and the muckrackers to the level of respectability." 37

35 Ibid., 266-268.
36 Ibid., 265.

37 Hechler, 24.
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Roosevelt brought to the movement his whirlwind enthusiasm and dramatized the issues envolved.

His legislative achievements were greatest in

the field of conservation; his trust-busting was confined to some isolated
attacks on specific combinations; his efforts at railroad regulation fell
short of the progressive ideal of La Follette, who wanted to make physical
evaluation the basis for establishing rates.

Yet, with it all, it is ex-

tremely unlikely that the progressive movement would ever have attained its
position of national prominence without tne support of Theodore Roosevelt.
In La Follette, we find a different type of person than Roosevelt.
La Follette was tne man responsible for the establishment of the 11Wisconsin
Idea11 in his home state.

Something of his motivation can be gained from

an examination of this idea.

It was brought from Germany, where the govern-

men t was experiencing its first pangs of social consciousness.

It was based

on the belief that it pays the state to concern itself with the betterment

•

of human beings and the protection of human welfare. 38

Its doctrine was

that "business and human welfare can increase side by side" and "laws can
be so constructed as to lead to progress and at tile same time preserve to
tne fullest all human bette~ent.n 39

The "Wisconsin Idean advocated rail-

road regulation, sanitation, and social legislation in the hands of experts
who would deal justly and wisely with every interest in the state.
at efficiency and social and industrial betterment. 40

It aimed

La Follette was

38 Haynes, 395.
39 Charles McCarthy, The Wisconsin Idea, The Macmillan Company, New York,
1912, 30-31.
40

Haynes, 366.

•
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impregnated with this idea at the University of Wisconsin and it was the
basis of his program for his state.
La Follette added to the German concept by sponsoring greater participation by the people in their government.
part of the progressive movement.

He felt that was an essential

He had great faith in the people and

high hopes of the wisdom of their action.

At ru1 address before the Republi-

can Platform Convention in 1910, he gave expression to his feelings relative
to the people and the progressive movement •. At that time he said:

nrt

(the progressive movement) comprehends the aspirations of tne numan race
in its struggle from the beginning to the present time.n

:de continued by

saying that laws are made to carry out the will of the people, and when they
fail to do so, they must be changed;

11

for over all and above all and greater

than all, and expressing the supreme sovereignty of all are tae people." 41
And in order that the people themselves could care for their interests, he
fought for political reform.
his making.

Tne direct primary law in 7fisconsin was of

The other reformers "would have fallen to the ground but for

the timely arrival upon the field of the Governor ••• To him belongs the credit
for the victory. 11 42

La Follette did not just talk about modifying the

system of government so as to restore the ttsovereignty of the people and
carry out their will to rule." 43

de did something about the situation.

La Follette also saw in the progressive movement the fight

11

for the

rights of aJ.l the people against the encroachments of a powerful few. u 44

41 Torrelle, 182.
42

43

44

Lovejoy, 96, citing an unpublished letter by A. 11.. dall in the files
of Fred L. Holmes.
Haynes, 425, citing the American Yearbook, 1912, 2-3.
Ibid., 425, citation as above.
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From that idea came his fight against the special privilege that could
bend a government to its own will.

In order to distribute the cost of

government more equitably, ne recommended an income tax in his message to
the legislature in 1903.

45 He worked to reform the taxation system of

Wisconsin, where ti1ere was definite need for reform because of the great
undervaluation of property.
he insisted on a cownerce

46

He protecteu ti1e people 1 s interests wr1en

co~~ssion

to regulate rates within his state.

He worked on the very logical principle that it was tne state's duty to
furnish transportation facilities and, since the function was delegated to
the railroads, it was the duty of t:ne stateto regulate ti1em so that they
were required to furnisl1 adequate service at reasonable rates.

47

Certainly

that was protecting the interests of the people against the interests of
the few.
La Follette's efforts inevitably made enemies for him.
Roosevelt, ae made no attempt to appease these enemies.

But, unlike

He voluntarily

chose to fight his party after the Sa:wyer-Siebecker affair.

48

Only once

did he go back consciously to the policy of friendship with the conservatives.

That was in 1900.

In that year, he announced his candidacy for the

governorship for the third time.
field.

There were five other candidates in the

La Follette was so strong, however, that these withdrew.

49

Then

he attempted to restrain opposition to the "machine" by his supporters.

45 Haugen, 137.
46 Philipp, 105.
47 McCarthy, 39.

48
49

Barton, 52.
Philipp, 24.
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r

136
even tried to reach a

~armony

agreement witn tne

re~ular

Republicans, agree-

ing to give no objection to the reelection of Spooner to the Senatorship
if they would support him for t~1e governorship. So

In order to insure

himself general support, he avoided all mention of controversial state
issues except the primary election law.
question of railroad regulation. Sl
establish peace were in vain.

He was especially quiet on the

But he found that nis efforts to

The regulars, although they supported him

in the election, did all in their power to destroy his planned legislative
program.

This was inconsistent with La Follette's ideas and he told the

regulars tnat nto violate promises of that platform is to cneat and betray
the voter."
The

11

52

Stalwarts 11 did not take kindly to La Follette• s reprimand, and

they accused him of an attempt to become dictator of the state.

They viewed

"with alarm the persistent effort to strengthen the executive at the expense
of the legislative department of ti1e state."
the

11

53 Despite these statements,

Sta.lwarts 11 again supported I,a Follette when he was nominated in 1902.

This time, however, the governor made no effort to enlist the support of
the conservatives, and he continued to fight for his reforms despite their
objections.

So persistent was his effort tnat the "Stalwarts" bolted the

Republican convention in

1904, and refused to support La Follette.

They

even went so far as to form a new party, and tney called themselves the
SO
Sl

52
53

Barton, 142.
Ibid. ' 161.
Torrelle, 41-47.
Philipp, 52.
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11

National Republicans".

La Follette.

54

riowever, even this drastic step did not defeat

And he, in turn, never repeated his mistake of 1900 by allying

himself with t11.e

11

Stalwarts".

vVhile La Follette did not receive the support of the conservative
element within his party, there were many in his state who supported him.
The feeling in regard to him was well expressed by tne Milwaukee Journal
and was a testimony to him.

The Journal said:

"He stancis for principles

which are the very basis and founciation of representative government" and
then listed these as:

"The e:{ual rignt of every man to express his choice

for candidates by direct vote", and

11

the equal distribution of all burdens

of government by taxing the property of corporations the same as the property of individuals is taxed. n

55

When he became a United States Senator, La Follette consistently
supported the very things for which he had fought in Wisconsin.

In the

Senate, his leadership was all-important in solidifying and vitalizing
progressive sentiment.

He was a rallying point for the other Insurgents.

It was La Follette who founded tne National Progressive Republican League,
and he was, at first, its unanimous choice for the presidency.

56 He

showed his devotion to the cause of reform in a speech which he made in
1911, after the formation of the League.

He then completely stated his

program, and it included 11 Congressional legislation to prevent unreasonable
restraints of trade", taxation

54
55
56

11

based on physical valuation of corporate

Lovejoy, 87-88.
Ibid., 70, citing Milwaukee Jounnal, July 12, 1902.
La Follette, 519.
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properties and the cost of productionn, "a permanent, non-partisan,. scientific tariff commission" to establish duties.

de favored

11

the direct

primary for selection of delegates to conventions, the ?residential preference primary, the popular vote to be binding upon the action of the
delegates."

And he stood

11

for the initiative and referendum anci the

recall, including the recall of judges.n

57

Certainly there could be no

more sweeping and definite statement of support for progressive principles.
There was no attempt to express generalities or platitudes here.
Yet, for all of his sincerity, La Follette did not have the power to
strike fear into the hearts of the conservatives tnat did Roosevelt.

He

was so far in advance of his time, that they were likely to disregard him
as too radical to enlist popular support.

'fnis was shown at the time that

Taft was trying to regain the leadership of the Republican party.
one of his supporters wrote that
hurt.n

58

11

Then,

what La Follette says doesn't seem to

Yet, it was because of this same La Follette, and tne nradicals"

like him, that as much was accomplished toward reform as was done.
As all was not bad with Roosevelt, all was not good with La Follette.
He was always an obstinate man, and he became unnecessarily so as he got
older.

He insisted on his own

way had to be sacrificed.

57
58
59

plans and views, and whatever stood in the

59 He was ambitious, too. He had designs on

Haynes, 425, citing the American Yearbook, 1912, 2-3.
Mowry, 106, citing Letter of J. Adam Bede to carter, March
Carter MSS.
Barton, 2(8.

5,

1910,
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1

the presidency, and pushed himself to the front in order to attract. attention to himself. 60

He was a nard man to get along with because of his

inability to compromise, yet this very fact marked him as a sincere reformer.
La Follette was a man of high morals in public life.

He viewed the

problems of.state as well as of the individual in the clear, white light
of ethics, and there was no compromising with expedience permit ted in either
case. 61

This was what made his work of such value.

de was the consistent

beacon to which all progressives could turn; there was no wavering of his
light.

Bristow summed up his greatest contribution in the words:

Follette is the crusader, the pioneer.

He has blazed tne way and opened

the road for the rest of us to follow him ••• 11 62
:Middle West, too.

"La

He was a leader in tne

He became governor of Wisconsin about the time that

Altgeld died, and this carried on the progressive succession. 63
Chamberlain says that La Follette and Lollis D. Brandeis were nthe most
intelligent of the Progressives Who took over the ideas of the Populists
in an attempt to make them nationally effective." 64
he based his program on eduction of the people.

As might be expected,

rte believed that, wnen the

people saw the truth, tne "politicians collla. not keep the trutil off tne
statute books. n

65 He believed in issues, and he always had one when he

appealed to the people for election. 66 ae was a consistent supporter of

60 Haugen, 151.
61 Torrelle, "Forward", 12.
62 Hechler, 84, citing Letter of Joseph L. Bristow to rtarold Chase, March
7, 1909.
63 Chamberlain, 73.
64 Ibid., 233.
65 William Allen White, "The Progressive Hen and the Insurgent Ducklings",
The American Magazine, LXXI, no. 3, New York, 396 (January, 1911).
66 La Follette, 63-67. '
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the progressive idea that the people snould be educated to be masters of
their own destiny.
There remains now only a general comparison of Roosevelt and La Follett
in order to detennine which was the better representative of Liberal Republican principles.

Going back to the beginnings of the two men, La Follette•

background made him a born democrat; Roosevelt came closer to the English
ideal of tae disinterested gentleman in
edness within a class orbit, of course.

politics--W.~ich ~nplied

disinterest-

rt was no aberration that dictated

Roosevelt's genuine detestation of Thomas Jefferson.

This dislike was

strangely inconsistent with tne opening paragraph of the Progressive
party• s platfonn whicn held 11 wi th Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln that
the people are masters of t11e Constitution." 67

Roosevelt chose his friends

and advisers from within his aristocratic circle, and he was not one to
suffer men in denim shirts gladly outside of his ranch in the West.
La Follette, on the other hand, had a mythical faith in

11

the people"; he

-

believed that, provided ti1ere was plenty of light, t11e common man would
find his own way.

Tne superior population of Wisconsin was

11

excuse enough

for his credo." 68
Roosevelt yearned for the approval of history and simply wanted legislati ve action.

He demanded paper results to sr1ow for his term in office.

He was not at all unwilling to take compromise if that would get a measure
onto the statute books.

67 Payne, 304.
68

Ill

Chamberlain, 243.

La Follette, however, preferred to fight rather

r
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than to acquiesce in a bad measure. 69
differences between the two men.
taking

II

half a loaf 11 •

involved

11

There was one of tne fundamental

Roosevelt could see nothing wrong in

But La Follette felt tnat wnere a principle was

no bread is often better than half a loaf • 11

ae did not believe

in jeopardizing his cnances to get a true reform measure by stunting the
appetite of tne people with a half-way measure. 70
La Follette was a man who sought to make strict economic analysis
the basis of his laws; ne never talked without facts.

71 He made tremendous

use of the University of Wisconsin; appointing its faculty to the commissions
~nich

he instituted and calling upon it to· compile tne lists of statistics

with which he confronted the voters. 72
11

Roosvelt, on the ott1er hand, was

rather an agnostic in matters of economics. 11

He never understood tne

spirit of the laboratory, the spirit that was tne hope of the Progressive,
or Liberal, movement.

73

Roosevelt, for all of his compromising, ended up vvith a pitifully
small amount of acaievement to s;1ow for nis administration.
left the presidency, ne left me country too.

And wi1en he

It was La Follette, with his

grim tenacity, who persisted in carrying the Progressive fig:at througn the
Taft ad.'llinistration.
cause.

· 69
70

71
72

73
74

74 It was La Follette who organized the Progressive

ne made it possible to figi1t for a Republican Progressive as the

Ibid., 245.
La Follette, 268.
Chamberlain, 237.
Dictionary of American Biography, X,
Chamberlain--,237.
Ibid., 241.

544.
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presidential nominee in 1912, when he founded the National Progressive
Republican League.

La Follette said that the cause of the Progressives

made more converts at<d fared better while Roosevelt was in Africa than while
he was in the White House.
in this.

75

There is undoubtedly a great deal of trllth

Roosevelt served to confllse tne issues while he was president by

his contradictory statements m1d action.

He talked as a progressive and

acted as a conservative; Taft acted in a progressive manner while he spoke
as a conservative.

More people listen than think, and a great anger arose

against Taft ti:1at served to solidify progressive sentiment in the country.
There is no one who can say that La Follette would nave been nominated
by the Republicans, and elected to tne presidency in 1912, if Roosevelt
had refrained from placing himself in the pictllre as a candidate.

It is

my own opinion that, even if he had obtained the Republican nomination, he
could not have been elected.

3e did not have sufficient strength in the

East to carry a national election.

Yet I do feel that .1e would nave been

more truly representative of the ideals for wnicn tne progressives had
fought than was Roosevelt.

La Follette had proven that nis devotion to the

cause of reform was sincere, unchanging, a"'"l.d. dependable.
deed in close alliance.
dependable.
done muc1<.
progressive.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, was not at all

He talked much, ana evidently sincerely thougnt taat he nad
In actuality, his deeds were few, and tnen not always completely
He hypnotized himself into believing of himself what was

most flattering and most beneficial to him.

75

He was words and

La Follette,

478-479.
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Yet each man played a vi tal part in the progressive movement.
La Follette was tne crusader, the trail-blazer, tne unbending disciple of
I

reform.
ment.

76

Even Roosevelt acknowledged his preeminent position in the moveHe served to awaken the public's thought and conscience to the

evils that were rampant.

~le

was tile unbreakable steel neart of the movement.

!-:Ie remained true even after tne war had returned the country to
and tt1e other leaders !1ad deserted the cause.
much a true progressive, was tt1e
11

cake 11 •

11

11 1~ormalcy 11

77 Hoosevelt, not nearly so

icing 11 on tJ:le outside of t:1e progressive

'!is personality made the movement one of interest to the public.

de posed many pertinent questions and, while he did little to solve them
himself, he d.ici. create a national demand that these questions be met and
answered.

lie did not make the people thinl<, as diu La Follette, but he

carried them along by the enthusiasm of his very nature.

There was danger,

of course, in this method, for enthusiasm can die out and leave nothing in
its wake.

But ti1ere was need for some entllUsiasm, and Roosevelt gave it.

de was the best publicity man that tne Progressive cause ever had.

76 Torrelle, 11 Forward11 , 10.
77 Ibid., 11-12.
78 .Mowry, 16.
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BIBLIOGRAPJICAL ESSAY
In looking for material, I went first to the cara catalogue, where I
looked t.mder tne headings "La Follette", "Roosevelt", "'Nisconsin 11 , and
11

Progressive Party11 •

I found that tr1ere is an excellent bibliography of

La Follette, An Annotated Bibliograpny of Robert

~·

La Follette, the 1:an

and His Work, by Ernest W. Stirn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,

1937.

This was ver-:1 helpful and is an excellent and very comprehensive

work.

It was especiaLly beneficial in view of tr1e fact tnat La Follette

has not published nor had published about him as mucn as Roosevelt.

I also

used Poole's Index and the Reader's Juide covering t.ae years from 1880 to
•

1·

1912 in order to find tne articles published in periodicals, especially on
La Follette.

Insofar as possible, I avoided usin3 articles in contemporary

publications because I fQund tnern so biased on the subject under discussion.
We will list first those articles taken from periodicals.

With the

exception of t;1ree, I think that we may clc..ssify tne magazines as source
material.

Two of tnese are by Bruce Bliven, who is very sympathetic toward

La Follette.
no.

552,

!{e wrote

New York,

11

Robert M. La I'ollette 11 in New Republica, XLIII,

144-145 (July 1, 1925); and 11 Robert M. La Follette's

Place in Our History 11 in the August, 192_S issue of Current dis tory, XXn,
no.

5, Hew York Times Company, New York, 716-722.

Another article written

after La Follette 1 s death was Frederic A. Ogg, ''Hobert 11. La Follette in
Retrospect", current nistory, XXXIII, no number, New York Times Company,
New York, 685-691 (February, 1931).

Tnis is~a very fine and fair article.
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I took three articles from The American Magazine, Phillips Publisning
Company, no place; and all three were sympathetic to La Follette and the
progressive movement.

Ray Stannard Baker wrote two of

the Republican Party Breaking Up?

t~e

articles:

11

Is

The Story of tne Insurgent West 11 ,

February, 1910, LXIX, no. 4, 435-438; and "The Meaning of Insurgency",
~ff.ay,

1911, LXXII, no. 1, 59-64.

7/hite,

11

The other article is by 7filliam Allen

The Progressive Hen aYid tr1e Insurgent Ducklings", January, 1911,

LLU, no. 3, 394-399.

The outlook was ver;r interest in~ in ti1e light of

the fact that Tneodore Roosevelt was a contributing editor.

Although

progressive lll tone, it was never enthusiastically for La Follette.

I

consul ted the eaitorials in t.lle issues of February 4, 1911 (vol. 97, 245,

256-258); Ja..'1uary 13, 1912 (vol. 100, 57-58); and in the volume 100, February 17, 1912, 337.

-

In volume 100, I also used the issues of January 20,

1912, "La Follette as a Candidate, a Poll of tae Press", 120-122; February

3, 1911,

11

IA:r. La Follette as Seen from th<:: Gallery11 , 255-256.

'

And from the

same magazine, I reaa "Governor La Follette's Ringing :;v1essage 11 , ;Jay

25,

1901, vol. 68, no. 4, 199-201.
Current Literature, a Taft supporter, gave me two more references:
11

TI1.e Grooming of La Follette", November, 1911, LI, no.

series of editorials in ~arch, 1912, LII, no.
Work likewise supplied two references.

5, 496-500; and a

3, 245-248.

~~e World's

E. Jl.ay Stevens wrote, inOctober,

1902, vol. IV, no. 6, about "The La Follette-Spooner Campaign" and, in
July, 1911, William Bayard Hale wrote of

11

La Follette, Pioneer Progressive",

tnL, no. 3, 14591-14600.

Both of these are kind to La Follette al.tnougil

not biased innis behalf.

Hale is really a Wilson supporter.

The magazine

/
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is published in IJew York by Doubleday, Page, and Company.
From Harper• s Weekly, Harper and Brothers, New York, I read an article
by Earle Hooker Ec..ton,

11

A Personal Sketch of Governor La Follette 11 , XIVII,

no. 2506, December 31, 1904, 2025-2026, tnat. was pro-La Follette; anci
another in the same vein but on June 24, 1911 by C£larles Jonnston, "A Talk
with La Follette", LV, no. 2844, 9.
source of the article by T. S. Adams,

Tne Independent, New York, was tne
11

fne Dra.ua of IVisconsin Politics", LIV,

no. 2500, 1824-1826, on July 31, 1902, tnat was very neutral in its attiIn its editorial on February 1), 1912, "Senator La Follette's Disa-

tude.

bilityn, LY..xii, no. 3298, 369-371, it snows a pro-Taft sentiment, altt10ugh
not critical of La Follette.

" York.
published irt New
11

:dr. La Follette, as

The Literary Digest was a neutral source

Qn February 17,

See~.

on July 13, 1912, another

1912, it carried an article called

by His Party Press", XLIV, no. 7, 318-319; and
11

La Follette's Thrust at Roosevelt 11 ,

nv,

no. 1,

45-49.
11

Ihe Vlooing of Wall Street" was an amusing bit of satire in The Nation,

?Jew York, November 30, 1911, vol. 93, no. 2422, 512.
progressives.

It pokes fun at the

Richard Lloyd Jones wrote a very favorable piece for La

Follette in CoJ.lier 1 s, New York, called "Among La Follette's People", XLV,
no. 24, 17-18 (September

3, 1910).

Two earlier articles are a ,piece by Henry

w.

Wilbur,

11

A Coming Man",

XXIII, 25'0-253, in the Sept.ember, 1902, Junton 1 s Magazine, the Gunston
Company, New York.

Wilbur proved himself a good prophet.

is one by Lincoln Stepnens in McClure's :r1agazine,
New York, October, 1904.

s.

The last article

S. :>Jc Clure Company,

The article is one of a series called "Enemies
I

L

1:1
I'
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of the Republica a.YJ.J its particular title is

~~"'/Tisconsin:

a State Where the

People Have Restored Representative Government--The Story of Governor
La Follette", YJCVIII, no. 6, 563-579.

It is, as tae name suggests, favorable

to La Follette.
In our ru1alysis of the books used as reference for this paper, we
begin with those relating to the study of tile progressive movement.

c&~

First

to be discussed are those sources concerned with the formation of the
Progressive party.

William Jennings Bryan,

!:.

Tale of Two Conventions being

an Account of tt1e Republican and Democratic National Conventions of June,
1912, with

~

Outline of the Progressive National convention of August of

the Same Year, F1mk and ',l!fagnalls Company, New York, 1912, is a re;>orter' s
version of events and was very

hel~;?.ful

despite Bryan's lack of sympathy with

both the Republican and Progressive conventions.

In contrast, the Official

Report of the Proceedings of tae Fifteenth Republican National Convention
Held in Chicago, Illinois, June 18

through 22, 1912, IVIilton

w.

Blumberg,

Official Reporter, Tne Tenny Press, .New York City, 1912, was of no direct
benefit although it did give a comprehension of' t.1.e figat t11at ti1e Roosevelt
forces put up in that convention.

LYJ.other book used chiefly to obtain

background, and a fine work it was, is Backstage in 1912, the Inside Story
of the Split Republican Convention, Dorrar1ce and Company, Inc., Philadelphia

1932.

Rosewater was the 1912 chairman of the RepubJ.ic::m.

~Jational

Committee

and is, consequently, anti-Roosevelt, but it was enlightening to read the
book in view of the number of things that have been written expressing
~oosevelt 1 s

side of this dispute.

A collection of letters and

documen~

Papers of Edward ?. Costigan relating to the Progressive Movement in Coloradc
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1902-1917, edited by Colin B. Goodykoontz, University of Colorado, Boulder,
1941, was most informative and gave a picture of the progressive movement

in the West.
1912.

It also gave an excellent idea of tl1e sv•ting to Roosevelt in

Our final source pertaining to the Progressive party is fhe Birth

of the New Party

~

Nichols and Company,

Progressive Democracy by George denry Payne, J. L.
1~aperville,

Ill., 1912.

This book, written by an ardent

supporter of the new party, was very pro-P.oosevelt and not very reliable.
It gave only tnose facts wnich reflected glory on Roosevelt.
Turning now to secondary works on progressivism, we nave first The
Progressive Movement, Its Principles

a~d

Its ?rogr&mne by

Clark, Small, :.:aJnard and. Company, Boston, 1913.

s.

J. Duncan-

This sounded as thougn.

it would be very helpful, but it turned out to be a glorification of ti:le
11

Bull-Koose 11 party and its platform, its convention, and. its candidate.

It was virtually useless.

The Progressive MOVement,

~

Non-partisan,

Comprehensive Discussion of Current Tendencies in American Politics by
Benjamin Parke De Witt, T11e rK.acmillan Company, New York, 1915', proved much
more helpful.

It was really wi1at its n&ne implied.

Another fine book,

but one which covered only t11e last section of ti1e period of the development
of progressivism, was Insurgency, Personalities and Politics oftiae Taft
Era by Kenneth

w.

!-Iecnler, Columbia University Press, New York, 1940.

Tnis was well-footnoted, scholarly, and seemed unprejudiced.
There were also two books whicn treated the progressive movement in
individual states and tnree which dealt with it in Wisconsin.

Fred E.

Haynes wrote Third Party Movements Since tne Civil War with Special Refer~

to Iowa, The State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, 1916.

This

was excellently foot-noted and largely from periodicals or other current
literature.

It treated both Roosevelt and La Follette with equal enthusiasm

which made it more valuable.

The Progressive i\1lovernent of 1912 and the Third

Party Movement of 1924 in Maine by Elizabeth Rin_g, The ~ Bulletin, Xx:t:V,
no.

5,

January, 1933, University of lJiaine studies, second series, no. 26,

was taken largely from periodicals and was foot-noted but was not in sufficient detail to be very helpful.

The three books on Wisconsin included

Charles Me earthy, Tne Wisconsin Idea, the ill:acmillan Company, New York, 1912.
This is a rambling account of ti1e topic with profuse praise of 'Jermany,
where the "Wisconsin Idea11 originated.

It was not too helpful because it

dealt largely with problems current in Wisconsin in 1912.
hand, Wisconsin,
fine.

~

Experiment in Democracy by Frederic

c.

On the other
Howe was very

It was published by Gharles Scribner's Sons in New York in 1912.

It was very sympathetic in it.s attitude toward La Follette and had to be
used'witn some discretion as a result, but the author nad a very comprehensive knowledge of his topic.

This is natural in view of the fact that

.dowe was then secretary of tne National Republican League and had been a
lecturer at the University of Wisconsin.

This book may almost be considered

source since tl1e author nad sucn intimate connection wi tn the movement of
which he was writing.

The last of the books on Wisconsin was William

Fre>ncis Raney, IVisconsin,
York, 1940.

~

Story of Progress, Prentice-Iiall, Inc., New

The volume included an excellent chapter on La Follette, and

the entire work is very neutral in tone.
Next we will analyze those books that dealt with La Follette.
most helpful source, aside from the magazines already mentioned, was

The

II

I',I
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II

I

La Follette's Autobiography,
by Robert
1913.

u.

~Personal

Narrative of Political Experiences

La Follette, the Robert M. La Follette co., Madison, Wisconsin,

This was botn interesting to read anci very informative.

In view of

the author's interest in the topic under discussion, tae book must be subjected to internal criticism, but I feel that it is remarkably truthful.
Because of the fact that there is so little source m.s.terial available, I
was forced to make extensive use of this volume.

fu~other

book of source

material that I consulted in part was Pioneer and Political Reminescences
(Wisconsin L:agazine of History, volumes XI, XII, andXIII), The Antes Press,
Evansville, Wisconsin, n. d., by Nils Haugen.
to apply internal criticism.

Here again it was necessary

Alt;:wugh this book dealt witn tne progressive

movement in Wisconsin in its entirety, I use<i caiefly that section that
dealt with La Follette and so have listed it in tnis section.

Ellen Torrelle

assisted by Albert 0. Barton, and Fred L. Holmes, compiled Tne Political
Philosophy of Robert M. La Follette
The Robert

r.~.

~

Revealed in His Speeches

La Follette Co., Madison, 'illisconsin, 1920.

~Writings,

Although this

contained only direct selections, I felt that a conscious effort was made
to select those waicr1 would reflect most to La Follette's credit.
very different nature was Political Reform in Wisconsin,

Of a

~Historical

Review

of the Subjects of Primary Election, Taxation, and Railway Regulation by
E.rnanuel L. Philipp, assisted by Edgar T. ·wheelock, E. L. Philipp, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, n. d.

Tnis was written by an apologist of tne nstalwarts 11 and

is naturally very anti-La Follette.

From comparison with other books, I

found that there were some errors in it.

Yet more common than actual mis-

information, was editing offacts to make them appear in an untrue light •
•
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Although there is no date given in the book, I think that it was written
around 1908.

The last book which I am listing as source material on La

F'ollette is La Follette 1 s Winning of Wisconsin, 1894-1904, 2nd edition,
Madison, Wisconsin, 1924 (The Homestead Company, Des Moines, Iowa).

Tnis

might not be considered strictly source material but I nave so listed it
because l1r. Barton was intimately connected wi tn t:1e progressive movement
during most of tne time of which he writes.

The book was veFy favorable to

La Follette and haJ to be used witll care for that reason.
Of tne secondary references that I used, one of the best was Allen
Fraser Lovejoy, La Follette and the Establismnent of the Direct Primary in
Wisconsin, 1890-1904, Yale University Press, New ;-J.aven Conn., 1941 (Patterson Prize Essays, Yc:le University, Vol.
almost entirely from source material.

1).

This is carefully foot-noted

.Utnougr1 it is sympathetic to La

Follette, it 1naintains a scholarly detachment.

To learn soMething of La

Follette 1 s life from a neutral source, I consul ted the Dictionary of Ameri~

Biography.

The article t,:1ere on r'Robert ,H. La Folletteu is w-ritten by

Frederic A. Paxson.

The Dictionary itself is edited by Allen Johnson and

Dumas Malone and is published by cnarles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1938.
Tae article I used is in volume X ana covers pages 541-546.
Frank ;-rarris, Conteinpora.."'Y Portraits,
New York, 1923.

11

I also used

Senator La Follette", Brentano' s,

The author is very definitely a liberal and, as a result,

is very sympathetic to the Senator.

The final reference used in my search

for information regarding La Follette was Chester

c.

Platt, What La

Follett~s

State Is Doing, Some Battles Waged For I·/Iore Freedom, Batavia Times Press,
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Batavia, New York, 1924.

This was a rather worthless volume because it

dealt with a later period tl1a...'1 that of t11e paper.

Moreover, it was violent-

ly partisan.
Before listing tne references used in studying Roosevelt, I want to
mention two books that dealt wiu1 reform in general rather than the progressive movement.

One that was of great help regarQtng the history of the

corrupt practices law was

s.

Gale Lowrie, Corrupt Practices at Elections,

Comparative Legislative Bulletin, no. 23 of the Wisconsin Library Commission,
Legislative Reference Department, i'l:adison, Wisconsin, Februar.r, 1911.
was excellently foot-noted almost entirely from legislative sources.
second of the books on reform was Farewell to Reform, Being
the Rise, Life, and Decay of tne Progressive

1·~ind

Chamberlain, Liveright, Inc., New York, 1933.

~

weru~

History of

Chapter Eight was entitled

was a newspaper man a...'ld the book is most interesting reading.

and unerringly picks out every

The

in America by John

"The Progressive Hind in Action--La Follet·t.e and Rooseveltn.

of Roosevelt and La Follette is scintilating.

This

Chamberlain
Jis analysis

He is very pro-La Follette

spot in the Colonel's annqr.

of its interesting reading it must be subjected to criticism.
is obviously liberal to the point of being almost

radicP~

In spite

Chamberlain

and, thus, he has

no sympathy with a 11 middle-of-the-roader 11 like Roosevelt.
In listing source material that was used regarding Roosevelt, it is
best to begin with taat written by Roosevelt himself.

This list does not

begin to cover all the works covered by him for he was a voluminous writer,
but I nave tried to use some of 11is key works.

Since all these are by

Theodore Roosevelt it will not be necessary to list

~~e

autnor 1 s name with

r
153
each work.

I first read Theodore Roosevelt, an Autobiography, ?dacmillan

and Company, Limited, London, 1913.

I did not, however, make much use of

this in the paper for Roosevelt was anything but a modest man ana was not
always careful of the accuracy of the facts which ne presented.

Applied

Ethics, one of the Willian Belden :Joble Lectllres for 1910, aoward University,
Cambridge, Mass., 1911, was of little value except as a statement of Roosevelt's philosophy.

Of more help, but very similar in content, was

:~erican

Ideals, New Knickerbocker Edition, G. p. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1897.
The Roosevelt Policy, Speeches, Letters and State Papers, relating to
Corporate Wealth and Closely Allied Topics, two volumes, The Current Literature Publishing Company, New York, 1908, promised mucn but, after reading
one or two speecnes, I found that both volumes were repetitions of the same
few ideas.

Letters to Kermit from Theodore Roosevelt, 1902-1908, Will

Irwin, editor, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1946, gave an interesting
picture of Roosevelt as a father and also gave some idea of his own evaluation of his administr2tion.

One of the most helpful works on Roosevelt

was Public .rapers of Theodore Roosevelt, Governor, '1899, Brandow Printing
Company, Alba""ly, New York, 1899.

Ranking with this was volume XV of T.ae

Works of Theodore Roosevelt, Herman Hagedorn, editor, National Edition,
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1926.

This was entitled State ?apers

as Governor ru1d President, 1899-1909.
There were three other source books which I used relating to Theodore
Roosevelt.

Joseph Bucklin Bishop wrote and compiled

~~eodore

Roosevelt and

His Time Shown in His Own Letters, two volumes, Charles Scribner's Sons,
New York, 1920.

The quotations contained in the book would be listed as
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source material.

They were, however, linked togetner with a narrative

that was Mr. Bishop 1 s own.

Bishop was a great admirer of Roosevelt's and

t(lis is obvious in the work.

Since the letter and speeches are excerpts,

it is possible to include only t<lose parts which are desired to give the
correctly favorable impression of Il.oosevelt, and this nas been done in some
cases.

I did not feel tnat this was an especial.Ly good source.

Dudley Foulke wrote Roosevelt
Reform League, New York, 1925.

~

the Spoilsman,

~·Jational

William

Civil Service

Foulke was a civil service commission "t.mder

Roosevelt and because of his contact with most of the fac·t.s presented, I
have listed this as a source.
book seems fair.

Foulke is very loyal to Hoosevelt but the

The last source was Oscar King Davis, Released for Publi-

cation, Some Inside Political History of Tneodore Roosevelt and His Time,

1898-1918, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1925.

This is another book

by a newspaper man and, thoQgn it made interesting reading, it was not too
helpful except for background material.

It dealt largely with anecdotes

that showed Roosevelt's character and personality.
I read two biographies.
Roosevelt,

~

Tne first was William Roscoe Thayer, Theodore

Intimate Biography, Houghton 1iifflin Company, New York, 1912.

This was of very little use because tne author was so definitely prejudiced
in favor of Roosevelt.

The other biography proved to be one of tt1e most

helpful books which I used.

It was definitely tne least biased and, there-

fore, one of the most unusual and most valuable.
~Biography

It was Theodore Roosevelt,

by Henry F. Pringle, Harcourt, Brace artd Company, New York, 1931.

It was foot-noted almost entirely from source material, including the
available manuscript sources.

I would

reco~nend

this book highly.

r
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The secondary works which dealt witn- tne perioa rather tnan with just
tne man were two in number.

Chapters Eight to Seventeen of James Ford

Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909, The Macmillan
Comp~~y,

New York, 1923, dealt

wi~~ ~~e

administration of Roosevelt.

This

work was sympatnetic to big business and still favorable to Roosevelt, an
interesting situation.
usual reference.
beneficial.

Altaough it. was 9rofusely foot-noted, Bishop was the

Since I read Bishop's books, I diu not find this especiall

Harold Howland wrote Tneodore Roosevelt and His Times,

~

Chronicle of the Progressive Movement (The CO.ronicles of America Series,
Allen Johnson, ed.), Yale University Press, New :J:aven, Conn., 1921.
was exceedingly pro-Roosevelt; the autnor calls himself
supportera of Theodore Hoosevelt.
· there were many quotations.

11

This

anotner ardent

There were very few foot-notes

alt~·10ugh

Here again, facts were distorted or misinter-

preted to place Roosevelt in tae most favorable light possible.
Finally, I read three books that dealt 1ri. t11 particular phases of
Theodore Roosevelt's history.
Boss Platt and ]is Jew York,

£·

Harold
~

~.

Josnell did a competent piece on

Study of the ?oli tical Leadership of Thomas

Platt, Tneodore Roosevelt and Others, the University of Chicago Press,

Chicago, 1924.
reform.

It was especially helpful in studying tae topic of political

For noosevelt 1 s labor record, particularly as an Assemblyman and as

Governor of Ne'l'r York, IIoward Lawrence Hurwitz, Theodore Roosevelt and Labor
in New York State, 1880-1900, Solumbia University Press, New York, 1943, was
excellent.

It was copiously foot-noted, almost entirely from source materi

It also was

compa:.~atively

free from bias.

Roosevelt and the Progressive

~~ovement

The last book is Theodore

by George 3. r,;owry, University of

r
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'Hisconsin Press, Eadison, Wisconsin,

1946.

manuscript sources and current periodicals.
the rest was commendable.

It is well foot-noted from
Chapter One seemed vreak but

It was objective and treated tne subject quite

comprehensively althoug11 it concerned itself ci1iefly wi t~1 the period after

1909.
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